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Race, Religion, and Attitudes Toward Capital Punishment: A Test of Attribution Theory 
Sheila M. Schlaupitz 
ABSTRACT 
The present study attempts to provide a more thorough understanding of public attitudes toward 
capital punishment.  Two theories are tested toward this end, utilizing a random sample taken from the jury 
pool in Hillsborough County, Florida. 
First, An indirect test of reference group theory demonstrates the degree to which faith group, 
religiosity, and race affect public attitudes toward the death penalty.  Surprisingly, there is little, albeit 
mixed, support for reference group theory as it attempts to explain attitudes toward capital punishment.  
Using the relationships between religion and capital punishment attitudes that we presumed would emerge 
from the test of reference group theory, we developed a processual model to more accurately describe how 
the relationships between religion and capital punishment operates. 
A test of attribution theory provided the vehicle through which this processual model could be 
tested.  Although it seemed that the model was dependent on significant findings between the relationships 
in reference group theory, this was not the case.  Indeed, we found many relationships between certain 
dimensions of religion and capital punishment attitudes that were consistent with previous research.  
Moreover, this piece of research is among the first to examine the effect of possessing a more progressive 
theological emphasis on death penalty attitudes.  It addresses important theoretical and empirical questions 
regarding the direct and indirect relationships between religion and capital punishment attitudes. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Attitudes toward capital punishment have been widely examined for decades, and to some extent, 
public opinion has always influenced debates surrounding the death penalty.  In the decades following the 
1930s, the implications of public opinion on the death penalty have progressed to include establishing 
“evolving standards of decency under the Eight Amendment” (Trop v. Dulles, 1958, p. 101), as well as 
developing conditions under which the death penalty is (Gregg v. Georgia, 1976; Tison v. Arizona, 1987; 
Penry v. Lynaugh, 1989; Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri, 1989) and is not (Furman v. 
Georgia, 1972; Coker v. Georgia, 1977; Lockett v. Ohio, 1978; Enmund v. Florida, 1982; Ford v. 
Wainwright, 1986; Thompson v. Oklahoma, 1988) constitutional.  The leading United States Supreme 
Court cases have maintained that public opinion is a legitimate justification for capital punishment; 
however, the implication remains that if public sentiment shifts to condemn the death penalty, capital 
punishment may then be ruled unconstitutional.  In fact, public opinion may be a necessary circumstance 
for the abolition of capital punishment, as recent case law has reflected the Court’s reluctance to place 
limitations on capital punishment under any circumstances when the public supports it. 
 Early applications of the Eighth Amendment to death penalty decisions permitted capital 
punishment while prohibiting torture and barbaric means of executions (Paternoster, 1991; Vilo and Morris, 
1997).  New York introduced the electric chair in 1890 as a “humane” alternative to the previously 
primitive methods that had been used (Coyne and Entzeroth, 1994).  Since then, states have continued to 
search for more humane methods of execution based on scientific evidence and eyewitness accounts that 
extant methods (hanging, firing squad, electrocution, lethal gas, and lethal injection) cause great suffering 
and slow deaths, thus amounting to cruel and unusual punishment.  The Supreme Court, however, has 
rejected Eighth Amendment claims that any of these methods are cruel and unusual, and all five means of 
execution are still used in the United States (Coyne and Entzeroth, 1994). 
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 Despite the Supreme Court’s refusal to apply Eighth Amendment claims to methods of execution, 
it has endorsed the principle that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause should not be interpreted 
statically (Weems v. U.S., 1910), but rather in light of “evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society” (Trop v. Dulles, 1958, p. 101).  Interestingly, though, Trop’s punishment of 
three years of hard labor, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge from the U.S. 
Army (and consequently, denationalization) was not considered disproportionate to the crime of wartime 
desertion, which was, in fact, punishable by death.  Rather, it was assessed against “a principle of civilized 
treatment guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment” and subsequently barred as a punishment due to its cruel 
and unusual nature.  The Court further ruled that capital punishment could not be declared unconstitutional 
in a time when it was so widely accepted (Trop v. Dulles, 1958, p. 99). 
 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Supreme Court, in light of the Trop decision, clarified and 
refined the implementation of capital punishment, even beyond the scope of  Eighth Amendment 
challenges.  For example, in Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), the Supreme Court held that potential jurors’ 
reservations about capital punishment were insufficient grounds for automatically excluding them from 
sitting on a capital jury.  The Court relied heavily on the belief that jurors reflect “…the conscience of the 
community on the ultimate question of life and death” (p. 519).  This link between the community and the 
penal system is an important indicator of “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.”  Conversely, it was only recently that the Supreme Court held that the refusal to ask 
jurors if they would automatically impose a death sentence, regardless of the facts of the case, was 
inconsistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Morgan v. Illinois, 1992). 
 The issue of the role of juror discretion in capital cases emerged again in 1971 in the consolidated 
cases of Crampton v. Ohio and McGautha v. California.  Although this was a Fourteenth Amendment case 
to which Trop was not directly applied, it was an important pre-cursor to the landmark case of Furman v. 
Georgia, because it addressed the potential arbitrary and capricious sentencing of death row inmates as a 
consequence of unrestricted juror discretion in capital sentencing proceedings.  The Supreme Court rejected 
the claims of McGautha and Crampton, thereby upholding the constitutionality of standardless juries, as 
well as a single capital proceeding to make both guilt and sentencing determinations, the latter of which 
Crampton raised.  The Court reasoned, in part, that despite many challenges to standardless juries that had 
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been presented to state and federal courts, no court had upheld such a challenge.  Because McGautha did 
not address the Eight Amendment question of the constitutionality of capital punishment per se, the de 
facto moratorium which had begun on June 2, 1967 after the execution of Luis Jose Monge in Colorado’s 
gas chamber, remained in effect (Coyne and Entzeroth, 1994).  Within a month of the McGautha decision, 
however, the Supreme Court agreed to hear a group of cases regarding whether the imposition and 
administration of capital punishment violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment, thereby also violating the Fourteenth Amendment (Robinson v. California, 1962).  These 
cases were consolidated under Furman v. Georgia (1972). 
 In a 5 to 4 per curiam decision, the Supreme Court held that the current imposition and 
administration of capital punishment were cruel and unusual due to their arbitrary and capricious nature, 
which, in part, resulted from unguided jury discretion.  Thus, the death penalty statutes of 40 jurisdictions, 
as well as various federal statutory provisions, were effectively voided, and 629 inmates had their death 
sentences commuted (Death Penalty Information Center, 2001a; Coyne and Entzeroth, 1994).  The Court 
stopped short of declaring capital punishment, per se, unconstitutional, thereby freeing states to rewrite 
their statutes to comport with the standards set forth in Furman and essentially establishing a new system of 
capital punishment under which a better judgment on whether it could be constitutionally administered 
could be made. 
 Over the next four years, 35 of the initial 39 states whose statutes had been invalidated rewrote 
them to meet the Furman standards.  Ten states created mandatory death sentences for prescribed crimes, 
reasoning that this policy removed all juror discretion.  Mandatory capital punishment schemes for 
individuals convicted of first degree or felony murder (Woodson v. North Carolina, 1976), individuals 
convicted under a Louisiana statute which imposed an automatic death sentence for all first degree 
murders, but limited that category of offenders to five types of murder (Roberts v. Louisiana, 1976), and 
later for inmates who committed murder while serving a sentence of life without parole (Sumner v. 
Shuman, 1987), were declared unconstitutional. 
 Other states established sentencing guidelines for the judge and jurors, which included the 
consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in making a determination of life or death.  
Three forms of these guided discretion statutes were upheld by the Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia 
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(1976), Jurek v. Texas (1976), and Proffitt v. Florida (1976).  Georgia’s procedural safeguards included the 
specification of ten statutory aggravating circumstances, one of which must be established beyond a 
reasonable doubt for a death sentence to be imposed; no requirement that a mitigating circumstance be 
found for a recommendation of mercy; and an automatic appeal of all death sentences, which included a 
proportionality review.  The statutory provision that was upheld in Jurek v. Texas enumerated five death-
eligible offenses, one of which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt for a death sentence to be 
sought.  Further and contrary to most statutory revisions, Texas established three questions for jurors to 
answer, upon which a sentencing determination would be made: 
1. whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed  
 and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result; 
2. whether there is a possibility that the defendant will commit criminal acts of violence that would 
 constitute a continuing threat to society; and  
3. if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was  
 unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased (Jurek v. Texas, 1976, p. 269). 
 The Supreme Court held that the enumerated offenses constituted the finding of an aggravated 
factor, and the three questions presented to the jury focused on mitigating circumstances in a sufficient 
enough manner for the statute to be constitutional.  Finally, Florida’s revised death penalty statute was 
similar to Georgia’s, except that in Florida, the jury’s verdict is determined by a majority vote, and it is 
only advisory—the trial judge makes the final sentencing determination.  In essence, four procedural 
reforms (consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, bifurcated trial, automatic appellate 
review of convictions and death sentences, and proportionality review), coupled with the Supreme Court’s 
explicit rejection that capital punishment, per se, is unconstitutional, reinstated capital punishment in the 
United States. 
 The years following the Gregg decision (1977 to the present) have been characterized by attempts 
by the Supreme Court to clarify the conditions under which capital punishment is and is not constitutional.  
In comporting with Trop’s requirement that the Eighth Amendment be interpreted in light of “evolving 
standards of decency,” the Supreme Court has consistently relied on indices of public opinion in making its 
determinations. 
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 Within two years of Gregg, the Supreme Court ruled in Coker v. Georgia (1977) that capital 
punishment was disproportionate to the crime of raping an adult woman, and therefore, unconstitutional 
under such circumstances.  Justice White emphasized that only 3 of the 35 states that had rewritten their 
pre-Furman statutes had included rape as a death-eligible crime, and 2 of the 3 statutes were invalidated 
because the death penalty was mandatory.  (When these states rewrote their statutes a second time, neither 
included rape as a death-eligible offense, thus leaving Georgia the sole state to authorize capital 
punishment for the crime of raping an adult woman.)  Further, Justice White noted that juries in Georgia 
had given death sentences to only 6 of 63 convicted rapists since 1973.  Thus, Americans’ “evolving 
standards of decency,” as reflected by legislatures and juries, seemed to suggest that death was an 
impermissible punishment for rape. 
 Five years later, the Supreme Court employed a similar justification of the role of public opinion 
in determining death penalty standards in Enmund v. Florida (1982).  Enmund had driven a getaway car 
following a robbery-murder, and he, like Coker, appealed his death sentence on the grounds that it was 
disproportionate to his involvement in the crime.  Consistent with Coker, the Supreme Court overruled 
Enmund’s death sentence, and again cited public opinion as a basis for its decision.  Specifically, it 
indicated that only 8 of the 36 states with capital punishment statutes permitted the imposition of the death 
penalty for defendants who only participated in robberies that turned into murders.  Moreover, it pointed 
out that only 6 of 362 offenders who had been executed since 1954 were put to death for participating in a 
felony during which an accomplice committed a murder.  Again, these statistics were representative enough 
indicators of public support for the death penalty for the Supreme Court to use them in its justification for 
overturning the death sentence of Earl Enmund. 
 In decisions such as Coker v. Georgia and Enmund v. Florida, the Supreme Court demonstrated 
its ability to exercise discretion when determining the circumstances under which offenders were death-
eligible.  However, even when the Court implemented procedural safeguards against the death penalty, it 
still cited public opinion as a legitimate justification for its decisions. 
 The cautionary approach to death penalty issues was short-lived, as the Supreme Court—arguably 
at the urging of Justice Rehnquist—began to stress the importance of expeditious executions.  Indeed, in 
1985, the majority ruled that every error in the capital sentencing process did not warrant judicial 
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intervention and that the state had a legitimate interest in speeding up the appeals process for death penalty 
cases (Zant v. Stephens, 1983).  Similarly, in Herrerra v. Collins (1993), the Supreme Court held that new 
evidence of innocence, without the presence of other constitutional violations, was not a basis for federal 
courts to order a new trial.  These cases, as well as other death penalty-related cases, reflected the public’s 
overwhelming support for capital punishment throughout the mid 1980s and early 1990s (Bohm, 1991). 
 In 1989, the Supreme Court determined that capital punishment was not a cruel and unusual 
punishment for the mentally retarded (Penry v. Lynaugh), nor was it cruel and unusual for juveniles 16 and 
17 years old (Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri).  Although public opinion was implicit in the 
Supreme Court’s trend toward increasing the imposition of capital punishment during the 1980s, it also 
remained an explicit determinant of its decisions.  For example, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in 
Stanford v. Kentucky, pointed out that there was not public consensus against the execution of 16 and 17 
year olds.  Of the 35 states with capital punishment statutes, 15 did not impose the death penalty for 16 year 
olds, while 12 refused to permit it for 17 year olds.  Thus America’s “evolving standards of decency” did 
not conflict with the execution of 16 and 17 year olds.  The U.S. re-affirmed its endorsement of the 
execution of juveniles when, in the process of ratifying the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights in 1992, which prohibits the death penalty for individuals who committed their crimes when they 
were under 18, it reserved the right to execute juveniles.  (The U.S. is the only country with an outstanding 
reservation to this Covenant, and ten countries have since filed objections to it) (Death Penalty Information 
Center, 2001b). 
Given the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings over the past two decades, which have broadened the 
category of eligible defendants who may be put to death, weakened safeguards against unfair death 
sentences, and sped up the appeals process, it is reasonable to assume that the number and rate of 
executions will increase.  In fact, several U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the mid to late 1990s have 
demonstrated little, if any, constitutional sensitivity with respect to death row inmates’ Sixth (Strickler v. 
Greene, 1999), Eighth (Harris v. Alabama, 1995; O’Dell v. Netherland, 1997; Buchanan v. Angelone, 
1998), and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
   Interestingly and somewhat surprisingly, the turn of the 21st century marked significant changes in 
public opinion toward capital punishment and several major developments in related research, challenges 
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against, and legislation regarding the administration of capital punishment.  The February, 2000 Gallup Poll 
illustrated that support for capital punishment had reached a 19-year low.  This apparent and dramatic shift 
in public opinion was validated by several other polls, which showed that most Americans support a 
moratorium on capital punishment until issues of fairness can be resolved; almost 90 percent support the 
provision of access to DNA evidence in capital trials; and an overwhelming majority of citizens (83%) 
support providing qualified and experienced attorneys to capital defendants (Death Penalty Information 
Center, 2000).  Although there were no prominent death penalty cases decided by the Supreme Court in 
2000, politicians nationwide appear to have responded to the public’s demand that the current system of 
capital punishment be improved.  Notably, the Republican and pro-death penalty Governor of Illinois, 
George Ryan, issued a moratorium on executions in Illinois.  The Florida Supreme Court struck down a bill 
passed by the state legislature that attempted to severely cut the appeals process in capital cases.  Also 
around this time, the Innocence Protection Act was introduced in the U.S. Congress, allowing for the DNA 
testing of all inmates.  This concern over wrongful executions seems to be widespread—on May 11, 2000, 
the establishment of the National Committee to Prevent Wrongful Executions was announced. 
Immediately thereafter, on June 12, 2000, Professor Liebman, a law professor at Columbia 
University released a significant study of death penalty cases, revealing serious mistakes in two-thirds of all 
capital trials.  Concerns over the execution of the mentally retarded and juveniles and racial and regional 
biases were also reflected (e.g., in the American Bar Association’s urge for a moratorium, U.S. Department 
of Justice study, the U.S. Supreme Court granting certiorari to John Paul Penry, Clinton’s six-month 
reprieve to Juan Raul Garza, and the case of Saldano v. Texas, 2000) (Death Penalty Information Center, 
2000).   
The long-term rise in executions since Gregg, combined with the potential increase of juvenile 
executions, the heightened scrutiny of errors in capital trials and the execution of innocents (Radelet, 1992; 
Liebman, 2000) and the blatant systematic biases in the administration of the death penalty (McCleskey v. 
Kemp, 1987) may lead to a shift in public opinion back toward opposition.  Although the events of 2000 
reflect a year of dramatic changes and not a trend, the developments in the beginning months of 2001seem 
to suggest that the shift in public opinion is not idiosyncratic.  Indeed, several states have proposed 
legislation barring executions either for special offender populations like the mentally retarded or 
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altogether, and many states have developed avenues through which inmates sentenced to die may gain 
access to DNA evidence to prove their innocence (see the Death Penalty Information Center’s website for 
more details).  Furthermore, the Supreme Court heard the case of Shafer v. South Carolina, in which it held 
that when future dangerousness is at issue in a capital case, juries must be informed whether a life sentence 
carries the possibility of parole.  Of greater magnitude, the Supreme Court also re-evaluated the case of 
John Paul Penry and determined that one supplemental jury instruction regarding mitigating evidence was 
not compliant with its earlier mandate in Penry I, requiring that the jury be able to consider and give effect 
to mitigating evidence in making a sentencing determination. 
This potential shift in death penalty sentiment has important implications for the standards and 
practices involved in death sentences, since state legislators, as well as the Supreme Court, use public 
opinion as a basis for their decisions.  Thus, it is important to continuously measure public attitudes toward 
capital punishment, in terms of the bases and circumstances for both support for and opposition to the death 
penalty.  Public opinion, particularly toward capital punishment, is significant because the public acts as a 
pressure group on legislatures.  This influence has a direct impact on the creation of law, which, in turn, 
reflects the nature of American society.  This impact of public attitudes thus underscores the importance of 
understanding the process through which these attitudes are shaped.  How is public opinion, especially on 
life and death issues, formed? 
One of the more powerful influences on the development of attitudes toward any given issue is the 
reference group.  Reference groups are, generally, membership groups to which individuals belong 
(Cochran, Chamlin, Beeghley, Harnden, and Blackwell, 1996).  Reference groups include family, 
friendship networks, work groups, or voluntary associations such as religion or faith groups.  In fact, 
religion constitutes a unique social structure through which attitudes toward capital punishment may be 
analyzed.  Specifically, unlike other reference groups, membership in a faith group provides individuals 
with distinct moral messages to which they should subscribe.  The extent to which individuals use their 
religion as a point of reference, moreover, is largely a function of the salience their religion holds for them.  
This may be evidenced by their identification with Biblical and other moral messages delivered by a 
religious official.  Regarding death penalty attitudes, religion may be a basis for arguments from either side, 
as the Bible contains justifications both for and against capital punishment. 
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Confounding the effects of faith group membership and religious salience on death penalty 
attitudes is the variable of race or ethnicity.  For example, Blacks and Hispanics—even those members of 
fundamentalist faith groups—tend to adopt a more progressive theological emphasis than their white 
counterparts.  That is, their faith groups identify with more moderate or liberal social and political beliefs.  
Thus, the effects of faith group and other religious factors on public attitudes toward the death penalty may 
also vary by racial or ethnic group. 
Although reference group theory addresses why we should anticipate the influence of faith group 
and race on attitudes toward capital punishment, it does not address how these groups function to shape 
arguments surrounding the death penalty.  In other words, what processes motivate individuals within and 
across different reference groups to support or oppose capital punishment?  Attribution theory (Heider, 
1958) provides one answer to this question.  Specifically, it posits that people occupy one of two different 
attribution styles with regard to placing blame and/or causation for deviant and criminal behavior.  The first 
is a dispositional attribution style, which is characterized by the belief that crime is chosen.  In other words, 
offenders commit crimes as a result of selfish, but rational, motivations.  A situational attribution style, on 
the other hand, is characterized by the belief that crime is caused by environmental forces (Heider, 1958; 
Young, 1991; Grasmick and McGill, 1994).  Although attribution theory was initially a psychological 
theory of motivation, it has since been applied to criminology.  The concepts of situational and 
dispositional attribution styles reflect the criminological debate between the classical and positivist schools 
of thought (Cullen, Clark, Cullen, and Mathers, 1985).  Specifically, the dispositional position attributes 
blame to the individual offender, thus legitimizing punishment, while the situational attribution style looks 
into the environment for social causes of crime, thereby emphasizing reformation and re-integrative efforts, 
rather than punitive measures (Grasmick and McGill, 1994).  These attribution styles end to reflect 
individuals’ attitudes toward other issues, as well, including support for formal sanctions that are imposed 
by the criminal justice system on offenders.  Specifically, those with a dispositional attribution style are 
more likely to support punitive measures, as they believe that the offenders engaged in crime by their own 
choice and deserved to be punished.  Individuals who possess a situational attribution style, on the other 
hand, are more likely to support rehabilitative efforts, as these tend to be aimed at helping the offender 
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adjust to adverse circumstances that may have contributed to their offending behavior (Cullen et al., 1985; 
Young, 1991). 
Although research has demonstrated empirical support for attribution theory, the question of who 
adopts a dispositional versus situational attribution style remains largely unanswered.  Contemporary 
research has assumed that religious affiliations influence people’s attribution styles, which, in turn, shape 
their correctional attitudes (Carroll and Payne, 1977; Hawkins, 1981; Cullen et al., 1985; Young, 1991; 
Grasmick and McGill, 1994).  Specifically, the doctrines of fundamentalist faith groups promote a 
dispositional attribution style, presumably because they emphasize a strongly literal Biblical interpretation, 
including the Old Testament focus on punishment and facing God’s wrath.  By definition, individuals who 
possess a dispositional attribution style believe that crime is a result of free will, which should then make 
them more likely to support punitive sanctions, such as capital punishment (Grasmick and McGill, 1994).  
Conversely, members of moderate or liberal religious denominations should adopt a situational attribution 
style as a result of their exposure to more tolerant moral messages.  Individuals who possess a situational 
attribution style believe that crime is a function of external forces, and therefore, offenders should be 
treated rather than punished.  Thus, members of non-fundamentalist faith groups should oppose capital 
punishment as a result of their situational attribution styles (Grasmick and McGill, 1994). 
The present study investigates the linkages among race, religion, and attitudes toward capital 
punishment by engaging in several levels of questioning.  Initially, the independent direct effects of race 
and religion on death penalty attitudes are examined to establish whether they, alone, affect individuals’ 
attitudes toward capital punishment.  The processes through which religious teachings direct individuals to 
choose opinions on secular social issues like the death penalty, are then addressed within the framework of 
attribution theory.  We predict that individuals’ attribution styles will be determined by the theological 
emphasis of the faith group to which they subscribe.  However, the strength of this relationship will be 
positively associated with the extent to which individuals identify religion as a salient institution, as well as 
their levels of involvement in their faith groups.   
The nature of the relationship between theological emphasis and attribution style may also be 
affected by race or ethnicity.  Among individuals who identify religion as important and who are highly 
involved in their faith groups, we expect this relationship to play out as follows: fundamentalist 
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denominations typically provide a forum that encourages their members to adopt conservative ideological 
beliefs (and hence, a punitive theological emphasis).  Non-fundamentalist faith groups, on the other hand, 
will likely encourage their members to identify with more moderate or liberal social and political beliefs 
(and hence, adopt a more progressive theological emphasis). 
When race and faith group are considered, we expect white fundamentalists to be the most 
punitive and black non-fundamentalists to be the most progressive in their theological emphases (see Britt, 
1998; Applegate, Cullen, Fisher, and Vander Ven, 2000).  Individuals who possess a punitive theological 
emphasis will also adopt a dispositional attribution style, and individuals who possess a more progressive 
theological emphasis will identify with a situational attribution style.  Individuals’ attribution styles, in 
accordance with attribution theory, should be predictive of their views on crime and justice policies, with 
people possessing a dispositional attribution style supporting more punitive philosophies and respondents 
with a situational attribution style advocating rehabilitative responses to crime.  The final path in the 
attribution theory model reflects a positive association between support for punitive policies and support 
for capital punishment.  Conversely, support for rehabilitative measures should be positively related to 
opposition to the death penalty. 
The purposes of this study, then, are twofold: (1) to examine the impact of race and religion on 
attitudes toward capital punishment, and (2) to test hypotheses derived from attribution theory which 
attempt to account for how religious teachings influence opinions regarding more secular social issues like 
capital punishment. 
The thesis is organized in the following manner.  Chapter Two examines research on public 
attitudes toward capital punishment, focusing on demographic trends and motivations for attitudes toward 
the death penalty.  Chapter Three provides a review of the literature on religion, punitive attitudes, and 
capital punishment support.  Attribution theory provides the framework for this discussion.  Chapter Four 
details the methodology of this study, including the sample and procedure, measurement of the variables, 
and the analytic strategy.  Chapter Five provides the results from the preliminary analysis of the effects of 
race and religion on capital punishment attitudes, and Chapter Six reports the findings from our test of 
attribution theory.  Chapter Seven concludes with a discussion of the findings and their implications. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RESEARCH ON ATTITUDES TOWARD CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
General Trends Over Time 
Although over 19,000 convicted criminals have been executed in the U.S. since the first occurred 
in Virginia in 1608 (Death Penalty Information Center, 2001a), it was not until 1953 that the first major 
American public opinion poll, a Gallup poll, regarding capital punishment was taken (Carroll, 2000).  The 
1953 Gallup Poll revealed that 68 percent of the respondents supported the death penalty for people 
convicted of murder, while 25 percent opposed it.  Support steadily declined through the 1950s and 1960s, 
culminating in an all-time low of 42 percent in 1966 (Bohm, 1991).  That year, 47 percent of Americans 
opposed capital punishment, and 11 percent had no opinion.  Over the next three decades, the public grew 
increasingly punitive (Durham, 1988; Pillsbury, 1989); pro-death penalty sentiments reached new heights 
in 1994 with 80 percent in favor of capital punishment (Carroll, 2000). 
Bohm (1991) observed that since their beginning, the Gallup Polls have revealed two long-term 
and five short-term trends.  The first long-term trend demonstrated that public support for capital 
punishment declined by 28 percent between the years 1953 and 1966.  During that time period, opposition 
increased by 18 percent and the proportion of respondents who did not know or had no opinion grew by 10 
percent (Bohm, 1991).  The trend culminated with a de facto moratorium on executions, beginning in 1967, 
and a de jure moratorium as a result of the historic Furman decision, in which the Supreme Court ruled that 
capital punishment, as it was administered, was unconstitutional.  The second long-term trend began in the 
mid-1960s.  It demonstrated that death penalty support increased by 32 percent between 1966 and 1985, 
while opposition decreased by 28 percent, and the percent of respondents with no opinion declined by 3 
percent (Bohm, 1991; Carroll, 2000).  Indeed, a 1972 Gallup public opinion survey revealed that 50 percent 
of Americans favored capital punishment for individuals convicted of murder.  The percent of individuals 
in 1981 who favored the death penalty had risen to 66 percent, while only 25 percent of the citizenry 
opposed it.  By 1985, support had reached a level of 74 percent, its highest ever, and opposition was at 19 
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percent, its record low.  Between 1985 and 1994, attitudes toward capital punishment varied, with most 
Americans favoring it (70 to 80%) and few opposing it (16 to 22%).  The 1994 poll reflected a new all-time 
high for death penalty support (80%); however, since then, support has steadily declined, and opposition 
has steadily increased.  The year 2000 reflected the closest gap between support and opposition in decades, 
with support at 66 percent, its lowest in decades, and opposition at 27 percent (The Gallup Organization, 
2000).  The shift in public attitudes toward capital punishment that is reflected in the two long-term trends 
is largely a function of the rapid social changes that occurred during the 1960s.  They included the Civil 
Rights movement, student protests, and the due process revolution, all of which may have contributed, to 
varying degrees, to a decrease in the public’s desire to punish offenders.  The social and political climate of 
the 1960s also involved de-industrialization and high levels of crime, drug use, and promiscuity, which 
were reflected in this period of social unrest.  One product of the social unrest of the 1960s was an upward 
shift in punitive attitudes among the public (see McCorkle, 1993). 
Demographic Variation in Public Attitudes Toward Capital Punishment 
 As established above, when Americans are asked questions about the death penalty, the results 
generally reveal high levels of support and low levels of opposition.  Yet, there is considerable evidence of 
variation in public sentiment, particularly when demographic variables are considered (Vidmar and 
Ellsworth, 1974; Bedau, 1982; Zeisel and Gallup, 1989; Bohm, 1991; Young, 1991; Barkan and Cohn, 
1994; Durham, Elrod, and Kinkade, 1996; Borg, 1997).  Assessing how attitudes vary both within and 
across demographic categories may provide insight into the structure and dynamics of capital punishment 
sentiment and thereby reveal knowledge pertaining to “evolving standards of decency” (Trop v. Dulles, 
1957, 101).  Table 1 depicts levels of support for, opposition to, and undecided attitudes toward capital 
punishment, averaged across 21 Gallup Polls conducted between 1953 and 1986, for a variety of 
demographic categories: city size, region of the country, occupation, income, education level, age, gender, 
political party affiliation, race, and religion. 
 Of the 21 Gallup Polls concerning death penalty attitudes taken before 1986, there are data on city 
size for 16.  Residents of cities with over one million people were slightly more likely to support and less 
likely to oppose capital punishment than residents of cities with less than one million people (Bohm, 1991).   
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Table 1. Levels of Support for and Opposition to Capital Punishment by Demographic Variables, Averaged 
Across 21 Gallup Polls, 1953-1986 * 
 
     Support (%) Opposition (%)  Undecided (%) 
 
City Size 
 1 million and over  61%  30%   11% 
 Under 1 million   55-56%  35-36%   8-10% 
 
Region 
 South    55%  36%   10% 
 West    64%  29%   7% 
 East     61%  31%   9% 
 Midwest    58%  34%   9% 
 
Occupation 
 Professional/business  58%  35%   7% 
 Manual    58%  33%   9% 
 Clerical/sales   64%  28%   9% 
 
Income Level 
 High    64%  30%   6% 
 Low    50%  39%   11% 
 
Education Level 
 Grade School Graduate  55%  33%   13% 
 High School Graduate  61%  31%   9% 
 College Graduate   58%  36%   6% 
 
Age 
 Under 30   57%  36%   8% 
 30-49    60%  32%   9% 
 50 and over   60%  30%   11% 
 
Sex 
 Females    53%  37%   10% 
 Males    65%  29%   6% 
 
Political Party 
 Democrat   55%  36%   10% 
 Republican   65%  27%   9% 
 Independent   58%  34%   9% 
 
Race 
 Black    41%  48%   11% 
 White    61%  31%   8% 
 
Religion 
 Catholic    62%  30%   8% 
 Protestant   59%  32%   9% 
 
*Adapted from Bohm, R.M. (1991). American death penalty opinion, 1936-1986: A critical examination of 
the Gallup Polls. In R.M. Bohm (Ed.), The Death Penalty in America: Current Research Cincinatti, OH: 
Anderson. 
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On average, 55 to 56 percent of respondents who resided in cities with populations under one million 
people supported capital punishment, while 35 to 36 percent were opposed.  In cities with over one million 
people, the mean for death penalty support was 61 percent, while the mean for opposition was 30 percent.  
An average of eight to ten percent of respondents in cities with under one million residents and eleven 
percent of respondents in cities with over one million people were undecided (Bohm, 1991).  One 
explanation for the higher levels of support and lower levels of opposition among people in large cities may 
be that crime tends to be concentrated in urban areas.  Thus, urban residents should be more likely to 
support punitive measures that would remove offenders from their streets. 
 Data on region of the country were available for every year of the poll except one (Bohm, 1991).  
Surprisingly, Bohm (1991) found that people residing in the South generally revealed the lowest levels of 
support for and the highest levels of opposition to capital punishment, with means of 55 and 33 percent, 
respectively.  Conversely, the West demonstrated the highest level of support and the lowest level of 
opposition, followed by the East and the Midwest, respectively (Bohm, 1991).  This result contradicts 
expectations, as 60 percent of all executions between 1930 and 1980, and 93 percent in the post-Furman 
era, occurred in the South (Bohm, 1991).  One possible explanation for this anomaly is the high number of 
poor blacks living in the South, where the judiciary is almost all white.  Other explanations have suggested 
that structural racial biases in the execution of blacks in the South may be associated with attitudes toward 
the death penalty (Keil and Vito, 1992; Borg, 1997).  Further, in her analysis of the subculture of 
punitiveness, Borg (1997) determined that the “southern subculture of punitiveness” (p. 41) may only apply 
to certain individuals, particularly the politically conservative, religious fundamentalists, and the racially 
intolerant.  Zeisel and Gallup’s (1989) examination of the 1985 and 1986 polls revealed that the West 
demonstrated the highest level of support for capital punishment, followed by the South, the Midwest, and 
the East, respectively. 
 Among the 20 polls that included information on respondents’ occupations, there was little 
variation between the categories, as the mean percentages for favoring the death penalty were 58 percent 
for both the professional and business and the manual categories and 64 percent for the clerical/sales 
category (Bohm, 1991).  Mean percentages for opposition were 28 percent for clerical/sales, 33 percent for 
manual, and 35 percent for professional and business.  Mean percentages for respondents who did not 
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express an opinion were approximately 9 percent for manual and clerical/sales and 7 percent for 
professional and business (Bohm, 1991).  The low mean level of support for capital punishment among 
workers in manual positions may be explained by the fact that they are comprised of a greater proportion of 
minorities.  Since offenders, particularly those sentenced to death, are members of racial or ethnic 
minorities of lower or working class backgrounds (Flanagan and McCleod, 1983; Baldus, Pulaski, and 
Woodworth, 1983; Eckland-Olsen, 1988; Young, 1991; Dieter, 1993; Bedau, 1997), it seems logical that 
persons in similar positions would be opposed to capital punishment.  The low support and high opposition 
by the wealthy, on the other hand, is likely a function of their higher levels of education, which exposed 
them to more socially and politically liberal viewpoints than less educated individuals would receive. 
 In the 19 polls for which there were data on respondents’ income, individuals in the highest socio-
economic group demonstrated higher levels of support for and lower levels of opposition to capital 
punishment than those people in the lowest income group.  On average, 64 percent of individuals in the top 
income category support capital punishment compared to 50 percent of those in the bottom income 
category (Bohm, 1991).  Relatedly, an average of 30 percent of the individuals in the highest income level 
opposed capital punishment, while an average of 39 percent of individuals in the lowest income level 
opposed it (Bohm, 1991).  Smith (1990) also discovered a consistent relationship between low socio-
economic status and opposition to the death penalty, and he attributed the differentiation to the desire for 
order among the wealthy and perceptions of injustices within the criminal justice system among the poor. 
 Information on respondents’ education was available in 16 of the 21 polls.  With a few exceptions, 
college graduates were the most likely to oppose capital punishment (mean=36%), followed by grade 
school graduates (mean=33%), and high school graduates (mean=31%).  Mean levels of support, on the 
other hand, were 55 percent for grade school graduates, 61 percent for high school graduates, and 58 
percent for college graduates (Bohm, 1991).  The relationship between education level and capital 
punishment attitudes, however, may be spurious (Smith, 1990).  In other words, because high school 
graduates tend to make more money than individuals who did not graduate, the apparent effect of their 
education levels on their attitudes toward capital punishment may actually be a function of their income, as 
income and education tend to be highly correlated.  Although income created a confounding effect between 
grade school graduates and high school graduates, Smith (1990) argued that it suppressed the relationship 
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between high school and college graduates.  That is, because the direct effect of education on support for 
capital punishment is negative for high school and college graduates, but the effects of education on income 
and income on support for capital punishment are both positive, the positive path between income and 
capital punishment suppresses the true negative net effect of education on capital punishment. 
 Two distinct patterns emerged with regard to the effect of age on death penalty sentiment.  Until 
1960, those under 30 were more likely to favor and less likely to oppose the death penalty than people over 
50.  Individuals between 30 and 49 usually fell between the two groups.  After 1960, the trend reversed, 
and respondents over 50 were more likely to support and less likely to oppose the death penalty than 
individuals under 30.  People between the ages of 30 and 49 fell closer to the 50 and over age group 
(Bohm, 1991).  The pattern of death penalty attitudes with regard to age is likely the function of a cohort 
effect.  Individuals who grew up prior to the 1960s (in the under 30 category who exhibited higher levels of 
support for the death penalty) were the same people who aged into the over 50 category following the 
1960s.  Thus, they maintained their support for capital punishment, while their younger counterparts who 
grew up in the 1960s, not surprisingly, exhibited comparatively less favorable attitudes toward the death 
penalty. 
 In all 21 Gallup Polls, as well as in other public opinion polls, the proportion of males who 
favored the death penalty exceeded the proportion of females.  Conversely, a consistently greater 
percentage of females than males opposed the death penalty (Zeisel and Gallup, 1989; Bohm, 1991; 
Ellsworth and Gross, 1994).  There was a 12 percent difference in the mean levels of support for capital 
punishment, with an average of 65 percent of males and 53 percent of females favoring it.  Further, there 
was an 8 percent difference in opposition levels, with an average of 29 percent of males and 37 percent of 
females against the death penalty (Bohm, 1991).  Consistent with earlier polls, the 2000 Gallup Poll 
reflected a 10 percent difference between men’s and women’s support for capital punishment—71 percent 
to 61 percent, respectively (Jones, 2000).  Several scholars have explained gender differences in variation 
toward capital punishment as a function of differences in the socialization process (Smith, 1990; Gelles and 
Strauss, 1976; Vidmar and Miller, 1980).  Females are generally socialized to be empathic, nurturing, kind, 
and understanding, while males are raised to be tough and unfeeling toward other human beings.  These 
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gender roles then tend to be translated to attitudes and behaviors.  Their application to death penalty 
attitudes suggests that males should be more supportive and females more opposed. 
 An evaluation of the Gallup Polls, 19 of which include information on respondents’ political party 
affiliations, demonstrates that Democrats generally exhibited the highest levels of opposition and the lowest 
levels of support; Republicans registered the lowest levels of opposition and the highest levels of support; 
and Independents fell between them (National Opinion Research Center Poll 1972-1977 in Bedau, 1982; 
Bohm, 1991; Jones, 2000).  These trends are not surprising, as Republicans tend to hold both politically and 
socially conservative beliefs, including support for ‘tough on crime’ policies like capital punishment.  The 
year 1957 was unusual, though, as there was only a 2 percent difference between Democrats and 
Republicans for both support for and opposition to the death penalty (Bohm, 1991). 
 Among the demographic variables, racial differences reflected the largest differentials in death 
penalty attitudes (Zeisel and Gallup, 1989; Bohm, 1991).  On average, over the 50-year period, 61 percent 
of whites supported capital punishment, as opposed to 41 percent of blacks.  Thus, there was a 20 percent 
difference in the mean levels of support between whites and blacks.  Regarding opposition, 48 percent of 
blacks were against the death penalty, compared to 31 percent of whites, revealing a 17 percent mean 
difference.  With the exceptions of the years 1953 and 1965, a greater percentage of blacks than whites 
have identified themselves as undecided on the issue of capital punishment (Bohm, 1991).  Barkan and 
Cohn’s (1994) investigation of the sources of racial variation in death penalty support showed that white 
support for capital punishment was associated with prejudice against blacks.  Young (1991), on the other 
hand, found that whites’ disbelief that poverty causes crime influenced their support for capital punishment, 
while black opposition to the death penalty was associated with their distrust in the police.  This was 
consistent with expectations, as punitive sanctions, including death sentences, have been disproportionately 
unfavorable for blacks (Radelet, 1981; Baldus et al., 1983; Radelet and Pierce, 1985; Eckland-Olsen, 
1988). 
 In 17 Gallup Polls, there was information on respondents’ religions.  Only in 1965 did more 
Catholics than Protestants favor the death penalty—there were no differences between these faith groups in 
any other year (Bohm, 1991).  An average of 59 percent of Protestants and 62 percent of Catholics favored 
capital punishment, while 33 percent of Protestants and 30 percent of Catholics opposed it.  About 8 
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percent of both groups were undecided (Bohm, 1991).  The apparent similarities between faith groups in 
their attitudes toward the death penalty were probably a function of measurement error, specifically 
combining all Protestants into one category, as well as ignoring differences in the strength of respondents’ 
religious convictions.  More valid measures may be needed because of ideological differences between 
fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist members of the same denomination that would not appear in faith 
groups.  The difference between Catholics and Protestants in 1965 may have been a consequence of 
Kennedy’s assassination, as Kennedy was Catholic (Bohm, 1991). 
 Although there are some inconsistencies, overall trends reflect a pattern of support for and 
opposition to capital punishment.  Specifically, whites, Protestants, Republicans, males, the relatively 
undereducated, residents of large cities, persons who live in the South, and people who have a lot of money 
tend to support the death penalty.  Non-protestants, liberals, females, individuals who are relatively well-
educated, residents of smaller cities, people who reside outside the South and the West, and people who do 
not have a lot of money are more likely to possess unfavorable attitudes toward capital punishment.  
Although such patterns are interesting and important, the sources of support for and opposition to capital 
punishment are necessary to provide a more comprehensive understanding of public opinion toward the 
death penalty. 
Motivations for Attitudes Toward the Death Penalty 
 It is necessary to understand the demographic variations in levels of support for and opposition to 
capital punishment, but this, alone, is not sufficient for a clear, comprehensive picture of public sentiment 
toward the death penalty in America, as only 8 percent of the variance in death penalty opinions has been 
explained by demographic variables (Fox, Radelet, and Bonsteel, 1991).  Another issue that needs to be 
addressed is the motivation behind the attitudes—why and under what circumstances do Americans support 
or oppose capital punishment?  The four major punishment philosophies (deterrence, incapacitation, 
retribution, and rehabilitation) provide possible rationales for the variation in capital punishment attitudes.  
Deterrence and incapacitation, which combined have been called utilitarian philosophies (Thomas and 
Foster, 1975; Zeisel and Gallup, 1989) and retribution are generally viewed as sources of support for 
capital punishment (Vidmar and Ellsworth, 1974; Tyler and Weber, 1982; Warr and Stafford, 1984; Zeisel 
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and Gallup, 1989; Cook, 1998), while support for rehabilitation has been associated with anti-death penalty 
sentiments (Warr and Stafford, 1984). 
 The deterrence philosophy of punishment seeks to reduce crime by using the offender as an 
example to make potential offenders realize that the cost of the punishment outweighs any potential 
benefits s/he may receive from committing the crime.  Such a realization, according to deterrence theory, 
occurs when the punishment is certain, severe, and swift.  Although there has not been definitive evidence 
supporting the deterrent value of capital punishment, several scholars have argued that the opposite, a 
brutalization effect, occurs (Cochran, Chamlin, and Seth, 1994; see also Paternoster, 1991 for a thorough 
discussion of this issue).  In spite of evidence to the contrary, deterrence is a frequent and primary reason 
people have cited for supporting capital punishment (Vidmar and Ellsworth, 1974; Tyler and Weber, 1982; 
Warr and Stafford, 1984; Zeisel and Gallup, 1989). 
 Several opinion polls have assessed public belief in the deterrent value of capital punishment.  A 
1972 poll conducted in Texas asked whether respondents believed fewer murders would be committed if 
individuals who were sentenced to death were actually executed.  Most of the sample (52%) said yes; 36 
percent said no; and 12 percent said they did not know (Vidmar and Ellsworth, 1974).  Likewise, among 
individuals in a 1973 Iowa poll who supported the restoration of the death penalty, 44 percent believed in 
its deterrent value (Vidmar and Ellsworth, 1974).  One comprehensive effort toward determining 
motivations for death penalty support was undertaken in the 1973 Harris Survey.  Fifty-six percent of the 
entire sample agreed that capital punishment was a more effective deterrent than life imprisonment; 32 
percent disagreed.  Among supporters of capital punishment, the percent of individuals who believed it was 
a better deterrent than life in prison rose to 76 percent, and among opponents, the level of agreement 
dropped to 29 percent (Vidmar and Ellsworth, 1974).  Thus, there appears to be some evidence of an 
association between belief in deterrence and support for capital punishment. 
 A study in Volusia County, Florida illustrated the complex nature of support for utilitarianism in 
general as a primary source of favorable attitudes toward the death penalty (Thomas and Foster, 1975).  
Thomas and Foster (1975) considered the interdependence of respondents’ perceptions of increasing crime 
rates, fear of victimization, willingness to employ punitive sanctions, and belief in deterrence, and they 
determined that the rising crime rate, coupled with fear of victimization and belief in the effectiveness of 
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punishment led to an increased willingness to employ measures of punitiveness, such as the death penalty 
(see also Vidmar and Ellsworth, 1974). 
 Interestingly, Tyler and Weber (1982) found that although authoritarianism was the strongest 
predictor of capital punishment support, the interaction between fear of crime and belief in deterrence was 
an additional explanatory variable.  Overall, however, their results indicated that symbolic political and 
social beliefs were more influential on attitudes toward the death penalty than instrumental beliefs, such as 
fear of crime and belief in deterrence.  Nevertheless, these symbolic attitudes were, themselves, the major 
source of the belief in deterrence (Tyler and Weber, 1982). 
 Results of these studies suggest that the belief in the efficacy of deterrence explains at least some 
of the variation in death penalty support, although further research is necessary to establish more definite 
conclusions.  Indeed, there is some evidence to refute earlier indications that belief in deterrence is related 
to public attitudes toward the death penalty.  For example, Ellsworth and Ross (1983) found that the 
majority of individuals would maintain their positions on capital punishment, even if they were wrong 
about its deterrent value.  Likewise, Gallup polls in 1985 and 1986 revealed that support for the death 
penalty was not a function of individuals’ beliefs in its deterrent value.  More recently, a 2000 Gallup Poll 
asked Americans who supported capital punishment why they favored it—of the 12 available responses, 
deterrence ranked third, but only 8 percent of respondents cited it as a basis for their support (The Gallup 
Organization, 2000). 
Incapacitation generally has not been found to be a primary basis of support for capital 
punishment; however, its importance may be underestimated in studies of public opinion (Bedau, 1997).  
Sixteen percent of death penalty supporters in one study indicated it as a reason (Zeisel and Gallup, 1989), 
and only 20 percent in another named it as the principal goal of punishment (Warr and Stafford, 1984).  A 
2000 Gallup Public Opinion Poll illustrated that incapacitation is a relatively low priority for death penalty 
supporters—it ranked seventh out of the twelve bases for support provided in the response options—and 
only 4 percent indicated that it was a reason for their support (The Gallup Organization, 2000).  Gibbs 
(1978) ascertained that the incapacitation argument, as a basis for the implementation of the death penalty, 
would be effective only to the extent that it recognized that capital punishment must be imposed frequently 
and that the crime being punished was of a repetitive nature.  
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 Bowers (1993), on the other hand, argued that the prevalence of incapacitation in forming death 
penalty attitudes was overlooked due to the failure among researchers to include alternatives to capital 
punishment.  Indeed, several opinion polls across the U.S. have shown that although between 70 and 80 
percent of the population endorsed the death penalty for murderers, less than 33 percent did so when life 
without parole plus restitution (LWOP+R) was an option (Bowers, 1990; Paternoster, 1991).  Zeisel and 
Gallup (1989) found similar results in their study: 71 percent of the sample favored capital punishment, but 
19 percent would oppose it if LWOP was an available alternative.  Further, they found that 16 percent of 
their respondents would oppose capital punishment if they were convinced that it was not a deterrent, and 
among those who initially expressed opposition to capital punishment (21%), 4 percent would favor it if 
they were convinced that it was a deterrent (Zeisel and Gallup, 1989).  Bowers (1993) also found that 
including a stipulation that the murderer would work in prison to provide monetary compensation for the 
victim’s family further decreased support for capital punishment.  Thus, there seems to be support for the 
argument that death penalty responses change when alternatives are provided. 
 As deterrence and incapacitation contribute to the social goal of reducing crime, retributive 
sentiments are a reflection of moral guidelines (Bedau, 1997).  Whereas most research has acknowledged 
the importance of retribution in shaping arguments for the death penalty (Vidmar and Ellsworth, 1974; 
Warr and Stafford, 1984; Zeisel and Gallup, 1989; Paternoster, 1991), Bedau (1997) refuted it, both as a 
punishment goal and as a legitimate basis for the support of capital punishment.  He argued that the death 
penalty does not rectify anything and, therefore, the notion of retribution should be banned.  He further 
contended that confident judgments regarding the offender and the context of the crime, which should have 
implications on the imposed sentence, can only be made when the individual’s situation is objectively 
considered and not clouded by anger and other such emotions. 
 Relatedly, Justice Marshall contended in his dissent in Gregg v. Georgia that there are two types 
of retribution, both of which are constitutionally and morally inadequate.  First, he addresses the claim that 
the death penalty is necessary because it pre-empts the citizenry from seeking private vengeance, and states 
that capital punishment clearly does not accomplish this result.  Second, he considers the purely retributive 
justification of capital punishment, which states that the death penalty is morally acceptable because it ends 
the lives of convicted murderers.  Justice Marshall opined that the notion that society can make and carry 
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out the judgment that a murderer deserves to die is proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.  After all, the 
Eighth Amendment protects human dignity, for which capital punishment has at its very roots the total 
denial. 
 Nonetheless and contrary to Bedau (1997) and Justice Marshall, most of the research, as well as 
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, have established citizens’ willingness to endorse 
retribution as a primary basis of support for the death penalty (Vidmar and Ellsworth, 1974; Gregg v. 
Georgia, 1976; Warr and Stafford, 1984; Zeisel and Gallup, 1989; Ellsworth and Gross, 1994; Cook, 
1998).  Whereas deterrence was once a more socially acceptable justification for capital punishment than 
retribution (Vidmar and Ellsworth, 1974; Thomas and Foster, 1975), social norms have changed and 
retribution is now seen as a legitimate reason to support the death penalty (Warr and Stafford, 1984; Fox et 
al., 1991).  Consistent with this logic, lex talionis has been cited more frequently than deterrence among 
proponents of the death penalty since 1981 (Ellsworth and Gross, 1994).  Results from the 1973 Harris 
Survey revealed a figure as high as 81 percent of the sample who agreed with statements measuring 
retribution as the basis for their support of capital punishment (Vidmar and Ellsworth, 1974).  A Seattle 
Survey also showed overwhelming favor for retribution as the primary sentencing goal with regard to the 
death penalty (Warr and Stafford, 1984).  There was a 22-percentage point difference between retribution 
and the next most popular sentiment, incapacitation.  Although retribution did not receive support from the 
majority of the sample (42%), two-thirds of the respondents ranked it as one of their top three choices 
(Warr and Stafford, 1984).  Forty-eight percent of the sample in the 1985 Gallup Poll reported retribution 
as the primary reason for their approval of capital punishment, with 30 percent citing their belief in the 
philosophy “an eye for an eye” and an additional 18 percent naming just deserts—i.e., murderers deserve to 
be executed (Paternoster, 1991).  “An eye for an eye” or “fits the crime” was the number one reason given 
by death penalty supporters for their positions on capital punishment in a 2000 Gallup Poll.  An additional 
13 percent of supporters cited reasons related to retribution, as well: “fair punishment” (6%), “they deserve 
it” (5%), and “serve justice” (2%) (The Gallup Organization, 2000). 
 Although punitiveness as a symbolic (versus instrumental) response to crime does not entirely 
coincide with retribution, the two concepts parallel each other in many ways, particularly in that both 
involve the desire to punish the offender based upon the gravity of the offense and without concern for the 
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crime control potential of the sanctions (Thomas and Foster, 1975; Tyler and Weber, 1982).  Analyses of 
the instrumental and symbolic responses to crime typically include fear of victimization (Thomas and 
Foster, 1975; Stinchcombe, Adams, Heimer, Schepple, Smith, and Taylor, 1980), which is associated with 
the deterrence goal of reducing the crime rate and, thus, considered an instrumental response to crime.  
These studies also tend to include measures of dogmatic or authoritarian personality, which are associated 
with having a punitive orientation, thereby making it a symbolic response to crime.  Tyler and Weber 
(1982) tested the symbolic approach, specifically hypothesizing that authoritarianism would be associated 
with harsher punishments, including executions.  The results were consistent with their hypotheses, as 
authoritarianism was the strongest predictor of death penalty support (Tyler and Weber, 1982). 
 Cook (1998) expanded this body of research by measuring desire to punish with opinions 
regarding the death penalty and abortion.  She found that individuals who favored capital punishment and 
opposed abortion displayed more punitive sentiments than respondents who were against capital 
punishment but in favor of a woman’s choice to have an abortion (Cook, 1998).  A more in-depth analysis 
of variables related to the just deserts philosophy demonstrated that gender (males 2.4 times more likely 
than females), punitiveness toward sinners (almost twice as likely), political conservativism (1.8 times 
more likely), and opposition to euthanasia and suicide (1.78 greater odds) were statistically significant 
correlates of retributive opinion (Cook, 1998). 
 Whereas attitudes favorable toward punitive policies, including the death penalty, reflected 
support for the deterrence, incapacitation, and retributive sentencing philosophies, non-punitive sentiments 
were associated with the rehabilitative doctrine (Warr and Stafford, 1984; Applegate et al., 2000).  Warr 
and Stafford (1984, p. 102) found that rehabilitation was a secondary, yet important, goal of punishment, as 
less than 20 percent of their sample identified it as a primary goal, but 59 percent ranked it in the top three.  
Education level and age were significantly related to goals of punishment, such that as education level 
increased, support for punitive philosophies decreased, and older respondents were significantly more 
likely to employ the retributive doctrine than younger ones (Warr and Stafford, 1984). 
 Many other studies have brought to light dimensions of public opinion that are not purely punitive, 
but rather support the commitment of understanding and resources toward addressing the sources of 
offending behavior (Cullen, Cullen, and Wozniak, 1988; Gottfredson and Taylor, 1985; Skovron, Scott, and 
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Cullen, 1988).  Cullen, Skovron, Scott, and Burton (1990), however, were among the first to investigate 
support for punitive versus rehabilitative measures for different offenses.  They asked respondents whether 
they believed rehabilitation would be helpful for violent, non-violent, juvenile, and adult offenders and 
found that individuals tended to believe less in rehabilitation for adult and violent offenders than for 
juvenile and non-violent offenders.  McCorkle (1993) further developed this line of research, examining 
how support for punitive and rehabilitative measures varied across six offenses (robbery, rape, molestation, 
burglary, drug sale, and drug possession).  They found that, although respondents expressed a high degree 
of punitiveness regardless of the crime, they were significantly more punitive toward offenders who 
committed crimes against people and less so toward non-violent and drug offenders (primarily burglary and 
drug possession). 
 Few studies have been conducted on the relationship between public support for rehabilitation and 
support for capital punishment.  Applegate et al. (2000) undertook an investigation that indirectly examined 
this relationship.  Specifically, they examined the link between possessing a forgiving theological emphasis 
and correctional attitudes.  They found that individuals who held a forgiving theological emphasis were 
more supportive of rehabilitation and less punitive than others; they were also less likely to support capital 
punishment.  These findings seem to suggest that there is an association between support for rehabilitation 
and opposition to the death penalty. 
 Although deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution have all been associated with support for 
capital punishment, their independent explanatory power has varied over time.  Deterrence and retribution 
have been consistently cited with greater frequency than incapacitation as a motivation for support for 
capital punishment.  Until the early 1980s, deterrence was the most common justification for support for 
the death penalty; however, as research steadily invalidated the deterrence argument (Cochran et al., 1994), 
and as retribution became more socially acceptable (Fox et al., 1991), it has been the most frequently cited 
reason for supporting capital punishment.  Understanding motivations for public attitudes toward the death 
penalty is necessary; however, it may not be sufficient for a clear and comprehensive view of public 
sentiment toward the death penalty in America.  Another issue that needs to be addressed is the specific 
circumstances under which Americans support or oppose capital punishment. 
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Changes in the Question Wording of the Dependent Variable 
 Recent literature has increasingly focused on question wording and specific circumstances under 
which support for capital punishment wavers or strengthens to acquire a more comprehensive 
understanding of public attitudes toward the death penalty in America.  Although some research has 
concluded that question wording was a largely insignificant determinant of capital punishment support 
(e.g., Bedau, 1997), most scholars agree that there is high variation in levels of support, depending on the 
context of the question (Vidmar and Ellsworth, 1974; Zeisel and Gallup, 1989; Paternoster, 1991; Durham 
et al., 1996; Borg, 1998).  Question wording varied in specificity according to the purpose of each study.  
The 1953 and 1965 Gallup polls asked about favoring the death penalty for women and juveniles, 
respectively, and found that 68 percent of the population favored capital punishment in 1953, and 65 
percent favored it for women.  Forty-five percent of the population favored capital punishment for murder 
in 1965, but only 23 percent favored it for juveniles (Vidmar and Ellsworth, 1974).  A Minnesota Poll 
conducted in May, 1973 revealed that 49 percent of the sample favored a mandatory death sentence for the 
murder of a law enforcement officer, 59 percent supported it when a kidnapper or hijacker killed someone, 
58 percent for the assassination of a federal official, and 39 percent in the cases of crimes against the 
federal government (Vidmar and Ellsworth, 1974).  The Harris Survey, conducted in June, 1973, concluded 
that support for a mandatory death sentence under a variety of circumstances was never higher than 41 
percent (Vidmar and Ellsworth, 1974; Bedau, 1982).  The difference between the Minnesota Poll and the 
Harris Survey was response options—in the Minnesota Poll, respondents had to choose either yes or no; 
whereas, in the Harris Survey, the response options “depends” and “not sure” appeared (Vidmar and 
Ellsworth, 1974).  The June, 2000 Gallup Poll revealed that most Americans who support capital 
punishment (37%) do so “with reservations,” while an almost equal percentage support it “without 
reservations” (28%) as oppose it (26%) (Jones, 2000). 
 A second major issue regarding response options was the inclusion of life without parole (plus 
restitution sometimes added: LWOP, LWOP+R).  Several opinion polls across the United States have 
shown that although between 70 and 80 percent of the population endorsed the death penalty for murderers, 
less than 33 percent did so when LWOP+R was an option (Bowers, 1990; Paternoster, 1991).  Zeisel and 
Gallup (1989) found similar results in their study: 71 percent of the sample favored capital punishment, but 
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19 percent would oppose it if LWOP was available.  A Gallup Poll conducted in August and September, 
2000 reported that when “life imprisonment with absolutely no possibility of parole” was an option, 
support for the death penalty fell from 67 percent to 49 percent (Carroll, 2000). 
 Given the recent media attention to the arbitrary and discriminatory application of capital 
punishment, as well as the potential execution of innocents (particularly the execution of Texas inmate 
Gary Graham), a Gallup Poll conducted in June, 2000 asked Americans whether they believed the death 
penalty is applied fairly.  Results showed that 51 percent believe it is applied fairly, while 41 percent do not 
believe it is applied fairly.  Further, among individuals who believe it is applied fairly, an overwhelming 
majority (86%) support capital punishment.  On the other hand, persons who believe it is applied unfairly 
are divided—47 percent oppose it, and 44 percent support it, suggesting that there is a strong correlation 
between belief in the fairness of capital punishment and favorable attitudes toward it (Jones, 2000).  Similar 
to the 2000 Gallup Survey findings, a nationwide NBC/Wall Street Journal Poll reported that 42 percent of 
respondents supported a moratorium on capital punishment until questions about its fairness were resolved; 
42 percent did not believe that America’s current system of capital punishment was administered fairly.  
Relatedly, a 2000 Newsweek Poll indicated that 82 percent of respondents believe that states should make 
it easier for death row inmates to introduce evidence that could prove their innocence—even if it meant 
delaying the death penalty process (Death Penalty Information Center, 2001c).  (Recall that the Supreme 
Court prohibited new evidence of actual innocence without the introduction of at least one other 
constitutional issue in federal post-conviction proceedings in Herrerra v. Collins). 
 Another method of questioning respondents about support or opposition to the death penalty is the 
factorial survey.  The structure of the factorial survey is such that variables are built into vignettes by 
randomly varying the specific values of these factors.  Durham et al. (1996), for instance, used 2 versions 
of 17 homicide scenarios to determine the level of support for capital punishment.  They found that the 
version of the homicide, which was a proxy measure for aggravating and mitigating circumstances, was a 
significant predictor of level of support for the dependent variable in 6 of the vignettes.  When they ranked 
the 34 vignettes, degrees of support ranged from 24.4 percent to 93.2 percent.  They additionally found that 
only 5.2 percent of the respondents opposed the death penalty under all conditions, while 13.1 percent 
endorsed it in every vignette (Durham et al., 1996).  Thus, there appears to be overwhelming support for 
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the argument that question wording and response options significantly affect public attitudes toward capital 
punishment. 
 Over the past 50 years, capital punishment attitudes have been the subject of major public opinion 
polls, as well as scholarly endeavors in the field of criminology.  Although there has clearly been a 
progression in the understanding of public attitudes toward the death penalty, particularly with regard to 
demographic correlations and bases of support, the origins of these beliefs remain unclear.  Some research 
has suggested that the source of death penalty attitudes may be rooted in religion.  Chapter Three discusses 
the extant literature on religion, including the role of race in religion, and how they affect public attitudes 
toward capital punishment. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RELIGION, RACE, AND SUPPORT FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
 Until recently, research on religion and punitive attitudes made only crude distinctions between 
faith groups, particularly between Protestants, Catholics, and Jews (e.g., Blumstein and Cohen, 1980; Tyler 
and Weber, 1982; Bohm, 1991).  Results of this research have largely reported that religion did not affect 
punitive attitudes.  For example, 16 of 17 Gallup polls taken prior to 1995 indicated that Protestants and 
Catholics were not significantly different from one another on their attitudes toward capital punishment.  
No data were provided for Jews, members of other religions, or non-affiliates.  Although Blumstein and 
Cohen (1980) found that Catholics, Protestants, and Jews were more punitive than individuals with no 
affiliation, they also did not find significant differences among these faith groups.  Consistent with previous 
findings, Tyler and Weber (1982) found no effect of religious affiliation on attitudes toward the death 
penalty. 
 Recent studies have broken this pattern in favor of a more in-depth examination of the effects of 
religion on death penalty sentiments.  Grasmick, Davenport, Chamlin, and Bursik (1992) contended that it 
is because of the strong punitive overtones in Judeo-Christian teachings and their belief in a literal 
interpretation of the Bible that Protestant fundamentalists are attracted to the retributive punishment 
philosophy.  Their hypothesis was supported, as fundamentalist Protestants were significantly more likely 
to support the retribution doctrine than liberal/moderate Protestants, Catholics, and individuals with no 
religious affiliation.  These differences were maintained when the effects of religious salience and socio-
demographic variables were controlled.  The differences between fundamentalists and liberal/moderate 
Protestants and Catholics, however, became non-significant when the effect of a measure of Biblical 
literalness was controlled, thereby suggesting that Biblical literalness rendered a statistical association 
between faith group and support for retribution that is causally spurious.  Although the distinction between 
fundamentalists and moderates/liberals is an improvement in the measure of Protestantism, Grasmick et al. 
(1992) maintain some of the measurement crudeness in earlier studies both by failing to consider Jews in 
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their analyses and by lumping liberal and moderate Protestants into one category when there may be 
notable differences in their social and political attitudes. 
 In a follow-up study, Grasmick, Cochran, Bursik, and Kimpel (1993a) examined the effects of 
religious affiliation on levels of support for five punitive justice policies that included juvenile and adult 
death penalty, harsh courts, stiffer laws, and police use of deadly force.  They found that liberal/moderate 
Protestants were significantly less retributive than evangelical/fundamentalist Protestants on every justice 
preference item, except police use of deadly force.  Catholics fell between these two groups on the same 
four items; however, the only relationship that attained significance was that they were more likely to 
support juvenile executions than liberal/moderate Protestants, but less likely than 
evangelical/fundamentalist Protestants (Grasmick et al., 1993a).  Again, Jews were not considered in the 
analyses, and liberal and moderate Protestants were combined into one group. 
 Unlike previous research, Britt (1998) found no effect of membership in a fundamentalist church 
on death penalty support.  He suggests three possible reasons for this finding.  The first is due to different 
measures of death penalty support.  Rather than dichotomize death penalty attitudes into favorable or 
unfavorable responses, Britt used five Likert-scale response options, ranging from strongly oppose to 
strongly favor capital punishment.  Secondly, the non-significance of the effect of fundamentalism on death 
penalty support may be the result of differences in measures of religious affiliation, as Britt (1998) 
compared fundamentalist Protestants with one other category, which included all other mainstream faith 
groups, rather than separating out moderate/liberal Protestants, Catholics, and Jews.  A third possibility 
could be that the non-significance of the effect of fundamentalism on support for capital punishment was 
actually a function of differences between black and white fundamentalists’ views.  In other words, 
fundamentalist Protestants tend to be more proscriptive (i.e., intolerant or prohibitive) than non-
fundamentalists, which make them more likely to align with a conservative social agenda, including issues 
such as pornography, drinking, and abortion.  Non-fundamentalists, on the other hand, tend to be attracted 
to a more liberal social agenda, which includes civil rights, the environment, and other social justice 
concerns (Hall, 1997).  However, blacks tend to hold more liberal views than whites.  Thus, a distinction 
must be made between black and white fundamentalists. 
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 There is reason to believe that there are substantive racial differences between faith groups, 
particularly when Blacks and Hispanics are compared to whites (Britt, 1998).  The uniqueness of African 
American religion is rooted in its history, particularly slavery.  Religion was multi-functional for blacks, as 
it was the only permissible means through which they could seek relief from oppression, while also trying 
to realize the goals of freedom and equality through protest and action (Washington, 1964).  The common 
suffering of blacks during the Nineteenth Century, from which their religion was established, has created a 
unity that still prevails today. 
 Here and there this folk religion may be identifiable with a given congregation, 
 yet wherever and whenever the suffering is acute, it transcends all religious 
 and socio-economic barriers which separate Negroes from Negroes.  There 
 are Negroes who are Protestants, there are Negroes who are Christians, there  
 are Negroes in churches….There are Negro religious institutions which  
 developed out of the folk religion.  And it is this historical folk religion which 
 unites all Negroes in a brotherhood which takes precedence over their 
 individual pattern for the worship of god, or the lack thereof.  The root of 
 this folk religion…is racial unity for freedom and equality.  Every ecclesiastical 
 expression of Negro congregations and institutions is but a variation or  
 frustration of this theme (Washington, 1964: 30-31). 
Accordingly, blacks should function differently than whites in their religious institutions.  Specifically, they 
should possess different styles of worship, receive different moral messages, and emphasize different 
dimensions of religiosity than whites. 
 Hispanics, like blacks, have a cultural experience that creates a unique context through which they 
recognize and synthesize cultural, social, and religious goals.  The major themes in Hispanic ministry 
reflect their group struggles: (1) inculturation or evangelization of culture; (2) the promotion of social 
justice or structural transformation; (3) modernity and secularization; (4) popular Catholicism/religiousness 
( Dolan and Deck, 1994).  The goal of evangelizing is conceived of as both personal conversion and 
structural change, and although there has been a bifurcation among religious leaders, many agree that 
personal conversions must occur in order for more just and humane structures to be built.  The less 
emphasized, but important goal of social conversion is also contained in the first theme under inculturation.  
This is a particularly difficult goal to realize, as it requires a critical cultural consciousness, which is 
inhibited both by the ontology of American individualism and by the Hispanics’ negative attitudes and 
stereotypes of the oppressive American culture.  Structural change remains an ideal in Hispanic ministry, 
but it remains largely ignored, particularly when the clergy is Hispanic, which is often the case.  Hispanics 
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are suspicious and uncomfortable with politics in the U.S., and thus, social teachings of the church remain 
largely uncommunicated.  The goals of modernization and secularization may only be achieved through 
dialogue between Anglican and Hispanic cultures and through a critical reading of the Gospel, while 
simultaneously  recognizing that the world is entering a post-modern era.  In other words, a resolution must 
be made between traditional role perceptions and contemporary American values (e.g., progress and 
egalitarianism) (Dolan and Deck, 1994).  Because of their unique group experience, Hispanics are more 
likely to use religious faith groups to achieve different purposes than either whites or blacks, but 
particularly whites.  Thus, they are likely to receive different moral messages and emphasize different 
facets of religiosity than other races and ethnicities.  With regard to capital punishment, Hispanics, like 
blacks, will likely be supportive of social justice concerns, thereby making them less likely to support the 
death penalty than whites.  This should occur equally across their faith group memberships, although 
Hispanics who are part of moderate and non-proscriptive faith groups should be less likely to support 
capital punishment than Hispanics who are members of fundamentalist faith groups. 
 In addition to social scientific research conducted on the effects of race and religion on attitudes 
toward capital punishment, various faith groups have also set forth, in position papers and formal doctrines, 
their official stances on issues such as capital punishment.  In the 1970s, numerous Christian groups 
supported capital punishment, perhaps the most notable being the National Association of Evangelicals 
(NAE), which represented more than 10 million conservative Christians and 47 denominations and the 
Moral Majority.  The Christian Coalition, NAE’s successor, has maintained its support for capital 
punishment, as well (Death Penalty Information Center, 2001b).  Currently, the Southern Baptist Church, 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, Seventh Day Adventists, and Fundamentalist and Pentecostal churches are 
among the only religious groups that continue to take a stand in favor of the death penalty.  Ironically, the 
American Lutheran Church (different from the Lutheran Church in America) has issued a statement in 
favor of capital punishment, contending that there is scriptural support for the state’s right to execute its 
citizens and that death is a necessary sentence to maintain order in society (“Capital Punishment: What the 
Religious Community Says”).  To the contrary, the Jewish faith, the Roman Catholic Church, and most 
Protestant denominations including Baptists, Episcopalians, Lutherans, Methodists, Presbyterians, and the 
United Church of Christ, have spoken out against capital punishment (“Capital Punishment: What the 
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Religious Community Says;” Death Penalty Information Center, 2001b; 2001d).  These documents 
comport with the conclusions established in extant research. 
 Given these official positions and supporting literature, the following testable hypothesis has been 
derived: 
1. As religious conservativism increases, support for capital punishment will increase. 
Relatedly, the current study also examines the interactive effects of religion and race on capital  
punishment attitudes.  With this in mind, the following predictions have been developed, consonant with 
Britt’s (1998) findings: 
2. As religiosity increases, the effect of religious conservativism on capital punishment support 
will increase. 
 
3. Across faith groups, support for capital punishment will be greater among whites than among 
Blacks and Hispanics. 
 
4. Among whites, as religiosity increases, the effect of religious conservativism on capital 
punishment support will increase. 
 
5. Among Blacks and Hispanics, as religiosity increases, the effect of religious conservativism 
on capital punishment support will remain unchanged. 
 
 
Attribution Theory 
 Although several studies have addressed why we should anticipate racial/ethnic and faith group 
differences in attitudes toward capital punishment, they fail to fully explore the underlying processes 
through which religion may shape attitudes for and against capital punishment.  Attribution theory provides 
such an explanation.  Specifically, it posits that people occupy one of two different attribution styles with 
regard to placing blame and/or causation for deviant and criminal behavior.  The first is a dispositional 
attribution style, which is characterized by the belief that crime is chosen.  In other words, offenders 
commit crimes as a result of selfish, but rational motivations.  A situational attribution style, on the other 
hand, is characterized by the belief that crime is caused by environmental forces (Heider, 1958; Young, 
1991; Grasmick and McGill, 1994).  Although attribution theory was initially a psychological theory of 
motivation, it has since been applied to criminology.  The concepts of situational and dispositional 
attribution styles reflect the criminological debate between the classical and positivist schools of thought 
(Cullen et al., 1985).  Specifically, the dispositional position attributes blame to the individual offender, 
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thus legitimizing punishment, while the situational attribution style looks into the environment for social 
causes of crime, thereby emphasizing reformation and re-integrative efforts, rather than punitive measures 
(Shaver, 1975; Grasmick and McGill, 1994).  These attribution styles tend to reflect individuals’ attitudes 
toward other issues, as well, including support for formal sanctions that are imposed by the criminal justice 
system on offenders.  Specifically, individuals with a dispositional attribution style are more likely to 
support punitive measures, as they believe that the offenders engaged in crime by their own choice and 
deserve to be punished.  Individuals who possess a situational attribution style, on the other hand, are more 
likely to support rehabilitative efforts, as these tend to be aimed at helping the offender adjust to adverse 
circumstances that may have contributed to their offending behavior (Hawkins, 1981; Cullen et al., 1985; 
Young, 1991). 
 Early research on attribution theory demonstrated that the characteristics of the dispositional and 
situational attribution styles were consistent with the facets of the theory.  Hawkins (1981), for example, 
categorized criminal offenses into crimes of violence committed by adults, property crimes committed by 
adults, and crimes committed by juveniles.  Across all three types, he found that his sample of college 
students preferred more severe sanctions for crimes attributed to dispositional factors than crimes attributed 
to situational factors. 
 Further, Cullen et al. (1985) examined the effect of attribution style, which they labeled classical 
(dispositional) and positivist (situational) on general punitiveness, the effectiveness of rehabilitation as a 
punishment goal, and support for capital punishment.  Based on survey data from a random sample of 200 
residents of Galesburg, Illinois, Cullen et al. (1985) determined that the positivist (i.e., situational) 
attribution scale had a significant negative effect on general punitiveness and capital punishment support 
and a significant positive effect on the belief that rehabilitation would be an effective punishment goal.  
That is, the more likely individuals were to attribute crime to environmental factors, the less likely they 
were to possess punitive attitudes, including support for capital punishment, and the more likely they were 
to support rehabilitation as a punishment goal.  These findings held for their sample of both the general 
public as well as criminal justice practitioners. 
 Young (1991) examined the influence of measures of situational and dispositional attribution 
styles on death penalty support.  He found that, among whites, the belief that “poverty causes crime” 
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(situational attribution style) was inversely related to support for capital punishment.  Conversely, he found 
that, among whites, the belief that criminals commit crimes for rational self-serving reasons (dispositional 
attribution style) was positively related to death penalty support.  Young’s results further suggested that 
blacks were more affected by perceptions of procedural and distributive justice than by attribution style. 
 Early research on attribution theory demonstrated empirical support for its main tenets regarding 
the characterization of dispositional and situational attribution styles.  It failed, however, to explore the 
relationship between religion and attribution style.  Grasmick and his colleagues (1992; 1993a; 1993b; 
1994) employed attribution theory as a mechanism to explain how religious differences shape attitudes 
toward crime and justice. 
 Grasmick et al. (1992) examined the effect of Protestant fundamentalism on the retributive 
sentencing philosophy.  Consistent with their expectations, they found that fundamentalists were more 
likely to support the retributive doctrine of punishment than both liberal/moderate Protestants and 
individuals with no religious affiliation.  Although this study did not provide a direct test of attribution 
theory, it was an important pre-cursor, as it provided a link between religion, particularly fundamentalism, 
and retributive sentiment. 
 Recall that religion may serve as an important group from which individuals adopt their attitudes 
and model their behaviors.  Given the inherently moral nature of religious groups, the socialization process 
that occurs within them, particularly the faith groups that espouse proscriptive doctrines, may be an 
important source of the internalization of retributive emotions upon which attitudes toward issues such as 
capital punishment are based (Vidmar and Miller, 1980). 
 Applying this notion of individual socialization to attribution theory, Grasmick, Bursik, and 
Blackwell (1993b) contended that, because fundamentalist Protestants believe that behaviors which go 
against Biblical teachings are a reflection of bad character, they should be more likely to possess a 
dispositional than a situational attribution style.  Among whites, their hypothesis was supported, as Biblical 
literalness was significantly and directly related to the tendency to attribute juvenile crime to dispositional 
causes.  In other words, the more literally individuals interpreted the Bible, the more likely they were to 
attribute juvenile crime to offender character.  Dispositional attribution style, in turn, was significantly and 
positively related to punitiveness toward juveniles. 
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 Grasmick et al. (1993a) further considered the role of attribution theory when they hypothesized 
that, because of their tendency to adopt a dispositional attribution style, evangelical/fundamentalist 
Protestants would be more likely to support punitive sanctions for offenders than would members of other 
religious faith groups.  Indeed, they found that Protestant fundamentalists were significantly more punitive 
than liberal/moderate Protestants on four out of five punitive justice items, including both adult and 
juvenile death penalty support, support for harsher courts, and support for stiffer laws. 
 Grasmick and McGill (1994) provided the first complete and direct application of attribution 
theory to the religion-punitiveness relationship.  They found that, among whites, Biblical literalness 
positively affected the likelihood of attributing juvenile crime to dispositional causes.  Dispositional 
attribution, in turn, had a significant positive effect on the desire to punish juvenile offenders.  Further, 
when controls were included, attribution style accounted for half of the effect of Biblical literalness on 
punitiveness, and the remaining effect fell to non-significance.  Thus, attribution style was, as 
hypothesized, the intervening variable.  In other words, Biblical literalness affected individuals’ attribution 
styles, which then affected punitiveness.  It is important to note, however, that the effect of Biblical 
literalness fell to non-significance when the analysis was run for blacks.  Thus, fundamentalist Protestant 
beliefs do not appear to generate the same punitiveness among blacks as they do whites (Grasmick and 
McGill, 1994). 
 Although attribution theory provides an explanation for how religion shapes arguments for and 
against capital punishment, it largely fails to explore how a forgiving and tolerance-oriented theological 
emphasis may also lead to the possession of a situational attribution style, which, in turn, should shape 
attitudes unfavorable to capital punishment.  Applegate et al. (2000) focused on the link between 
progressive theological emphases and correctional attitudes.  Their analyses indicated that religiosity had a 
significant effect on correctional attitudes.  Specifically, individuals who possessed a more forgiving 
theological emphasis were more supportive of rehabilitation for offenders, less likely to believe their local 
courts were too lenient, and advocated less punitive approaches to criminals in general and to a 
hypothetical offender.  They were also significantly less supportive of capital punishment.  These 
relationships remained when controls were included (Applegate et al., 2000).  Further, Biblical literalness 
and perceptions of a punitive God were significant and positively associated with punitive attitudes and 
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negatively related to rehabilitation support.  In other words, individuals who possessed fundamentalist 
religious beliefs were more likely to favor punitive measures and oppose rehabilitative ones than non-
fundamentalists.  These relationships retained their significance when demographic and other relevant 
controls were included.  Although Applegate et al. (2000) add the dimension of forgiving theological 
emphasis, they fail to fully explore attribution style as a possible linkage between theological emphasis and 
the adoption of various philosophies of punishment. 
 Previous research has suggested that Biblical literalness plays an important role in individuals’ 
attribution styles, with higher degrees of Biblical literalness associated with more dispositional attribution 
styles (Grasmick et al., 1993b).  It also indicates that attribution style is a consistent predictor of 
punishment philosophy, with possessing a dispositional attribution style predicting support for more 
punitive policies (including capital punishment) and possessing a situational attribution style predicting a 
more rehabilitative approach to offenders (Cullen et al., 1985; Young, 1991; Grasmick et al., 1993a).  It 
neglects, however, to systematically specify the entire causal process by which religion and perceptions of 
crime causation affect attitudes toward capital punishment.  The present study provides a direct test of 
attribution theory, specifically improving upon extant research by delineating the process through which 
attitudes toward the death penalty are shaped by an individual’s theological emphasis. 
 Applegate et al. (2000) found that both theological emphasis and Biblical literalness were 
associated with attitudes toward correctional treatment, including attitudes toward capital punishment.  
They did not, however, examine the possible link between theological emphasis and Biblical literalness.  
There is extensive evidence that different religious orientations produce different images of God, with more 
conservative religions adopting a more punitive image of God and more liberal religions perceiving God as 
more understanding and forgiving.  It follows, then, that individuals’ perceptions of God will affect their 
interpretation of His word.  People who perceive God as rigid and condemning should be more likely to 
adopt a literal interpretation of the Bible, while people who perceive God as more malleable and forgiving 
should be more likely to allow for a more interpretative approach to the Bible.  The latter group of 
individuals might, for instance, believe that parts of the Bible are literal, but other parts are symbolic or 
figurative, have contextualized meanings, etc.  More formally stated, 
6a. There will be a positive and direct relationship between a punitive theological emphasis and a 
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 more literal interpretation of the Bible. 
6b. Conversely, a more progressive theological emphasis will be negatively associated with Biblical  
 literalness. 
 Consistent with Grasmick et al.’s (1993b) findings, we also assert that Biblical literalness will 
affect individuals’ attribution styles.  We predict the following with regard to the relationship between 
Biblical literalness and attribution style: 
7a. A more literal interpretation of the Bible will be directly predictive of a dispositional attribution  
 style for adult and juvenile offenders. 
7b. Conversely, a less literal interpretation of the Bible will be predictive of a more situational  
 attribution style for adult and juvenile offenders. 
 Keeping with the propositions of attribution theory and in accordance with the findings of Cullen 
et al. (1985), Young (1991), and Grasmick et al. (1993a), which indicated that there was relationship 
between attribution style and individuals’ positions on punishment philosophy our correctional system 
should adopt, we establish the following hypotheses: 
8a. A more dispositional attribution style will have a direct positive effect on possessing a more  
 punitive punishment philosophy for adult and juvenile offenders; and  
8b. Conversely, a more situational attribution style will be directly and negatively related to  
 possessing a more punitive sentiment toward adult and juvenile offenders. 
 Previous research has examined various indicators of punitiveness and capital punishment as two 
separate dependent variables.  Due to the conceptual linkages between Biblical literalness and attitudes 
toward the death penalty, we model them as distinct from one another.  Once we have established a 
relationship between attribution style and correctional punishment philosophy, we are then in a position to 
understand why Biblical literalness affects capital punishment support—it is because individuals who 
possess a more punitive punishment philosophy tend to favor capital punishment more than individuals 
who adopt a more reformative approach to adult and juvenile offenders.  Accordingly, the final path in the 
processual model suggests: 
9a. A more punitive punishment philosophy will be directly associated with capital punishment 
 support; and 
9b. Conversely, a more rehabilitative philosophy toward the correctional treatment of adult and  
 juvenile offenders will be directly and negatively related to support for the death penalty. 
 Early research on religion and attitudes toward crime and punishment issues was limited to 
differences between faith groups.  Later research extended the concept of religion to include measures of 
personal religiosity (e.g., religious commitment and involvement, religious beliefs) and included measures 
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of Biblical literalness.  These developments were important, because they provided a clearer and more 
accurate picture of why religion affects death penalty attitudes.  Despite this progress in the research 
literature surrounding religion and punitive attitudes, the research thus far has been largely atheoretical.  
Attribution theory appears to offer a substantive explanation that demonstrates the process of how religion 
affects punitive attitudes, including attitudes toward capital punishment; however, it fails to explicate the 
entire causal process through which religion affects death penalty attitudes.  Based on the body of research 
that has evolved, we established a comprehensive causal model for this relationship.  Summarily, we 
believe that theological emphasis will affect the degree to which individuals literally interpret the Bible; 
that Biblical literalness will determine individuals’ attribution styles (Grasmick et al., 1993a; Grasmick et 
al., 1993b; Grasmick and McGill, 1994); that individuals’ attribution styles will predict the punishment 
philosophies that they support and oppose (Cullen et al., 1985; Grasmick and McGill, 1994); and that 
individuals’ punishment philosophies will affect their attitudes toward capital punishment. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample and Procedure 
 The data for this investigation were obtained from a survey administered to individuals called for 
jury service in Hillsborough County, Florida during the fall of 1999.  The jury pool consists of a random 
selection of Hillsborough County residents18 and over with a driver’s license or Florida identification.  
Groups that are ineligible to serve include those under 18 (Att.Gen. 1973.Laws 1973, c. 73-21, the Adult 
Rights Law, § 743.07), convicted felons whose civil rights have not been restored [Fla. 1950, F.S.A. 
§40.04(2), 40.02(5), 40.07(2), 913.03, F.S.A. Const. art. 16, §25], those individuals under prosecution for 
any crime [Fla. App. 1974, West’s F.S.A. §§40.01, 40.07, 40.07(1)], people no longer residing in 
Hillsborough County (C.A.Fla. 1978, West’s F.S.A. §40.01 et seq.; U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 6, 14), and 
non-U.S. citizens (C.A.Fla. 1975, 28 U.S.C.A. §1861, 1865).  Other groups who may decline to serve 
include expectant mothers and unemployed parents with full custody of a child under six [Fla. 1984; West’s 
F.S.A. §40.01(1)], full-time law enforcement officers and investigative personnel [Fla. 1984; West’s F.S.A. 
§40.013(2)], and individuals over 70 years of age (Op.Atty.Gen., 070-115, Aug. 25, 1971).  Despite the 
potential biases in under-representing these groups of people, the jury pool is, perhaps, the best readily 
available random sample of adults.  There are also other advantages associated with this population.  For 
example, many are called to report for jury duty, but end up waiting in the courthouse for part or all of the 
day.  These individuals have been called upon to perform a civil duty.  They have agreed to sacrifice their 
time, while tolerating other inconveniences (e.g., waking up at an early hour, traffic, parking, etc.), as well.  
Yet despite their frustrations, when they arrive at the courthouse, they sit and wait for, minimally, two 
hours; some wait all day.  Understandably, these potential jurors are bored and exasperated.  The 
administration of a lengthy questionnaire related to issues of crime and justice, then, is convenient as a time 
filler and beneficial in that participation in this study at least serves as a proxy for the fulfillment of 
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citizenship duties.  This situation also facilitates the development of an extensive and comprehensive 
questionnaire, as there were minimal time constraints on the respondents. 
 Once it had been established that the jury pool would provide an appropriate sample for survey 
research, several meetings between researchers at the University of South Florida (USF) and the 
Prosecutor’s Office, the Public Defender’s Office, and the staff at the Courthouse for the Thirteenth 
Judicial Circuit in the State of Florida ensued.  During these meetings, details concerning administration 
and scheduling were addressed, and drafts of the questionnaire were exchanged for suggestions and 
comments.  A final instrument was then submitted to the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at USF.  The 
survey underwent an expedited review process and permission to proceed was granted.  A final copy of the 
questionnaire may be found in Appendix A, and an informed consent form is located in Appendix B.  A 
copy of the codebook for the survey may be obtained from the author. 
 The jury pool is called on Monday and Wednesday mornings of every week.  Data collection 
occurred over two different weeks in a one-month period.  Following the first week of data collection, a 
few weeks elapsed prior to the second survey administration.  Three researchers distributed questionnaires 
and informed consent forms on every chair in the central courtroom prior to 7:30 a.m. when the potential 
jurors arrived.  On the first day, however, a smaller courtroom was used in addition to the central 
courtroom, which increased the number of potential respondents by approximately 60 people.  The 
researchers circulated among the potential jurors to assist with questions and collect the survey instruments.  
One researcher also made an announcement on each of the days detailing the purpose of the study and 
reminding the respondents that their participation was voluntary, their identities would remain anonymous, 
and that the information they provided would be held with the strictest assurance of confidentiality. 
 The four days of data collection generated a total of 655 surveys.  For the analysis in the present 
study, a sub-sample was selected that included only those subjects who were black, white, or Hispanic.  All 
others (American Indian or Alaskan Natives and Asians) were deleted from the analysis.  This selection 
process resulted in a final sample size of 636 respondents. 
 The demographic characteristics in the present sample of potential jurors in Hillsborough County 
were largely reflective of the overall Hillsborough County population.  With regard to gender, 51 percent of 
Hillsborough County residents were males, while 49 percent were females, according to the 1990 Census 
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Report.  Of the potential jurors surveyed in this study, 54.1 percent were females and 45.9 percent were 
males.  Race and ethnicity were measured by separate items that reflect similar measures in the U.S. 
Census.  According to the Demographics USA County Edition, 1998, 82.3 percent of residents in 
Hillsborough County, Florida were Caucasian and 15.2 percent were African American.  In our sample, a 
similar distribution emerged: 79.9 percent of respondents identified themselves as Caucasian and 11.9 
percent as African American.  In Hillsborough County, Hispanics comprise 2.4 percent of the population; 
in the present sample, 10.4 percent identify themselves as Hispanic. 
 Our sample was similar to Hillsborough County residents in their level of educational attainment: 
18 percent of Hillsborough County residents have graduated from high school; 26 percent of the potential 
jurors in our sample were high school graduates.  Thirty-four percent of Hillsborough County residents 
attended college, but did not graduate—29.7 percent of our sample attained this level of education.  Similar 
percentages were college graduates (24% of Hillsborough County residents, 24.4% of our sample) and had 
a graduate or professional degree (11% of Hillsborough County residents, 9.4% of our sample). 
 Although it was not possible to compare our sample to Hillsborough County residents across all 
income categories because they were measured with different categories and with different definitions of 
income (effective buying income or after tax income in the Demographics USA Report as opposed to 
annual household income in our survey), the income level, as determined by the median incomes appear to 
be similar.  The median after tax income for Hillsborough County residents was $40,900, while the median 
income category for the jury pool in our sample was that category that ranged from $40,000 to $45,000. 
 Unfortunately, although our survey instrument included several other demographic characteristics, 
they were unavailable for Hillsborough County residents.  Based on the data that were available, though, 
our sample appears to be an accurate portrayal of Hillsborough County overall.  Keep in mind that although 
information on ages of both populations are available, it would be inappropriate to draw any comparisons, 
because the jury pool is limited to individuals ages 18 and over. 
Measurement of Variables 
Capital Punishment Attitudes 
The dependent variable, attitudes toward capital punishment, is measured with items reflecting 
general and circumstantial support for/opposition to capital punishment for both juveniles and adults.  
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Although most previous studies have used rather crude measures of death penalty support (Grasmick et al., 
1993a; Grasmick et al., 1993b; Britt, 1998; Applegate et al., 2000), a more in-depth operationalization is 
used in the present study for three reasons.  First, support for capital punishment may vary by type of 
offense and characteristics of the offender, such as age (Young, 1991).  Second, since public opinion is a 
legitimate basis for the implementation of the death penalty, it is imperative to understand all of the 
qualitative distinctions between the conditions under which support may vary (Young, 1991).  Finally, 
because prior research has established that support for the death penalty substantially declines when general 
support is distinguished from support in concrete situations (Ellsworth and Ross, 1983), respondents in the 
present study were asked to indicate their support for capital punishment across a variety of Likert-type 
statements.  Response options ranged from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree.  The two general 
items state, “Generally speaking, I support the death penalty for adults,” and “Generally speaking, I support 
the death penalty for juveniles.”  The mean levels of support on these two items were 3.87 and 2.80, 
respectively.  Beyond these and in keeping with the recommendations of Ellsworth and Ross (1983) and 
Durham (1988), circumstantial support for the death penalty was measured for both adults and juveniles 
across six specific offense-types.  They included: the murder of a criminal justice employee (mean = 3.59, 
3.22, for adults and juveniles, respectively), a planned murder (mean = 3.95, 3.50), the murder of a child 
(mean = 3.95, 3.39), an unplanned murder (mean = 3.02, 2.83), serial rape (mean = 3.37, 3.06), and child 
molestation (mean = 3.27, 2.93). 
Based on the mean levels of support for these offender and offense-specific items, it is clear that 
respondents largely favor or hold neutral attitudes toward capital punishment.  In fact, slight opposition 
(mean support less than 3.0) appeared in only 3 of the 14 items: general juvenile support and support for 
capital punishment for juveniles who commit an unplanned murder or who molest a child.  Consistent with 
previous research, though, respondents’ degree of capital punishment support varied across these different 
circumstances.  Table 2 presents the distribution of support for capital punishment on these 14 items. 
As Table 2 reflects, this sample of Hillsborough County residents exhibited a higher level of 
capital punishment support for adults than juveniles across every offense type, as well as on a general level.  
Moreover, respondents indicated greatest support for the death penalty for adults on a general level (66%) 
and when adults committed planned murder (66.8%).  The highest level of juvenile death penalty support 
Table 2. Percentage Distribution of Capital Punishment Attitudes by Specific Offenders and Offense Types 
 
Variable   SD5  D4  N3  A2  SA1  Mean 
Adults-general support  8.3%  3.9%  21.7%  24.2%  41.8%  3.87 
Adults-murder of cj employee 8.3%  4.4%  33.0%  28.3%  225.9%  3.59 
Adults-planned murder  7.9%  1.7%  23.6%  20.9%  45.9%  3.95 
Adults-murder of a child  7.9%  1.7%  25.9%  16.8%  47.6%  3.94 
Adults-unplanned murder  7.5%  15.1%  52.5%  17.6%  7.2%  3.02 
Adults-multiple rapes  9.1%  12.1%  35.5%  18.9%  24.4%  3.37 
Adults-child molestation  8.8%  15.1%  37.6%  17.1%  21.4%  3.27 
 
Juveniles-general support  22.3%  17.3%  30.5%  17.8%  12.1%  2.80 
Juveniles-murder of cj employee 8.8%  11.2%  45.1%  18.6%  16.4%  3.23 
Juveniles-planned murder  8.3%  8.2%  36.0%  20.4%  27.0%  3.49 
Juveniles-murder of a child 8.3%  8.2%  41.7%  19.5%  22.3%  3.39 
Juveniles-unplanned murder 10.2%  19.0%  53.1%  12.7%  4.9%  2.83 
Juveniles-multiple rapes  10.2%  16.0%  44.8%  15.9%  13.1%  3.06 
Juveniles-child molestation 10.7%  18.7%  47.6%  12.4%  10.5%  2.93 
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was for those juveniles who committed planned murder (47.4%); respondents also reported a relatively 
favorable attitude for juveniles who killed other kids (41.8%).  For both adults and juveniles, the greatest 
proportion of respondents opposed capital punishment for unplanned murder, rape, and child molestation.   
Observe, however, that the highest opposition to juvenile capital punishment was the general item 
(39.6%).The 14 death penalty opinion items were collapsed into one 14-item additive capital punishment 
support scale.  The range of scores on this scale was 14 (opposed capital punishment under every 
circumstance) to 70 (supported capital punishment under every circumstance).  The mean for the sample 
was 46.76, reflecting a moderate level of support for capital punishment.  Interestingly, despite conceptual 
distinctions in capital punishment attitudes by offender and/or offense type, the data reveal no empirical 
benefit to separating the items.  Indeed, when the 14 items were entered into a principal components factor 
analysis, the results suggested that a single factor solution best fit the data.  Specifically, according to the 
Kaiser Rule, three factors had eigenvalues greater than 1.00 (values = 8.55, 1.39, and 1.27 of factors 1,2, 
and 3, respectively).  When the Scree Discontinuity Test was applied, however, the greatest difference in 
the eigenvalues occurred between the first two factors, suggesting the presence of only one meaningful 
factor.  The 14 items all loaded well, with loadings ranging from .61 (general support for juvenile capital 
punishment) to .87 (support for the death penalty for juveniles who committed a planned murder).  See 
Appendix C for a breakdown of the item-to-scale correlations.  Finally, this 14-item additive scale 
produced a Cronbach’s Alpha reliability coefficient of .95, indicating a highly reliable scale. 
Measures of Religion 
 Recall that the first set of hypotheses to be tested addresses the independent and interactive effects 
of race and religion on capital punishment attitudes.  Thus, the independent variables in these analyses are 
religious conservativism, measured by current denominational affiliation; religiosity; and race. 
Religious Conservativism 
 Faith groups serve as membership groups that provide a context for which individuals may 
evaluate themselves in relation to the dictates of their faiths.  Potential jurors in this sample were asked to 
identify their faith groups from one of the following response options: Catholic, Jewish, Protestant, none, or 
other.  Given the prevalence of different Protestant sects, as well as their doctrinal differences, individuals 
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who identified themselves as Protestants were also asked to specify to which denomination they belonged: 
Baptist, Episcopalian, Lutheran, Methodist, Presbyterian, Fundamentalist, Pentecostal, or Other.  Almost 
half (49.8%) of the sample reported that they were Protestants, while nearly a quarter (23.7%) indicated 
that they were Catholics.  Non-affiliates comprised 11.9 percent of the participants, followed by others 
(7.9%), and Jews (2.5%).  The remaining 4.7 percent were missing.  Protestants, in turn, indicated the 
following denominational distribution: Baptist (23.0%), Episcopalian (4.1%), Lutheran (3.1%), Methodist 
(8.5%), Presbyterian (4.6%), Fundamentalist (1.1%), Pentecostal (3.8%), and Other (2.7%). 
 Because of the small percentage of blacks and Hispanics in each faith group, we trichotomized 
faith group into members of liberal, moderate, and conservative denominations to measure religious 
conservativism.  Consistent with previous categorizations (Smith, 1990), liberal faiths included the 
Protestant denominations Episcopalian and Presbyterian, as well as individuals who are not members of 
any faith group.  Moderate religions included Catholic, Jewish, and the Protestant denominations Lutheran 
and Methodist.  Finally, conservative faiths were comprised of the Protestant sects Baptist, Fundamentalist, 
Pentecostal, and Other Protestant faiths.  Non-Protestant members of other faith groups and missing data 
were coded as moderate, as this category represented the mean, the median, and the mode (Smith, 1990).  
Respondents received a score of 1 if they were members of a liberal religion, 2 if they were part of a 
moderate religion, and 3 if they identified themselves as members of a conservative faith group.  Of the 636 
respondents, 129 (20.3%) were categorized as religious liberals, 319 (50.2%) as religious moderates, and 
188 (29.6%) as religious conservatives. 
 Given the findings of previous studies (Grasmick et al., 1992; Grasmick et al., 1993a; Britt, 1998) 
regarding the significant differences between conservative Protestants and members of other faith groups, 
we employed a third measure of religious conservativism, which makes a dichotomous distinction between 
conservative Protestants (i.e., Baptists, Fundamentalists, Pentecostals, and Other Protestants, all coded 1) 
and members of all other faith groups and non-affiliates (coded 0).  A frequency distribution showed that 
191 (30%) of the Hillsborough County respondents were members of a conservative Protestant 
denomination, and 445 (70%) were members of a different faith group or non-affiliates—i.e., non-
conservative Protestants.
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Religiosity 
 A single 9-item religiosity scale was created to assess the effect of religiosity on death penalty 
attitudes.  The 9 indicators tapped different, but related aspects of religious salience, commitment, and 
involvement.  They are: 
1. “In a typical month (4 weeks long), how many times do you attend worship services?” 
This item contained ordinal level response options. 
2. “How many church-related groups or organizations do you belong to (include Bible studies, 
youth groups, educative activities, choral groups, etc.)?” 
This item was an interval level measure, with responses being the number of groups to which 
respondents belonged. 
3. “How often do you take part in the activities and organizations of a church or place of 
worship, other than attending services?” 
This item was an ordinal measure, with response options ranging from 0 (never) to 6 (more 
than once a day). 
4. “In a typical month, how often do you pray outside of worship services (do not include table  
blessings)?” 
This, too, was an ordinal measure.  Possible responses ranged from 0 (never) to 4 (once a 
day). 
5. “In a typical month, how often do you have quiet time that focuses on religious or spiritual  
development (e.g., read religious material, meditate, etc.)?” 
The response categories were the same as they were for the item above. 
6. “Religion is a very important part of my life.” (coded 1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly 
disagree) 
7. “I would describe myself as very religious.” (coded 1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly 
disagree) 
8. “When I have decisions to make in my everyday life, I usually try to find out what God wants 
me to do.” (coded 1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree) 
9. “Religion influences how I live my life.” (coded 1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree) 
 
The composition of this scale was based on a compilation of items taken from related literature.  The 
first item, which is indicative of respondents’ attendance at worship services, has been widely used as a 
measure of religious commitment/involvement (Bock, Cochran, and Beeghley, 1987; Cochran, 
Beeghley, and Bock, 1988; Beeghley, Bock, and Cochran, 1990; Clarke, Beeghley, and Cochran, 
1990; Cochran and Beeghley, 1991; Cochran, Beeghley, and Bock, 1992; Young, 1992; Cochran, 
Chamlin, Beeghley, Harnden, and Blackwell, 1996).  Participation in religious organizations (items 2 
and 3) has also been a prevalent measure of religiosity, although much of the previous research (Bock 
et al., 1987; Cochran et al., 1988; Beeghley et al., 1990; Clarke et al., 1990; Cochran and Beeghley, 
1991) has dichotomized it into whether or not respondents were members of a religious organization.  
The present study expanded this dimension of commitment/involvement to include both the number of 
 48
organizations, as well as the amount of time participants spent engaged in activities related to the 
organization(s). 
 Young (1992) developed the concept of devotionalism (analogous to religious commitment), 
which he operationalized with concepts related to attendance at services, frequency of prayer, and 
frequency with which individuals read the Bible at home.  In agreement with Young’s 
conceptualization of devotionalism, two items were developed to ascertain the frequency with which 
respondents engaged in prayer and ‘quiet time,’ (which included, but was not limited to reading the 
Bible at home).  Finally, the last four statements in the religiosity scale assess the salience of religion 
in respondents’ daily lives.  These are a replication of a scale created by Grasmick and his colleagues 
(Grasmick et al., 1993a; Grasmick et al., 1993b; Grasmick and McGill, 1994) and validated by their 
research, as well as in subsequent studies (e.g., Curry, 1996; Applegate et al., 2000). 
 Items were standardized into z-scores, as they were measured on different metrics.  These 9 
standardized items were entered into principal components factor analysis, which suggested that a 
single factor solution best fit the data.  The Kaiser Rule demonstrated two eigenvalues greater than 1 
(5.56 and 1.17 on factors 1 and 2, respectively); however, an application of the Scree Discontinuity 
Test revealed the presence of only one substantive factor, as the greatest difference between the 
eigenvalues was between the first two values.  Factor loadings ranged from .63 (number of church-
related groups to which respondents belonged) to .87 (the degree to which respondents agreed that they 
turned to God for guidance in their daily decisions) (see Appendix D).  The linear composite of these 9 
standardized items had an alpha reliability of .92.   
Race 
 Religious influences do not operate in a vacuum.  Numerous secular influences may enhance or 
attenuate the relationship between religion and attitudes toward capital punishment.  Race is one of 
these influences, as racial differences in both socio-political views and religious affiliations have 
appeared in previous studies (Young, 1991; Barkan and Cohn, 1994; Britt, 1998). 
 Race, in the present study, was measured by asking respondents to indicate their race according to 
the following racial categories used by the federal government: American Indian or Alaskan Natives, 
Asians, Blacks or African Americans, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islanders, and Whites.  Given 
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the unique role that religion plays in Hispanic cultures in America, we also asked one question to 
determine respondents’ ethnic origins: “Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin (includes a 
person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or Central American, or other Spanish culture or race, 
regardless of race)?”  As race was, the description of ethnicity was based on that used by the federal 
government.  The variable used in the analysis was a dummy variable, coded 0 for non-Hispanic 
whites and 1 for non-whites.  The non-white category included only Blacks and Hispanics—the 
remaining racial groups were not considered, because there were too few members of these groups to 
analyze.  In fact, this was also the case with Blacks and Hispanics—separated, there were too few 
members of each group to provide meaningful results.  Although it may be ideal to examine the unique 
effects of race and ethnicity, the dichotomizing of race/ethnicity is conceptually sound, as both Blacks 
and Hispanics are oppressed populations in the United States, and religion plays a prevalent and unique 
role in both cultures.  Given their experiences with oppression, we would expect that both groups 
would hold more liberal social and political views than whites.  Of the 636 respondents in this 
investigation, 18 percent were non-white, and 82 percent were white.  Table 3 provides the correlation 
matrix for the death penalty scale, the religion variables, the race variable, and the control variables.  
Table 4 provides descriptions of the religion variables and the race variable, including their means and 
standard deviations. 
Measures from Attribution Theory
 Following the initial hypotheses, which are expected to establish a relationship between religion 
and attitudes toward the death penalty, it is necessary to determine the process through which religion 
affects capital punishment attitudes.  As we discussed previously, attribution theory provides a useful 
framework from which to analyze the religion-capital punishment attitudes relationship.  Keeping with 
the tenets of attribution theory, we developed a path model that reflects the indirect relationship 
between religion and death penalty attitudes. 
First, we measure religion by theological emphasis, rather than faith group or religiosity, as it is 
likely that the theological emphasis of a faith group translates into punitive or progressive secular 
attitudes.  We developed a 6-item theological emphasis scale; the first 3 items listed below were taken 
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Table 3.  Correlation Matrix of Death Penalty Scale Variables, Religion Variables, the Race Variable,  
               and Control Variables 
 
 sex race age education    income ideology  abortion  sexroles 
 
Sex 1.00 -0.04 0.04 0.03   0.09* 0.01 0.01 0.17* 
Race  1.00 0.13* -0.04   -0.07 -0.13* 0.04 0.03 
Age   1.00 -0.02   0.06 0.10* 0.05 0.19* 
Education    1.00   0.36* 0.01 -0.13* -0.16* 
Income       1.00 0.09* -0.11* -0.06 
Ideology        1.00 0.33* 0.24* 
Abortion         1.00 0.37* 
Sexroles          1.00 
Socwlfre 
Cjscale 
No religion 
Jewish 
Catholic 
Episcopalian 
Presbyterian 
Methodist 
Lutheran 
Baptist 
Fundamentalist 
Rel. tradition 
Cons. Prot 
Religiosity 
Dpscale 
Ad-gen. dp supp 
Ad-murder cj emp 
Ad-plan murder 
Ad-murder child 
Ad-unplan murder 
Ad-rape 
Ad-molest child 
Juv-gen. dp supp. 
Juv-murder cj emp 
Juv-plan murder 
Juv-murder child 
Juv-unplan murder 
Juv-rape 
Juv-molest child 
 
Continued on next page 
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Table 3 continued 
 
 socwlfre        cjscale     no religion         Jewish      Catholic      Episcopalian Presbyterian 
 
Sex 0.19*  -0.07  0.04  0.03 0.02 -0.08*    -0.04 
Race -0.21*  -0.21* 0.03  -0.05 0.11* -0.07 -0.05 
Age 0.01  0.13* -0.18*  0.10* -0.03 0.01 0.08* 
Education 0.09*   0.12* -0.04  0.10* 0.07 0.12* 0.09* 
Income 0.15* 0.16* -0.04  0.11* 0.06 0.05 0.08* 
Ideology 0.27* 0.19* -0.18* 0.06 -0.00 0.01 0.03 
Abortion 0.13* 0.07 -0.19* -0.16* 0.03 -0.09* -0.06 
Sexroles 0.21* -0.11* -0.10* -0.08* -0.08 -0.04 -0.01 
Socwlfre 1.00 0.16* 0.02 -0.06 -0.01 0.08* 0.01 
Cjscale  1.00 -0.07 0.03 0.05 0.08* 0.08* 
No religion   1.00 -0.06 -0.21* -0.07 -0.08* 
Jewish    1.00 -0.09* -0.03 -0.04 
Catholic     1.00 -0.11* -0.12* 
Episcopalian      1.00 -0.04 
Presbyterian       1.00 
Methodist 
Lutheran 
Baptist 
Fundamentalist 
Rel. tradition 
Cons. Prot 
Religiosity 
Dpscale 
Ad-gen. dp supp 
Ad-murder cj emp 
Ad-plan murder 
Ad-murder child 
Ad-unplan murder 
Ad-rape 
Ad-molest child 
Juv-gen. dp supp. 
Juv-murder cj emp 
Juv-plan murder 
Juv-murder child 
Juv-unplan murder 
Juv-rape 
Juv-molest child 
 
Continued on next page 
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Table 3 continued 
 
 Methodist Lutheran Baptist Fund.  Rel. tradition cons. Prot religiosity  
 
Sex -0.05 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.14* 
Race -0.06 -0.09* -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 -0.08* 0.07 
Age 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08* 0.14* 0.11* 0.21* 
Education 0.06 0.05 -0.16* -0.05 -0.16* -0.18* -0.05 
Income 0.08* 0.02 -0.08* -0.11* -0.11* -0.14* -0.06 
Ideology -0.01 -0.03 0.16* 0.14* 0.22* 0.22* 0.28* 
Abortion -0.05 -0.11* 0.15* 0.27* 0.32* 0.29* 0.47* 
Sexroles -0.04 -0.01 0.16* 0.14* 0.21* 0.22* 0.21* 
Socwlfre 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.11* 
Cjscale 0.03 0.06 -0.06 0.02 -0.05 -0.04 0.08* 
No religion -0.11* -0.07 -0.20* -0.10* -0.57* -0.24* -0.40* 
Jewish -0.05 -0.03 -0.09* -0.05 -0.02 -0.11* -0.08* 
Catholic -0.17* -0.10* -0.30* -0.16* -0.07 -0.37* -0.05 
Episcopalian -0.06 -0.04 -0.11* -0.06 -0.31* -0.13* -0.05 
Presbyterian -0.07 -0.04 -0.12* -0.06 -0.34* -0.14* -0.03 
Methodist 1.00 -0.05 -0.16* -0.09* -0.04 -0.20* 0.08* 
Lutheran  1.00 -0.10* -0.05 -0.02 -0.12* -0.04 
Baptist   1.00 -0.15* 0.70* 0.83* 0.21* 
Fundamentalist    1.00 0.24* 0.34* 0.43* 
Rel. tradition     1.00 0.83* 0.42* 
Cons. Prot      1.00 0.32* 
Religiosity       1.00 
Dpscale 
Ad-gen. dp supp 
Ad-murder cj emp 
Ad-plan murder 
Ad-murder child 
Ad-unplan murder 
Ad-rape 
Ad-molest child 
Juv-gen. dp supp. 
Juv-murder cj emp 
Juv-plan murder 
Juv-murder child 
Juv-unplan murder 
Juv-rape 
Juv-molest child 
 
Continued on next page 
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Table 3 continued 
  
 dpscale ad-gen dp ad-murder cj ad-plan ad-murder ad-unplan ad-rape 
  supp employee murder child murder 
Sex 0.09* 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.03 
Race -0.14* -0.16* -0.18* -0.12* -0.13* -0.10* -0.12* 
Age 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 0.06 0.02 
Education -0.14* -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.13* -0.14* 
Income 0.07 0.08* 0.13* 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.01 
Ideology 0.17* 0.14* 0.16* 0.13* 0.14* 0.09* 0.09*  
Abortion -0.11* -0.16* -0.07 -0.11* -0.10* -0.09* -0.10*  
Sexroles 0.04 -0.03 -0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.02 
Socwlfre 0.22* 0.20* 0.23* 0.21* 0.19* 0.13* 0.15* 
Cjscale 0.06 0.16* 0.13* 0.13* 0.14* 0.09* 0.01 
No religion 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.04 
Jewish -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.03 
Catholic -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.05 -0.00 
Episcopalian -0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 
Presbyterian -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 
Methodist -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 
Lutheran 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 
Baptist 0.12* 0.09* 0.11* 0.05 0.05 0.12* 0.03 
Fundamentalist -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 
Rel. tradition 0.06 0.02 0.05 -0.00 -0.01 0.07 -0.02 
Cons. Prot 0.09* 0.06 0.09* 0.04 0.03 0.11* -0.00 
Religiosity -0.09* -0.10* -0.10* -0.11* -0.13* -0.00 -0.06 
Dpscale 1.00 0.71* 0.85* 0.81* 0.82* 0.75* 0.78* 
Ad-gen. dp supp  1.00 0.67* 0.65* 0.65* 0.50* 0.50* 
Ad-murder cj emp   1.00 0.83* 0.83* 0.65* 0.60* 
Ad-plan murder    1.00 0.93* 0.55* 0.65* 
Ad-murder child     1.00 0.57* 0.66* 
Ad-unplan murder      1.00 0.52* 
Ad-rape       1.00 
Ad-molest child 
Juv-gen. dp supp. 
Juv-murder cj emp 
Juv-plan murder 
Juv-murder child 
Juv-unplan murder 
Juv-rape 
Juv-molest child 
 
Continued on next page 
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Table 3 continued 
 
 ad-molest juv-gen dp juv-murder cj juv-plan juv-murder juv-unplan juv-rape juv- 
 child support employee murder child murder  molest  
Sex 0.00 0.20* 0.14* 0.11* 0.09* 0.05 0.04 0.00  
Race -0.07 -0.07 -0.16* -0.11* -0.11* -0.05 -0.08* -0.05 
Age -0.04 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.11* 0.03 0.05 
Education -0.17* 0.09* 0.09* -0.10* -0.15* -0.18* -0.19* -0.23* 
Income -0.03 0.10* 0.12* 0.09* 0.07 0.04 -0.03 -0.06 
Ideology 0.05 0.14* 0.18* 0.19* 0.21* 0.10* 0.12* 0.10* 
Abortion -0.08* -0.12* -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08* -0.06  
Sexroles 0.02 0.09* 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.09* 0.07 
Socwlfre 0.11* 0.21* 0.25* 0.23* 0.19* 0.11* 0.12* 0.06 
Cjscale -0.02 -0.04 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.02 -0.06 -0.05 
No religion -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.04 
Jewish -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 
Catholic 0.05 0.01 -0.10* -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 0.01 0.05 
Episcopalian -0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.03 
Presbyterian -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 
Methodist -0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.07 -0.06 
Lutheran 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.01 
Baptist 0.07 0.12* 0.14* 0.11* 0.14* 0.14* 0.06 0.08* 
Fundamentalist -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 
Rel. tradition 0.05 0.08* 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.10* 0.02 0.06  
Cons. Prot 0.04 0.09* 0.11* 0.10* 0.11* 0.12* 0.04 0.05 
Religiosity -0.07 -0.09* -0.08* -0.06 -0.08* 0.02 -0.05 -0.04 
Dpscale 0.74* 0.62* 0.84* 0.87* 0.86* 0.73* 0.79* 0.74* 
Ad-gen. dp supp 0.42* 0.54* 0.55* 0.56* 0.53* 0.41* 0.40* 0.32* 
Ad-murder cj emp 0.55* 0.40* 0.75* 0.75* 0.71* 0.52* 0.50* 0.43* 
Ad-plan murder 0.55* 0.28* 0.62* 0.75* 0.67* 0.40* 0.48* 0.40* 
Ad-murder child 0.58* 0.28* 0.61* 0.72* 0.70* 0.41* 0.49* 0.44* 
Ad-unplan murder 0.53* 0.43* 0.59* 0.57* 0.58* 0.81* 0.49* 0.51* 
Ad-rape 0.78* 0.32* 0.50* 0.56* 0.53* 0.41* 0.81* 0.66* 
Ad-molest child 1.00 0.29* 0.47* 0.50* 0.49* 0.44* 0.67* 0.81* 
Juv-gen. dp supp.  1.00 0.62* 0.55* 0.58* 0.55* 0.49* 0.44* 
Juv-murder cj emp   1.00 0.80* 0.80* 0.68* 0.62* 0.54* 
Juv-plan murder    1.00 0.86* 0.61* 0.64* 0.55* 
Juv-murder child    1.00 0.67* 0.65* 0.61* 
Juv-unplan murder     1.00 0.58* 0.60* 
Juv-rape       1.00 0.80* 
Juv-molest child        1.00 
 
* p<.05 
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Table 4.  Descriptions of the Death Penalty Scale Variables, the Religion Variables, the Race Variable,  
               and the Control Variables (N = 636)a 
 
Variable   Description    %/Mean  SD 
 
Support for capital  14-item additive scale b   46.76  12.58 
Punishment 
 
Race/ethnicity  0 = whites    0.18  0.39 
    1 = Blacks and Hispanics 
 
Faith groupc   None     11.9%    
    Jewish     2.5% 
    Catholic     23.7% 
    Presbyterian    4.6% 
    Episcopalian    3.8% 
    Methodist    8.3% 
    Lutheran    3.1% 
    Baptist     22.6% 
    Fundamentalist    7.4% 
 
Religious tradition: 
 Liberal   None, Presb., Episc.   20.3% 
 Moderate  Jew, Cath., Meth., Luth.   50.2% 
 Conservative  Bapt., Fund., Pent., other Prots.  29.6% 
Conservative Protestant 0 = no (includes all other faiths)  70.5% 
    1 = yes (Bapt., Fund., Pent., Other)  29.6% 
 
Religiosity   9-item additive scaled   14.54  7.78 
 
Sex    0 = females    0.46  0.50 
    1 = males 
 
Age    Ordinal measure with higher number 43.74  11.93 
    representing higher age 
 
Education   Ordinal measure with higher number 5.02  1.57 
    representing more formal education 
 
Income   Ordinal measure with higher number 5.60  1.88 
    representing a higher income bracket 
 
Ideology   Likert item, ranging from 1=very liberal 3.20  0.95 
    to 5=very conservative 
 
Abortion attitudes  5-item additive scalee   12.99  4.92 
 
Continued on next page 
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Table 4 continued 
 
Attitudes toward sex roles 3-item additive scalee   5.53  2.34 
Attitudes toward social 2-item additive scalee   6.11  2.19 
welfare 
 
Attitudes toward the police 4-item additive scalee   14.75  3.31 
 
 
 
a The analyses only include Blacks, whites, and Hispanics.  All others (American Indians or  
 Alaskan Natives and Asians) were deleted from the analyses. 
 
b Appendix C describes the construction of this composite scale. 
 
c Faith group, religious tradition, and membership in a conservative Protestant faith group are all 
 measures of religious conservativism; each of these measures are nominal level.  
 
d Appendix D describes the construction of this composite scale. 
 
e Appendix F describes the construction of these composite scales. 
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Applegate et al.’s (2000) forgiveness scale.  The 6-item scale was comprised of the following 
statements: 
1. To receive forgiveness, it is important to love the sinner. 
2. “It is important to hate the sin, but love the sinner.” 
3. “God teaches us that even if someone has lived a life of crime, s/he should be forgiven for their 
offenses if they are truly repentant (sorry).” 
4. “The God I believe in sympathizes with people.” 
5. “The God I believe in understands when people sin.” 
6. “The God I believe in loves people, regardless of their behaviors and beliefs.” 
The response options for these items ranged from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree.  We re-
coded the items so that higher scores on the scale were indicative of a more punitive theological 
emphasis.  When these items were entered into a principal components factor analysis, the Kaiser Rule 
suggested the presence of two possible factors (eigenvalues = 3.09 and 1.09).  An application of the 
Scree Discontinuity Test, however, demonstrated that the greatest difference was between the first two 
values, thereby revealing the existence of only one substantial factor.  The item-to-scale correlations 
were moderate to high (see Appendix E), ranging from .59 (God understands when people sin) to .81 
(it is important to hate the sin, but love the sinner).  The overall reliability of this scale was high 
(Cronbach’s Alpha = .81).  The possible range of scores on this scale ranged from 6 (the most 
progressive) to 30 (the most punitive).  Potential jurors in Hillsborough County displayed a moderately 
progressive theological emphasis, with a mean score of 12.29 on the scale.  Appendix E displays the 
full results of this factor analysis. 
 The relationship between religion and capital punishment attitudes is argued to be indirect, 
operating through a process of attribution.  Just as previous research has revealed that possessing a 
strong belief in Biblical literalness is associated with individuals adopting a dispositional attribution 
style (Grasmick et al., 1993b), we, too, believe that this relationship will exist.  Moreover, we believe 
that respondents’ theological emphasis will affect the degree to which they literally interpret the Bible.  
Specifically, respondents who indicate that they have a more punitive theological emphasis should 
interpret the Bible more literally than respondents who have a more progressive theological emphasis, 
and individuals with a more progressive theological emphasis should adopt a more interpretative 
reading of the Bible than their more punitive counterparts. 
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 We utilized five statements from various (but similar) adaptations of Grasmick’s Biblical 
literalness scale (Grasmick et al., 1992; Grasmick et al., 1993b; Grasmick and McGill, 1994), which 
have been highly reliable in previous studies (e.g., Applegate et al., 2000).  The five items that 
comprised the Biblical literalness scale in the present study included: 
1. “The Bible is the actual word of God—to be taken literally word for word.” 
2. “Miracles really happened—not just stories.” 
3. “Jesus truly rose from the dead.” 
4. “Those who do not accept God will go to hell.” 
5. “Hell actually exists.” 
The response options for all 5 items ranged from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree.  Thus, the 
higher the respondents’ scores, the more literally they interpreted the Bible.  When these items were 
entered into a principal components factor analysis, the Kaiser Rule revealed the presence of a single 
factor solution (eigenvalue = 3.68).  Factor loadings ranged from .81 (the Bible is the actual word of 
God…) to .91 (miracles really happened…).  The scale produced a Cronbach’s Alpha of .91, indicative 
of a highly reliable scale.  Appendix E reports the results of this factor analysis.  The range of scores 
on this scale could vary from 5 (strongly disagreed with every statement) to 25 (strongly agreed with 
every statement).  Respondents in this sample, as a whole, interpreted the Bible with a fairly high 
degree of literalness (mean = 17.80). 
 The model, in accordance with previous research (Cullen et al., 1985; Young, 1991; Grasmick et 
al., 1993a), predicts that there should be a direct effect of Biblical literalness on attribution style.  We 
operationalized attribution style with one 10-item scale, which reflected respondents’ beliefs about 
why adult and juvenile offenders committed crimes.  We did not adopt a scale that had already been 
created; however, many of the items were taken from previous studies on attribution theory (especially 
Grasmick and McGill, 1994, but also Cullen et al., 1983).  The 10 items included the following: 
1. “Most adult offenders commit crimes because they have bad characters.” 
2. “Most juvenile offenders commit crimes because they have bad characters.” 
3. “Most adult offenders commit crimes because they are too lazy to find a lawful way out of a bad 
situation.” 
4. “Most juvenile offenders commit crimes because they are too lazy to find a lawful way out of a 
bad situation.” 
5. “Most adult offenders commit crimes as a way of coping with poor living conditions.” 
6. “Most juvenile offenders commit crimes as a way of coping with poor living conditions.” 
7. “Most adult offenders commit crimes because their home lives as children were lacking in love, 
discipline, and supervision.” 
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8. “Most juvenile offenders commit crimes because their home lives as children were lacking in love, 
discipline, and supervision.” 
9. “Most adult offenders commit crimes because of outside influences (e.g., peer pressure, money 
problems).” 
10. “Most juvenile offenders commit crimes because of outside influences (e.g., peer pressure, money 
problems).” 
 
These statements were Likert-type items with response options ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 
= strongly agree.  The situational attribution style items (5-10) were re-coded, so higher scores were 
demonstrative of a less situational attribution style.  When the ten items were entered into a principal 
components factor analysis, the Kaiser Rule suggested the presence of two factors (eigenvalues = 3.30 
and 1.52); however, the Scree Discontinuity Test revealed that the greatest difference between the 
eigenvalues occurred between the first two values.  Moreover, although the scale’s reliability is low 
(Cronbach’s Alpha = .40), deleting any of the items from the scale would not substantially improve it.  
The factor loadings were low, ranging from .52 (adults commit crimes to cope with poor living 
conditions) to .63 (juveniles commit crimes to cope with poor living conditions).  Appendix E reports 
the results of this factor analysis.  The possible values on this scale ranged from 10 (highest degree of 
situational attribution style) to 50 (highest degree of dispositional attribution style). Respondents’ 
mean on the attribution scale was moderate at 27.45. 
 Based on previous studies (e.g., Grasmick and McGill, 1994), possessing a dispositional or a 
situational attribution style should be associated with having a fundamentally punitive or progressive 
philosophy toward convicted offenders.  We tested this proposition by hypothesizing a direct path 
between attribution style and attitudes toward the correctional treatment of adult and juvenile 
offenders.  Again, we utilized one scale to measure attitudes toward system treatment for adult and 
juvenile offenders.  The scale was comprised of twelve items, which operationalize the general 
sentencing philosophies of retribution, incapacitation, specific and general deterrence, restitution, and 
rehabilitation.  The items included the following statements: 
1. “When determining the sentence for adult offenders who have been legally convicted of crimes,  
the circumstances of the offense, such as weapon used, planning, injury to the victim, and amount 
of loss are not important.  Instead, the sentence should be solely based on the seriousness of the 
offense committed.” 
2. “When determining the sentence for juvenile offenders who have been legally convicted of crimes,  
the circumstances of the offense, such as weapon used, planning, injury to the victim, and amount 
of loss are not important.  Instead, the sentence should be solely based on the seriousness of the 
offense committed.” 
 60
3. “The best way to deal with adults who have been legally convicted of crimes is to lock them up so 
they are not able to harm anyone again.” 
4. “The best way to deal with juveniles who have been legally convicted of crimes is to lock them up 
so they are not able to harm anyone again.” 
5. “The best way to deal with adults who have been legally convicted of crimes is to punish them  
harshly so they will learn their lesson and not commit other crimes.” 
6. “The best way to deal with juveniles who have been legally convicted of crimes is to punish them 
harshly, so they will learn their lesson and not commit other crimes.” 
7. “The best way to deal with adults who have been legally convicted of crimes is to punish them to 
the extent that they will pay their debt to society for the crimes they have committed.” 
8. “The best way to deal with juveniles who have been legally convicted of crimes is to punish them 
to the extent that they will pay their debt to society for the crimes they have committed.” 
9. “The best way to deal with adults who have been legally convicted of crimes is to punish them 
harshly to set an example, so that others will not commit crimes.” 
10. “The best way to deal with juveniles who have been legally convicted of crimes is to punish them 
harshly to set an example, so that others will not commit crimes.” 
11. “The best way to deal with adults who have been legally convicted of crimes is to treat and help 
them so that they do not commit other crimes.” 
12. “The best way to deal with juveniles who have been legally convicted of crimes is to treat and help 
them so that they do not commit other crimes.” 
Response categories for each of these items ranged from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree.  The 
rehabilitation item was re-coded, so higher scores on the scale were reflective of a less rehabilitative 
sentencing philosophy.  The items were entered into a principal components factor analysis.  The Kaiser 
Rule suggested the presence of three factors (eigenvalues = 4.22, 1.95, and 1.52); however the greatest 
difference between the eigenvalues was between the first two, thereby meeting the single factor criterion of 
the Scree Discontinuity Test.  It is also of interest to note that the overall reliability of the scale was high 
(Cronbach’s Alpha = .79), and deleting any of the twelve items would not substantially improve it.  Factor 
loadings ranged from .01 (juveniles should be rehabilitated) to .83 (juveniles should be punished to set an 
example so others will not commit crimes).  Factor loadings for each item, as well as the full results of this 
factor analysis are reported in Appendix E.  Possible scores ranged from 12 (most rehabilitative approach 
toward offenders) to 60 (most punitive philosophy toward system treatment of offenders).  Respondents in 
this sample were almost right in the middle of the continuum, with an average score of 37.32. 
 Finally, we predicted that a general punitive or rehabilitative punishment philosophy would be 
related to attitudes toward capital punishment, measured as described above.  Specifically, a punitive 
punishment philosophy would be positively associated with capital punishment support, and a more 
rehabilitative sentiment toward offenders would be associated with opposition to capital punishment.  The 
correlation matrix for the variables in the attribution theory analysis appears in Table 5.  
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Table 5.  Correlation Matrix of Variables in the Attribution Theory Analysis 
 sex race age education income ideology abortion sexroles 
sex 1.00 -0.04 0.04 0.03 0.09* 0.01 0.01 0.17* 
race  1.00 0.13* -0.04 -0.07 -0.13* 0.04 0.03 
age   1.00 -0.02 0.06 0.10* 0.05 0.19* 
education    1.00 0.36* 0.01 -0.13* -0.16* 
income     1.00 0.09* -0.11* -0.06 
ideology      1.00 0.33* 0.24* 
abortion       1.00 0.37* 
sexroles        1.00 
socwlfre 
cjscale 
theol. emph. 
punitive t.e. 
Bib. lit 
attrib.style 
pun. phil. 
dpscale 
 
Continued on next page 
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Table 5 continued 
 
 socwlfre  cjscale theol. emph. punitive t.e. Bib. lit attrib. style pun. phil. dpscale 
sex 0.19*  -0.07 0.11* 0.07  -0.04 0.03  0.04  0.09* 
race -0.21*  -0.21* -0.09* 0.09  0.04 -0.02  0.01  -0.14* 
age 0.01  0.13* -0.05 0.00  0.06 0.11* 0.00  0.01 
education 0.09*  0.12* 0.03 -0.11*  -0.18* -0.14* -0.17*  -0.14* 
income 0.15*  0.16* 0.09* -0.07  -0.13* -0.02  -0.04  0.07 
ideology 0.27*  0.19* -0.12* 0.08*  0.28* 0.13* 0.14*  0.17* 
abortion 0.13*  0.07 -0.33* 0.11*  0.44* 0.10* -0.02  -0.11* 
sexroles 0.21*  -0.11* -0.05 0.10*  0.22* 0.07  0.12*  0.04 
socwlfre 1.00  0.16* 0.13* -0.05  -0.02 0.22* 0.17*  0.22* 
cjscale   1.00 -0.05 -0.08  0.07 -0.01  0.03  0.06 
theol. emph.    1.00 -0.25*  -0.53* 0.09* 0.10*  0.15* 
punitive t.e.     1.00  0.42* 0.08  0.24*  0.13* 
Bib. lit.       1.00 -0.02  0.13*  0.11* 
attrib. style        1.00  0.13*  0.22* 
pun. phil.          1.00  0.45* 
dpscale            1.00 
 
* Significant at p<.05 
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Control Variables 
 Several opinion polls have suggested that socio-demographic variables may be related to attitudes 
toward capital punishment.  Thus, we controlled for them in the present study.  Sex is coded as a dummy 
variable (0 = female).  Age is measured in number of years.  Education is measured on an ordinal scale, 
ranging from 1 = grade school or less to 8 = an advanced degree.  Income is measured by combined 
household annual income, also an ordinal scale, ranging from 1 = under $10,000 to 10 = $150,000+.  In 
addition to socio-demographic variables, we control for several socio-political variables, as they, too, are 
likely to be related to both religious affiliation and death penalty attitudes.  First, political ideology is 
measured by a single item that asked respondents to identify their social and political views as: (1) very 
liberal, (2) somewhat liberal, (3) middle of the road, (4) somewhat conservative, or (5) very conservative.  
Note that we also asked respondents which, if any, political party they were a member of, but due to the 
risk of multicollinearity, this variable was not controlled for in the analysis. 
 Second, a five-item additive abortion scale was created (alpha = .87).  This scale was measured 
with five indicators of support for abortion under varying circumstances.   Specifically, these circumstances 
included: (1) under any circumstances, (2) when a woman’s health or life is endangered, (3) when the 
fetus’s health or life is endangered, (4) when the pregnancy was the result of a rape, and (5) when the 
mother cannot afford to raise the child.  These five items were entered into a principal components factor 
analysis, from which the Kaiser Rule suggested a single factor solution (eigenvalue = 3.29).  Factor 
loadings ranged from .74 (consideration of abortion when mother was poor) to .87 (consideration of 
abortion when the pregnancy was the result of rape) (see Appendix F). 
 Third, a three-item additive gender roles scale was created (alpha = .70).  Specifically, respondents 
were asked whether women should have an equal role with men in running businesses, the military, and the 
family.  Response options ranged from 1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree.  These three items were 
also entered into a principal components factor analysis, and the Kaiser Rule, again, indicated the presence 
of a single factor solution (eigenvalue = 1.96).  Factor loadings ranged from .77 (women should have an 
equal role with men in the military to .84 (women should have an equal role with men in businesses) (see 
Appendix F). 
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 Fourth, a two-item social welfare scale was created (alpha = .67).  Participants were asked whether 
they believed that the government should improve the social and economic conditions of minorities 
through: (1) affirmative action and (2) social welfare programs.  Again, the possible responses ranged from 
1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree.  A principal components factor analysis revealed that the two 
items successfully created one scale (eigenvalue = 1.50). 
 Finally, an additive four-item criminal justice scale was created based on respondents’ attitudes 
toward the police (alpha = .80).  Respondents were offered Likert-type statements, to which they were 
asked to indicated the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with the following statements: (1) “most 
police officers are prejudiced”; (2) “most police officers abuse their discretion”; (3) “most police officers 
are untrustworthy”; and (4) “most police officers act professionally when dealing with citizens” (reverse 
coded).  These items were entered into a principal components factor analysis, and the Kaiser Rule 
supported a single factor solution (eigenvalue = 2.56).  Factor loadings ranged from .75 (belief that most 
police officers are prejudice) to .82 (belief that most police officers are untrustworthy).  Appendix F 
provides the eigenvalues and the item-to-scale correlations for each of the control variables. 
 Table 3 provides the correlation matrix for the religion and the control variables.  Notice that the 
correlations between the control variable items were largely non-significant, thereby showing no 
explanatory overlap and enabling each to possess unique explanatory power—in other words, there does 
not appear to be a problem with multicollinearity. 
Analytic Strategy
 The statistical analysis will proceed in two stages.  First, we use analysis of variance (ANOVA) to 
assess significant differences in attitudes toward capital punishment by faith.  We then employ OLS 
regression to determine whether the variables in each path are, as we predicted, directly related to one 
another.  The strength and significance of the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable 
in each path is indicative of the success of attribution theory as a conceptual framework through which the 
relationship between religion and attitudes toward capital punishment may be understood.  We also utilized 
OLS regression to assess all of the possible indirect effects of the variables on one another (e.g., the 
possible effect of theological emphasis on attribution style or Biblical literalness on punishment 
philosophy).  These effects will not be reported in great detail, as they are not the focus of the analysis.
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Table 6.  Descriptions of the Variables in the Test of Attribution Theory (N = 636)a
 
Variable    Description   Mean  STD 
 
Theological Emphasis 
 Progressive  6-item additive scaleb  12.29  4.78 
 Punitive   4-item additive scaleb  10.60  3.41 
 
Biblical literalness  5-item additive scaleb  17.80  5.25 
 
Attribution style   10-item additive scaleb  27.45  4.21 
 
Punishment philosophy  12-item additive scaleb  37.32  7.10 
 
 
 
 
a The analyses include only Blacks, whites, and Hispanics.  All others (American Indians or 
 Alaskan Natives and Asians) were deleted from the analysis. 
 
b Appendix E describes the construction of these composite scales. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS: THE EFFECTS OF RACE AND RELIGION ON DEATH PENALTY ATTITUDES 
 We first conducted an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to assess significant differences in attitudes 
toward capital punishment by faith (hypothesis 1).  Table 7 contains the full results of the ANOVA 
procedure for all three measures of religious conservativism.  Prior to classifying faith groups into the 
liberal/moderate/conservative categories (which, recall, was due to the small number of individuals in some 
faiths and the small number of minorities in all faiths), we examined the differences in mean levels of 
overall support for capital punishment between each of the nine faith groups (see line 1 of Table 7).  
Inconsistent with our expectations, both the Tukey and Scheffe comparison of means tests revealed the 
presence of only one significant relationship: Baptists exhibited significantly higher levels of support for 
capital punishment overall (mean=49.54) than members of other faith groups (mean=45.95).  The overall 
model, however, was not significant.  When the faith groups were classified into religious traditions 
(liberal, moderate, and conservative), we expected to find a higher number of significant relationships, 
given the larger number of individuals in each group.  This was not the case.  Results of the Tukey and 
Scheffe comparison of means tests demonstrated no appreciable mean differences in overall death penalty 
attitudes between any of the classifications, and the overall model was also not significant (F=2.52, p>.05). 
 Because conservative Protestant faiths are reputed to be particularly proscriptive in their moral 
messages, we conducted an ANOVA to assess mean differences between members of these faiths and 
members of other faith groups.  Line 1 of Table 7 reports the results of this model.  Consistent with our 
expectation, conservative Protestants displayed significantly higher levels of support for capital punishment 
(mean=48.44) than members of other religions (mean=46.04).  The overall model was significant (F=4.86, 
p<.05), but it explained almost none of the variation in capital punishment attitudes (R²=.008). 
 Given the surprisingly weak association between religious affiliation and death penalty attitudes, 
we assessed faith group differences in capital punishment support by specifically examining support for 
capital punishment by offender and offense types (i.e., the 14 individual items that comprised the overall 
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Table 7. Analysis of Variance of Death Penalty Attitudes by Religious Conservativism, Measured by Faith 
Group, Religious Tradition, and Membership in a Conservative Protestant Denomination 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable  F-value  F-value   F-value 
    faith group religious tradition conservative Protestant 
 
dp-support scale   1.531   2.52   4.86* (.008)² 
 
adult-general support    1.20   2.03 
adult-murder of cj employee   2.74   5.04*  (.008) 
adult-planned murder    2.26   1.00 
adult-murder of child    0.89   0.42 
adult-unplanned murder    3.63* (.011)  7.10* (.011) 
adult-rape     0.09   0.01 
adult-child molestation    0.75   1.01 
juvenile-general support    2.85   5.19* (.008) 
juvenile-murder of cj employee   4.51* (.014)  8.28* (.013) 
juvenile-planned murder    3.54* (.011)  6.02* (.009) 
juvenile-murder of child    5.46* (.017)  8.05* (.013) 
juvenile-unplanned murder   4.35* (.014)  8.92* (.014) 
juvenile-rape     0.46   0.93 
juvenile-child molestation    1.09   1.58 
 
 
 
1 This overall model was non-significant; however, the ANOVA procedure revealed a significant 
 difference between Baptists and members of other faiths (F=9.16, p<.05). 
 
2 The R² values are reported in parenthesis next to those models that are significant. 
 
* Significant at p<.05 
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scale).  Due to the small number of members in most religions, we conducted ANOVAs for only the latter 
two measures of religious conservativism, religious tradition and membership in a conservative Protestant 
faith group. 
 When death penalty support is analyzed by offender and offense types and faith group is measured 
by religious tradition, 5 of the 14 models attain significance (see Table 7).  These models include support 
for capital punishment for juveniles who murder a criminal justice employee (F=4.51, p<.05), commit a 
planned murder (F=3.54, p<.05), murder a child (F=5046, p<.05), and commit an unplanned murder 
(F=4.35, p<.05) and adults who commit an unplanned murder (F=3.63, p<.05).  All of the models were 
weak, though, as they explained only 1.1 percent (juveniles who commit a planned murder and adults who 
commit an unplanned murder) to 1.7 percent (juveniles who murder a child) of the variation in death 
penalty attitudes.  Interestingly, four of the five significant models involve the execution of juvenile 
offenders, suggesting greater polarization among faith traditions with respect to juvenile rather than adult 
capital punishment.  Also interesting, in all five of the significant models, the Tukey and Scheffe 
comparison of means tests revealed that the only significant differences in mean support for capital 
punishment were between individuals affiliated with moderate and conservative faith groups, with 
members of conservative traditions displaying higher levels of support for the death penalty in all of the 
models.  There are no distinguishable differences between members of liberal and conservative religions.  
One possible explanation for this unexpected finding may be that the religious “liberal” category contains 
individuals claiming no religious affiliation.  There is no guarantee, in retrospect, that individuals without 
religious affiliation are actually liberal in their political or social ideologies. 
 When the measure of the independent variable is dichotomized (i.e., conservative Protestants/non-
conservative Protestants), similar findings to the previous ones occur.  Specifically, 7 of the 14 models 
attain significance: general support for juvenile capital punishment (F=5.19, p<.05), death penalty support 
for adults (F=5.04, p<.05) and juveniles (F=8.28, p<.05) who murder a criminal justice employee, juveniles 
who commit a planned murder (F=6.02, p<.05), juveniles who murder a child (F=8.05, p<.05), and adults 
(F=7.10, p<.05) and juveniles (F=8.92, p<.05) who commit an unplanned murder.  The mean level of 
support for capital punishment was higher for conservative Protestants than members of other faith groups 
in all of these models.  None of the models explained a substantial amount of variation in attitudes toward 
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capital punishment.  The weakest model (adults who committed an unplanned murder) accounted for 1.1 
percent of the variance, and the strongest (juveniles who committed an unplanned murder) accounted for 
1.4 percent.  Note that all five of the models that were significant when faith groups were trichotomized 
were also significant when the independent variable was dichotomized.  The only change was the addition 
of two significant models, general support for juvenile capital punishment and adults who murder a 
criminal justice employee. 
 Summarily, the first hypothesis that there would be a positive relationship between religious 
conservativism and support for capital punishment received mixed support.  Although there were some 
significant differences between moderate and conservative faith groups, being a member of a conservative 
Protestant denomination appeared to be the best predictor of support for capital punishment.  (Recall that 
the “conservative” category of the religious tradition measure was comprised of only Protestant 
denominations.)  Indeed, when conservative Protestants were compared with members of other faith 
groups, they displayed significantly higher levels of support for capital punishment in half of the offender 
and offense-specific models.  It is premature to draw any conclusions based on these findings alone, 
however.  The effect of individuals’ commitment to their religion and the importance of religion in their 
daily lives must also be considered, as group membership combined with the degree to which individuals 
identify the group as important (religiosity) affect their attitudes and behaviors. 
 We address the effect of religiosity in our second hypothesis: as religiosity increases, the effect of 
religious conservativism on capital punishment support will increase.  We employ Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) Regression to address this hypothesis and, again, use religious tradition and membership in a 
conservative Protestant faith group as measures of religious conservativism.  Table 8 reports the results for 
these analyses.  See also Appendix G for the effects of the control variables in both sets of models. 
 In the religious tradition models, religious tradition significantly affected death penalty attitudes in 
six of the models: adults who rape (b=-.37, p<.05), the overall juvenile scale (b=-2.22, p<.05), general 
support for juvenile capital punishment (b=-.53, p<.05), juveniles who commit a planned murder (b=-.45, 
p<.05), juveniles who rape (b=-.44, p<.05), and juveniles who molest a child (b=-.35, p<.05).  Somewhat 
surprisingly, the effect of religious conservativism on capital punishment support was negative; however, 
this effect occurred when religiosity was controlled.   When the interactive effects of religious tradition and 
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Table 8.  OLS Regression of Death Penalty Attitudes by Religious Conservativism (Measured by Religious 
Tradition and Membership in a Conservative Protestant Denomination) and Religiosity 
 
Dependent Variable  religious tradition  religious tradition*religiosity 
    b se(b) B  b se(b) B 
 
adult-overall scale  -1.11 0.90 -0.14  0.08 0.05 0.29 
adult-general support  -0.23 0.16 -0.16  0.02 0.01 0.34 
adult-murder of cj employee 0.04 0.16 0.03  0.00 0.01 0.08 
adult-planned murder  -0.11 0.16 -0.08  0.01 0.01 0.23 
adult-murder of child  -0.05 0.17 -0.04  0.01 0.01 0.12 
adult-unplanned murder  -0.11 0.13 -0.23  0.01 0.01 0.29 
adult-rape   -0.37* 0.17 -0.25  0.02 0.01 0.35 
adult-child molestation  -0.28 0.17 -0.20  0.01 0.01 0.24 
juvenile-overall scale  -2.22* 0.85 -0.29  0.16* 0.05 0.57 
juvenile-general support  -0.53* 0.17 -0.35  0.04* 0.01 0.67 
juvenile-murder of cj employee -0.12 0.15 -0.09  0.02* 0.01 0.37 
juvenile-planned murder  -0.45* 0.16 -0.31  0.03* 0.01 0.61 
juvenile-murder of child  -0.19 0.15 -0.14  0.02* 0.01 0.38 
juvenile-unplanned murder -0.14 0.13 -0.12  0.01 0.01 0.33 
juvenile-rape   -0.44* 0.15 -0.33  0.02* 0.01 0.51 
juvenile-child molestation  -0.35* 0.15 -0.28  0.02* 0.01 0.38 
 
    conservative Protestant  conservative Protestant*religiosity 
    b se(b) B  b se(b) B 
 
adult-overall scale  -0.94 1.45 -0.06  0.10 0.08 0.13 
adult-general support  -0.24 0.26 -0.09  0.02 0.01 0.17 
adult-murder of cj employee 0.10 0.25 0.04  0.01 0.01 0.06 
adult-planned murder  -0.26 0.26 -0.10  0.02 0.01 0.18 
adult-murder of child  -0.10 0.27 -0.04  0.01 0.01 0.09 
adult-unplanned murder  -0.09 0.21 -0.04  0.01 0.01 0.13 
adult-rape   -0.44 0.27 -0.17  0.02 0.01 0.16 
adult-child molestation  0.08 0.27 0.03  -0.00 0.01 -0.03 
juvenile-overall scale  -0.90 1.38 -0.06  0.11 0.07 0.15 
juvenile-general support  -0.23 0.28 -0.08  0.03 0.01 0.19 
juvenile-murder of cj employee 0.06 0.24 0.03  0.01 0.01 0.09 
juvenile-planned murder  -0.37 0.26 -0.14  0.03* 0.01 0.26 
juvenile-murder of child  -0.11 0.25 -0.05  0.02 0.01 0.15 
juvenile-unplanned murder 0.07 0.21 0.03  0.00 0.01 0.04 
juvenile-rape   -0.34 0.25 -0.14  0.02 0.01 0.15 
juvenile-child molestation  0.03 0.24 0.01  -0.00 0.01 -0.02 
 
 
 
*Significant at p<.05 
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religiosity were considered, the cross product term attained significance in 7 of the 8 juvenile models, but 
none of the adult models, thereby corroborating our earlier claim that the religion-death penalty attitudes 
relationship may be polarized among faith groups with respect to executing juvenile, but not adult, 
offenders.  The effects in these models were weak, but consistent with our hypothesis.  So, as religiosity 
increases, the effect of religious conservativism on capital punishment support also increases…for juvenile 
offenders: overall juvenile support scale (b=.16, p<.05), general support for juvenile capital punishment 
(b=.04, p<.05), juveniles who murdered a criminal justice employee (b=.02, p<.05), juveniles who 
committed a planned murder (b=.03, p<.05), juveniles who murdered a child (b=.02, p<.05), juveniles who 
raped (b=.02, p<.05), and juveniles who molested a child (b=.02, p<.05).  All 16 of the full models attained 
significance and possessed variable explanatory power, ranging from 10.8 percent (adults who raped) to 
19.5 percent (overall juvenile death penalty scale).  The F-values and R² values are as follows: overall adult 
scale (F=7.16, p<.05; R²=.170), general support for adult capital punishment (F=7.76, p<.05; R²=.182), 
adult murder of a criminal justice employee (F=5.69, p<.05; R²=.140), adult planned murder (F=5.60, 
p<.05; R²=.138), adult murder of child (F=5.75, p<.05; R²=.142), adult unplanned murder (F=4.69, p<.05; 
R²=.118), adult rape (F=4.23, p<.05; R²=.108), adult child molestation (F=4.72, p<.05; R²=.119), overall 
juvenile scale (F=8.47, p<.05; R²=.195), general support for juvenile capital punishment (F=7.21, p<.05; 
R²=.171), juvenile murder of a criminal justice employee (F=6.97, p<.05; R²=.166), juvenile planned 
murder (F=7.18, p<.05; R²=.171), juvenile murder of child (F=6.78, p<.05; R²=.163), juvenile unplanned 
murder (F=4.80, p<.05; R²=.121), juvenile rape (F=5.24, p<.05; R²=.131), and juvenile child molestation 
(F=5.20, p<.05; R²=.130). 
 Unlike the religious tradition models, religious conservativism measured by membership in a 
conservative Protestant faith group did not affect capital punishment support in any of the 16 models when 
all other variables were controlled.  Table 8 reports the results of these models and Appendix G reports the 
effects of the control variables.  The interactive effect of membership in a conservative Protestant faith and 
religiosity affected death penalty support in only one model, juveniles who committed a planned murder 
(b=.03, p<.05).  Note that this single significant effect is a juvenile model, and it is in the expected 
direction.  All of the 16 overall models were significant and explained between 8.6 percent (adults who 
molested a child) and 18.8 percent (general support for adult capital punishment) of the variation in death 
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penalty attitudes.  The F values and R² values were as follows: adult death penalty scale (F=9.47, p<.05; 
R²=.165), general support for capital punishment for adults (F=11.04, p<.05; R²=.188), adult murder of a 
criminal justice employee (F=9.08, p<.05; R²=.160), adult planned murder (F=7.65, p<.05; R²=.138), adult 
murder of child (F=7.45, p<.05; R²=.135), adult unplanned murder (F=6.85, p<.05; R²=.125), adult rape 
(F=4.49, p<.05; R²=.086), adult child molestation (F=4.48, p<.05; R²=.086), juvenile death penalty scale 
(F=10.36, p<.05; R²=.178), general support for juvenile death penalty (F=9.02, p<.05; R²=.159), juvenile 
murder of a criminal justice employee (F=9.76, p<.05; R²=.169), juvenile planned murder (F=9.01, p<.05; 
R²=.156), juvenile murder of child (F=8.61, p<.05; R²=.153), juvenile unplanned murder (F=6.93, p<.05; 
R²=.127), juvenile rape (F=5.57, p<.05; R²=.104), and juvenile child molestation (F=5.14, p<.05; R²=.097). 
 We turn now to our third hypothesis: across faith groups, support for capital punishment will be 
greater among whites than among Blacks and Hispanics.  An ANOVA revealed that, indeed, there were 
significant differences between whites and non-whites in their death penalty attitudes (F=12.63, p<.05).  
The Tukey and Scheffe comparison of means tests indicated that whites (mean=47.60) exhibited a 
significantly higher level of support for capital punishment than non-whites (mean=43.06).  The model 
explained 2 percent of the variance in death penalty attitudes.  Table 9 reports these findings. 
 When death penalty support is considered for specific offenders and offense types, the data 
demonstrated significant mean differences between whites and non-whites in 10 of the 14 models: general 
support for adult capital punishment (F=16.93, p<.05), support for the death penalty for adults (F=20.94, 
p<.05) and juveniles (F=16.79, p<.05) who murder a criminal justice employee, adults (F=8.56, p<.05) and 
juveniles (F=7.50, p<.05) who commit a planned murder, adults (F=10.55, p<.05) and juveniles (F=8.02, 
p<.05) who murder a child, adults who commit an unplanned murder (F=6.74, p<.05), and adults (F=8.88, 
p<.05) and juveniles (F=3.87, p<.05) who rape.  All of the models were weak in that they explained little 
variance in capital punishment attitudes; the R² values ranged from .006 (support for the death penalty for 
juveniles who rape) to .032 (support for the death penalty for adults who murder a criminal justice 
employee).  The remaining four models (general support for juvenile capital punishment, capital 
punishment support for juveniles who commit an unplanned murder, and for adults and juveniles who 
molest a child) were not significant.  Whites displayed more favorable attitudes toward capital punishment 
than non-whites in all ten of the significant models.  See Table 9 for a summary of these findings. 
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Table 9. Analysis of Variance of Death Penalty Attitudes by Race 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable  F-value   mean (whites)  mean (non-whites) 
 
dp support scale   12.63* (.020)1  47.60   43.06 
 
adult-general support  16.93* (.026)  3.97   3.45 
adult-murder of cj employee 20.94* (.032)  3.69   3.15 
adult-planned murder  8.56* (.013)  4.02   3.66 
adult-murder of child  10.55* (.016)  4.02   3.62 
adult-unplanned murder  6.74* (.011)  3.07   2.81 
adult-rape   8.88* (.014)  3.44   3.07 
adult-child molestation  3.43 
juvenile-general support  2.91 
juvenile-murder of cj employee 16.79* (.026)  3.31   2.85 
juvenile-planned murder  7.50* (.012)  3.56   3.22 
juvenile-murder of child   8.02* (.012)  3.45   3.12 
juvenile-unplanned murder 1.73 
juvenile-rape   3.87* (.006)  3.10   2.87 
juvenile-child molestation  1.85 
 
 
 
1 The R² values are reported in parentheses next to those models that are significant. 
 
* Significant at p<.05 
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 The ANOVA revealed strong support for our third hypothesis, regardless of whether the 
dependent variable was the death penalty attitudinal scale or the items comprising the scale.  Whites 
consistently displayed higher levels of support for capital punishment than Blacks and Hispanics.  The 
scope of these findings, though, is largely untelling.  Although race does constitute a group through which 
attitudes and behaviors may be affected, members of each race also belong to other groups, making it 
necessary to understand how attitudes are affected with the presence of multiple groups. 
 We analyze the differential effects of religious conservativism on capital punishment support 
while controlling for religiosity among whites and Blacks/Hispanics separately in our fourth and fifth 
hypotheses: among whites, as religiosity increases, the effect of religious conservativism on capital 
punishment support will increase; and among Blacks and Hispanics, as religiosity increases, the effect of 
religious conservativism on capital punishment support will remain unchanged.  Consistent with our 
previous analyses, we utilize religious tradition and membership in a conservative Protestant faith group as 
measures of religious conservativism.   
 Hypothesis 4 regarding the effect of religious conservativism on capital punishment support for 
whites received only slight support.  In the religious tradition models, religious tradition negatively affected 
death penalty support among whites in four of the juvenile circumstances, indicating that the more 
conservative their religious tradition, the less likely whites were to support capital punishment.  The four 
models included the overall juvenile death penalty scale (b=-1.77, p<.05), general support for juvenile 
capital punishment (b=-.43, p<.05), juveniles who commit a planned murder (b=-.37, p<.05), and juveniles 
who rape (b=-.37, p<.05).  Table 10 reports the results for both the religious tradition and membership in a 
conservative Protestant faith group models for whites.  Appendix H displays the effects of the control 
variables in these models.  More important than the effect of religious tradition on capital punishment 
support is the test of our hypothesis, which addresses the effect of religious conservativism on capital 
punishment support for whites as their degree of religiosity increases.  When the interactive effects of 
religious conservativism and religiosity are considered, they attain significance in the same four models as 
religious tradition; however, their relationship to capital punishment support is positive in the direction we 
expected.  Notice that the effects weaken when religiosity is considered.  The unstandardized Beta 
coefficients are: overall juvenile death penalty scale (b=.14, p<.05), general support for juvenile capital  
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Table 10. OLS Regression of Death Penalty Attitudes by Religious Conservativism (Measured by 
Religious Tradition and Membership in a Conservative Protestant Denomination) and Religiosity Among 
Whites 
 
Dependent Variable  religious tradition  religious tradition*religiosity 
    b se(b) B  b se(b) B 
 
adult-overall scale  -0.72 0.95 -0.09  0.06 0.13 0.22 
adult-general support  -0.15 0.17 -0.10  0.01 0.01 0.23 
adult-murder of cj employee 0.09 0.16 0.06  0.00 0.01 0.04 
adult-planned murder  -0.04 0.17 -0.03  0.01 0.01 0.18 
adult-murder of child  -0.01 0.17 -0.01  0.00 0.01 0.07 
adult-unplanned murder  -0.07 0.13 -0.07  0.01 0.01 0.29 
adult-rape   -0.29 0.18 -0.19  0.01 0.01 0.28 
adult-child molestation  -0.25 0.18 -0.17  0.01 0.01 0.20 
juvenile-overall scale  -1.77* 0.89 -0.23  0.14* 0.05 0.53 
juvenile-general support  -0.43* 0.18 -0.28  0.03* 0.01 0.52 
juvenile-murder of cj employee -0.04 0.15 -0..03  0.01 0.01 0.31 
juvenile-planned murder  -0.37* 0.17 -0.26  0.03* 0.01 0.60 
juvenile-murder of child  -0.15 0.17 -0.11  0.02 0.01 0.36 
juvenile-unplanned murder -0.11 0.13 -0.10  0.01 0.01 0.35 
juvenile-rape   -0.37* 0.16 -0.28  0.02* 0.01 0.51 
juvenile-child molestation  -0.29 0.16 -0.23  0.02 0.01 0.35 
 
    conservative Protestant  conservative Protestant*religiosity 
    b se(b) B  b se(b) B 
 
adult-overall scale  -0.76 1.49 -0.05  0.08 0.08 0.12 
adult-general support  -0.19 0.26 -0.07  0.02 0.01 0.15 
adult-murder of cj employee 0.08 0.25 0.03  0.01 0.01 0.08 
adult-planned murder  -0.24 0.27 -0.09  0.02 0.01 0.18 
adult-murder of child  -0.13 0.27 -0.05  0.01 0.01 0.09 
adult-unplanned murder  -0.12 0.21 -0.06  0.02 0.01 0.16 
adult-rape   -0.32 0.29 -0.12  0.01 0.02 0.11 
adult-child molestation  0.17 0.28 0.06  -0.01 0.02 -0.08 
juvenile-overall scale  -0.55 1.42 -0.04  0.11 0.08 0.16 
juvenile-general support  -0.15 0.29 -0.06  0.02 0.02 0.15 
juvenile-murder of cj employee 0.08 0.25 0.03  0.01 0.01 0.10 
juvenile-planned murder  -0.28 0.26 -0.11  0.03* 0.01 0.28 
juvenile-murder of child  -0.12 0.26 -0.05  0.02 0.01 0.18 
juvenile-unplanned murder 0.02 0.21 0.01  0.01 0.01 0.10 
juvenile-rape   -0.22 0.26 -0.09  0.02 0.01 0.15 
juvenile-child molestation  0.12 0.24 0.05  -0.00 0.01 -0.04 
 
 
 
*Significant at p<.05 
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punishment (b=.03, p<.05), juveniles who commit a planned murder (b=.03, p<.05), and juveniles who rape 
(b=.02, p<.05).  All of the 16 overall models are significant and have R² values ranging from .094 (adults 
who rape) to .190 (general support for adult death penalty).  The F values and R² values are: overall adult 
death penalty scale (F=6.9, p<.05; R²=.171), general support for adult capital punishment (F=7.42, p<.05; 
R²=.190), adult murder of a criminal justice employee (F=4.96, p<.05; R²=.136), adult planned murder 
(F=5.39, p<.05; R²=.145), adult murder of a child (F=5.41, p<.05; R²=.146), adult unplanned murder 
(F=4.69, p<.05; R²=.129), adult rape (F=3.29, p<.05; R²=.094), adult child molestation (F=4.67, p<.05; 
R²=.129), overall juvenile capital punishment scale (F=7.26, p<.05; R²=.187), general support for juvenile 
death penalty (F=6.65, p<.05; R²=.174), juvenile murder of a criminal justice employee (F=5.89, p<.05; 
R²=.157), juvenile planned murder (F=6.15, p<.05; R²=.163), juvenile murder of a child (F=5.77, p<.05; 
R²=.154), juvenile unplanned murder (F=4.58, p<.05; .126), juvenile rape (F=4.15, p<.05; R²=.116), and 
juvenile child molestation (F=4.49, p<.05; R²=.124). 
 When we changed the measure of religious conservativism to membership in a conservative 
Protestant faith group, we found different results of the effect of religious conservativism on capital 
punishment support among whites.  Our hypothesis received almost no support.  Indeed, membership in a 
conservative Protestant faith did not significantly affect whites’ attitudes toward capital punishment in any 
of the models.  More importantly, the more religious white members of conservative Protestant faith groups 
were, the more likely they were to support capital punishment in only one model—juveniles who 
committed a planned murder (b=.03, p<.05).  This isolated finding is untelling with regard to the effect of 
religious conservativism on capital punishment support.  Our failure to find significant results is more 
shocking, especially in light of the body of literature that suggests that highly religious white members of 
conservative Protestant faith groups display considerably conservative social and political attitudes, 
including support for the death penalty.  All 16 of the overall models attained significance and possessed 
explanatory power, ranging from 7.3 percent (adults who rape) to 21.2 percent (general support for capital 
punishment for adults).  The F values and R² values in each model were as follows: overall adult capital 
punishment scale (F=8.50, p<.05; R²=.168), general support for adult death penalty (F=11.32, p<.05; 
R²=.212), adult murder of a criminal justice employee (F=7.78, p<.05; R²=.156), adult planned murder 
(F=6.72, p<.05; R²=.138), adult murder of a child (F=6.68, p<.05; .137), adult unplanned murder (F=6.75, 
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p<.05; R²=.138), adult rape (F=3.31, p<.05; R²=.073), adult child molestation (F=4.43, p<.05; R²=.095), 
overall juvenile death penalty scale (F=9.41, p<.05; R²=.183), general capital punishment support for 
juveniles (F=8.74, p<.05; R²=.172), juvenile murder of a criminal justice employee (F=8.68, p<.05; 
R²=.171), juvenile planned murder (8.57, p<.05; R²=.169), juvenile murder of a child (F=7.83, p<.05; 
R²=.157), juvenile unplanned murder (F=6.63, p<.05; R²=.136), juvenile rape (F=4.35, p<.05; R²=.094), 
and juvenile child molestation (F=4.57, p<.05; R²=.098). 
 Our fifth hypothesis that religious conservativism should not affect death penalty attitudes among 
Blacks and Hispanics, regardless of their levels of religiosity, was almost entirely supported.  Religious 
tradition was only significant in the general death penalty support for juveniles model (b=-1.71, p<.05).  
Although this finding seems to suggest that as religious conservativism increases, death penalty support 
decreases, keep in mind that the effect of religiosity, which likely mediates faith group effects, is not 
considered.  Indeed, when religiosity is considered, religious conservativism measured by religious 
tradition is associated with increased support for capital punishment.  This effect is weak and is also 
observed in the general juvenile death penalty model (b=.12, p<.05).  More important is the larger picture 
that as religiosity increases among Blacks and Hispanics, religious conservativism has no significant effect 
on capital punishment attitudes.  Only three of these overall models attained significance: the overall 
juvenile death penalty scale (F=2.06, p<.05; R²=.285), general support for juvenile capital punishment 
(F=2.32, p<.05; R²=.310), and juvenile unplanned murder (F=2.16, p<.05; R²=.295).  Notice that the 
explanatory power of these models is substantially higher than that of the previous models that included 
both whites and non-whites and whites only. 
 When we measured religious conservativism with membership in a conservative Protestant faith 
group, the results are very similar to our findings for non-whites when religious conservativism was 
measured with religious tradition.  Membership in a conservative Protestant faith group was not significant 
in any of the 16 non-white models.  The interaction term conservative Protestant faith*religiosity was not 
significant in 15 of the 16 models, suggesting that, regardless of their degrees of religiosity, Black and 
Hispanic members of conservative Protestant denominations were not more likely than Black and Hispanic 
members of other faith groups to support the death penalty.  The model in which the interactive effect of 
religious conservativism and religiosity was significant (general support for juvenile capital punishment) 
 78
revealed that more highly religious Black and Hispanic members of conservative Protestant faith groups 
displayed higher levels of capital punishment support than their less religious counterparts (b=.11, p<.05).  
The results of these models, as well as for the religious tradition models, are reported in Table 11, and the 
effects of the control variables are reported in Appendix I for both the religious tradition and membership 
in a conservative Protestant denomination models.  Five of these sixteen overall models were significant, 
but explained less variation in capital punishment attitudes than the religious tradition models: adult 
unplanned murder (F=1.86, p<.05; R²=.177), the overall juvenile death penalty scale (F=2.34, p<.05; 
R²=.213), juvenile planned murder (F=1.85, p<.05; R²=.176), juvenile unplanned murder (F=3.03, p<.05; 
R²=.259), and juvenile rape (F=2.32, p<.05; R²=.211). 
 Summarily, our hypotheses regarding the race-religion/religiosity-death penalty attitudes 
relationship received slight to mixed support, at best.  Support for hypothesis 3 received mixed support 
limited to when religious tradition was the measure of religious conservativism and to support for capital 
punishment for juveniles.  Support for hypothesis 4 was also limited to support for the death penalty for 
juveniles, although even in these models, only half were significant when religious conservativism was 
operationalized as religious tradition, and only one was significant when it was operationalized as 
membership in a conservative Protestant faith group.  Support for hypothesis 5 received the most support 
and was not limited to support for juvenile capital punishment.  It is important to consider, however, the 
possibility that the findings (lack of significant religious conservativism*religiosity effects) regarding 
Black and Hispanic conservative Protestants could be a function of their low membership in these 
denominations.  There were 74 total non-whites, only 12 of whom identified themselves as members of 
conservative Protestant faiths. 
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Table 11.  OLS Regression of Death Penalty Attitudes by Religious Conservativism (Measured by 
Religious Tradition and Membership in a Conservative Protestant Denomination) and Religiosity Among 
Non-whites 
 
Dependent Variable  religious tradition  religious tradition*religiosity 
    b se(b) B  b se(b) B 
 
adult-overall scale  -3.34 3.26 -0.42  0.20 0.18 -0.42 
adult-general support  -1.00 0.60 -0.68  0.07 0.03 1.09 
adult-murder of cj employee -0.12 0.58 -0.09  0.01 0.03 0.22 
adult-planned murder  -0.32 0.60 -0.22  0.02 0.03 0.28 
adult-murder of child  -0.07 0.60 -0.05  0.01 0.03 0.14 
adult-unplanned murder  -0.24 0.47 -0.21  0.01 0.03 0.32 
adult-rape   -1.02 0.57 -0.76  0.05 0.03 0.89 
adult-child molestation  -0.57 0.61 -0.40  0.03 0.03 0.48 
juvenile-overall scale  -4.77 3.02 -0.62  0.28 0.17 0.88 
juvenile-general support  -1.71* 0.59 -1.12  0.12* 0.03 1.91 
juvenile-murder of cj employee -0.43 0.54 -0.32  0.03 0.03 0.60 
juvenile-planned murder  -0.92 0.60 -0.62  0.05 0.03 0.79 
juvenile-murder of child  -0.18 0.51 -0.14  0.02 0.03 0.30 
juvenile-unplanned murder -0.02 0.45 -0.02  0.00 0.03 0.07 
juvenile-rape   -0.79 0.49 -0.65  0.03 0.03 0.56 
juvenile-child molestation  -0.72 0.53 -0.56  0.03 0.03 0.59 
 
    conservative Protestant  conservative Protestant*religiosity 
    b se(b) B  b se(b) B 
 
adult-overall scale  -3.32 5.47 -0.20  0.22 0.29 0.25 
adult-general support  -1.15 1.04 -0.36  0.08 0.05 0.49 
adult-murder of cj employee 0.32 0.93 0.11  -0.01 0.05 -0.08 
adult-planned murder  -0.25 0.99 -0.08  0.02 0.05 0.12 
adult-murder of child  0.35 1.02 0.11  -0.01 0.05 -0.08 
adult-unplanned murder  0.13 0.76 0.05  -0.00 0.04 -0.00 
adult-rape   -1.79 0.97 -0.60  0.09 0.05 0.60 
adult-child molestation  -0.92 1.00 -0.31  0.05 0.05 0.35 
juvenile-overall scale  -4.42 5.08 -0.27  0.21 0.27 0.26 
juvenile-general support  -1.53 1.01 -0.48  0.11* 0.05 0.68 
juvenile-murder of cj employee -0.24 0.85 -0.09  0.02 0.04 0.12 
juvenile-planned murder  -1.14 1.01 -0.36  0.05 0.05 0.33 
juvenile-murder of child  0.15 0.89 0.05  -0.01 0.05 -0.07 
juvenile-unplanned murder 0.44 0.70 0.19  -0.03 0.04 -0.22 
juvenile-rape   -1.28 0.86 -0.46  0.04 0.05 0.31 
juvenile-child molestation  -0.83 0.90 -0.30  0.03 0.05 0.20 
 
 
 
*Significant at p<.05 
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CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS: ATTRIBUTION THEORY 
 Although the analysis so far has established a weak association between religion variables and 
death penalty attitudes, it must be recalled that the relationship may be at best indirect through the effect of 
religion on variables taken from attribution theory.  The following analyses address the links among 
religion, operationalized as theological emphasis and Biblical literalness, attribution style, punishment 
philosophy, and attitudes toward capital punishment. 
 Table 12 reports the results of two OLS regressions that model the impact of theological emphasis 
on the dependent variable, Biblical literalness.  The ten control variables are also included in both models.  
Model 1 includes the six-item composite scale described in the methods section.  This regression produced 
a significant theological emphasis effect, but in the opposite direction that we predicted (hypotheses 6a and 
6b).  Individuals who possessed a less forgiving theological emphasis adopted a less literal interpretation of 
the Bible than their more forgiving counterparts (b=-.46, p<.05).  There is no evidence of such a 
relationship in previous research, so it is difficult to speculate any conceptual reason why such an 
anomalous finding occurred. 
 Recall, however, that there was little variation in the respondents’ scores on the forgiving 
theological emphasis scale.  In fact, over three-fourths of the respondents had scores of 14 or lower (out of 
a range of 6 to 30, 14 or less constituted only the lower third of the scale).  To determine if the low 
variation was the reason for the negative relationship between theological emphasis and Biblical literalness, 
we examined the effect of a four-item punitiveness scale on Biblical literalness.  The four items (full 
descriptions of which are available in Appendix E) are related to individuals fearing God’s punishment 
after they have sinned, believing that evildoers will go to hell, that God condemns sinners, and that God 
gets even with sinners.  These items did not scale with the six forgiveness items that comprised the first 
theological emphasis scale.  They did, however, form a single factor solution when entered into a principal  
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Table 12.  OLS Regression of Biblical Literalness by Theological Emphasis, Measured by a Forgiving 
Theological Emphasis Scale and a Punitive Theological Emphasis Scale 
 
Model 1:  Forgiving Theological Emphasis Scale 
 
   DF  SS  MS  F 
Model   11  7060.44  641.86  38.37* 
Error   624  10437  16.73 
Total   635  17497   
 
R²=.404 
 
Biblical literalness 
    b  se(b)  B 
 
theological emphasis  -0.46*  0.04  -0.42 
race    -0.19  0.12  -0.05 
sex    0.08  0.34  0.01 
age    -0.00  0.01  -0.01 
educate    -0.39*  0.11  -0.12 
income    -0.10  0.09  -0.04 
ideology    0.87*  0.19  0.16 
sexroles    0.17*  0.08  0.04 
abortion    0.22*  0.04  0.20 
socwlfre    -0.10  0.08  -0.04 
police    0.08  0.05  0.05 
 
 
 
Model 2: Punitive Theological Emphasis Scale 
 
   DF  SS  MS  F 
Model   11  6578.45  598.04  34.18* 
Error   624  10919  17.50 
Total   635  17497   
 
R²=.376 
 
Biblical literalness 
    b  se(b)  B 
 
theological emphasis  0.55*  0.05  0.36 
race    -0.14  0.13  -0.03 
sex    -0.54  0.35  -0.05 
age    0.01  0.01  0.01 
educate    -0.24*  0.12  -0.07 
income    -0.13  0.10  -0.05 
ideology    0.83*  0.20  0.15 
sexroles    0.10  0.08  0.04 
abortion    0.34*  0.04  0.32 
socwlfre    -0.20*  0.08  -0.08 
police    0.13*  0.05  0.08 
 
 
*Significant at p<.05 
 82
components factor analysis.  The scale was moderately reliable, with a Cronbach’s Alpha of .63.  Item-to-
scale correlations are also provided in Appendix F. 
 The regression results, reported in Model 2 of Table 12, supported our hypotheses (6a and 6b), as 
individuals who adopted a more punitive theological emphasis also interpreted the Bible more literally than 
respondents with a less punitive theological emphasis (b=.55, p<.05).  Thus, we are likely correct in 
assuming that our earlier finding was a product of low variation from a skewed sampling distribution, 
rather than anything substantially meaningful. 
 The summary statistics at the top of Table 12 demonstrate that both of the overall models were 
statistically significant (F=38.37, p<.05, F=34.18, p<.05 for the first and second models, respectively).  The 
explanatory power of the independent variable, alone, was moderate; when the control variables were 
deleted from the models, the explanatory power of theological emphasis fell from 40.4 percent to 27.6 
percent in the first model and from 37.6 percent to 17.8 percent in the second model.  The absence of the 
control variables did not diminish the model’s explained variance by as much as it has in previous 
studies—typically, the explanatory power of religion variables, alone, is only about 10 percent (Grasmick 
et al., 1993a; Grasmick and McGill, 1994; Applegate et al., 2000).  Further, the absence of the control 
variables did not affect the nature of the relationship between individuals’ theological emphasis and the 
degree to which they interpreted the Bible literally. 
 Turning to our next hypotheses (7a and 7b), Table 13 reports the effect of Biblical literalness on 
attribution style, with the inclusion of the ten control variables.  Much to our surprise, a more literal 
interpretation of the Bible was significantly related to possessing a situational attribution style (b=-.07, 
p<.05).  The distribution of the sample on both variables was about normal, so it is unlikely that this finding 
is a product of a statistical anomaly.  The overall regression model of Biblical literalness on attribution 
style was significant (F=6.63, p<.05), but weak, as the combination of Biblical literalness and the ten 
control variables explained only 10.5 percent of the variance in individuals’ attribution styles. 
 Interestingly, though, when we removed the control variables from the analysis, we found that, 
instead of the explanatory power of Biblical literalness increasing, it fell to non-significant.  Thus, it 
appears that the negative effect of Biblical literalness on possessing a dispositional attribution style reflects 
a suppressor effect.  Indeed, when we examined the correlations between the explanatory and response 
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Table 13.  OLS Regression of Attribution Style by Biblical Literalness 
 
 
 
   DF  SS  MS  F 
Model   11  1175.42  106.86  6.63* 
Error   624  10056  16.12 
Total   635  11231 
 
R²=.105 
 
attribution style 
     
    b  se(b)  B 
 
Biblical literalness  -0.07*  0.04  -0.09 
race    -0.15  0.12  -0.05 
sex    -0.11  0.33  -0.01 
age    0.04*  0.01  0.12 
educate    -0.44*  0.11  -0.17 
income    -0.00  0.09  -0.00 
ideology    0.36  0.19  0.08 
sexroles    -0.12  0.08  -0.07 
abortion    0.07  0.04  0.08 
socwlfre    0.44*  0.08  0.23 
police    -0.07  0.05  -0.06 
 
 
 
*Significant at p<.05 
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variables and the three significant control variables in the model (age, education level, and attitudes toward 
social welfare), we found that education was significantly and negatively associated with Biblical 
literalness (r=-.18, p<.05) and possessing a dispositional attribution style (r=-.14, p<.05).  It appears, then, 
that by ignoring (rather than controlling for) respondents’ education level, we inflate the number of people  
with a situational attribution style who interpret the Bible literally.  This association actually does not 
exist—there is no significant relationship between the degree to which respondents interpret the Bible 
literally and their attribution styles.  Our hypotheses remain unsupported, but there is no evidence to the 
contrary, either, as there initially appeared to be. 
 Although this finding does not comport with previous research on the relationship between 
attribution theory and Biblical literalness (e.g., Grasmick and McGill, 1994), it is somewhat of a theoretical 
extension of the findings of Applegate et al. (2000).  Even though Applegate et al. (2000) found that 
Biblical literalness was associated with punitiveness (which is consistently associated with a dispositional 
attribution style), they did not find the relationships they expected between Biblical literalness and 
possessing a punitive theological emphasis (both measures of religious fundamentalism) and the two 
dependent variables, capital punishment support and beliefs that individuals’ local courts were too lenient. 
 They maintained, in spite of these anomalous findings, that the relationships between Biblical 
literalness and perceptions of a punitive God and punitive responses to convicted criminals persisted.  The 
lack of a significant relationship between Biblical literalness and possessing a dispositional attribution style 
in the present study, combined with the inconsistent findings of Applegate et al. (2000) regarding the effect 
of fundamentalism on punitiveness are indicative of the changing nature of the institution of religion.  Even 
highly fundamentalist religious individuals no longer seem to be the extreme dogmatists that they have 
been reputed to be.  It is also possible that the Bible contains both dispositional and situational attributions 
and that some literalists place greater emphasis on the forgiving aspects of the New Testament, rather than 
the vengeful “Yahweh” of the Old Testament.  The data do not contain such distinctions, however, so this 
proposition remains speculative. 
 Our third path (hypotheses 8a and 8b) predicted a positive relationship between possessing a 
dispositional attribution style and supporting a more punitive punishment philosophy toward convicted 
adult and juvenile offenders.  Table 14 reports the model from this regression procedure.  Indeed, there was
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Table 14.  OLS Regression of Punishment Philosophy by Attribution Style 
 
   DF  SS  MS  F 
 
Model   11  3716.30  337.85  7.45* 
Error   624  28298  45.35 
Total   635  32015 
 
R²=.116 
 
punishment philosophy 
 
    b  se(b)  B 
 
attribution style   0.29*  0.07  0.17 
race    0.08  0.20  0.02 
sex    0.08  0.56  0.01 
age    -0.03  0.02  -0.05 
educate    -0.74*  0.19  -0.16 
income    -0.07  0.16  -0.02 
ideology    0.81*  0.32  0.11 
sexroles    0.29*  0.13  0.10 
abortion    -0.22*  0.06  -0.15 
socwlfre    0.36*  0.14  0.11 
police    0.10  0.09  0.05 
 
 
 
*Significant at p<.05 
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a moderate effect of dispositional attribution style on having a punitive punishment philosophy (b=0.29, 
p<.05).  Consistent with our hypotheses, individuals who adopted a more classical position on crime 
causation (i.e., believed that crime was a product of free will) were more likely to support punitive 
measures to deal with convicted offenders.  Conversely, respondents who were more reflective of a 
positivist position on crime control (i.e., crime is caused by environmental forces) were more likely to 
support a rehabilitative approach to convicted offenders.  This overall model was statistically significant, 
but weak (R²=.116).  Deleting the control variables from the model reduced the explanatory power of the 
independent variable to 4.7 percent.   
 Finally, the last direct relationship we hypothesized (9a and 9b) was that possessing a more 
punitive philosophy toward the correctional system’s treatment of offenders would be predictive of higher 
levels of support for capital punishment among respondents.  The OLS regression analysis indicated that 
this was indeed the case (see Table 15 for the results of this analysis).  Punishment philosophy, in fact, was 
a relatively strong predictor of capital punishment support (b=0.68, p<.05).  The overall model was 
significant (F=21.60, p<.05) and moderately strong, explaining 27.6 percent of the variation in death 
penalty attitudes.  Removing the control variables from the analysis left an explained variance of 20.2 
percent for the effect of punishment philosophy on capital punishment. 
 The data have demonstrated some support for attribution theory; however, a comprehensive 
interpretation of the findings is contingent upon the indirect relationships between the variables.  We 
conducted OLS regression for the six indirect paths between variables in our model: the effects of the two 
theological emphasis scales on attribution style, punishment philosophy, and death penalty attitudes, the 
effects of Biblical literalness on punishment philosophy and death penalty attitudes, and the effect of 
attribution style on death penalty attitudes. 
 Although we found significant effects of possessing a punitive theological emphasis (the four-item 
scale comprised of items reflecting a punitive theological emphasis) on punishment philosophy (b=0.49, 
p<.05) and death penalty support (b=0.47, p<.05) in the expected directions, these effects were not as 
strong as the direct effect of theological emphasis on Biblical literalness.  There was not a significant 
relationship between possessing a punitive theological emphasis and attribution style.  Interestingly and 
contrary to our findings of the effect of possessing a forgiving theological emphasis on Biblical literalness, 
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Table 15.  OLS Regression of Death Penalty Attitudes by Punishment Philosophy 
 
   DF  SS  MS  F  
 
Model   11  27733  2521.20  21.60* 
Error   624  72832  116.72 
Total   635  100566 
 
R²=.276 
 
death penalty attitudes 
 
    b  se(b)  B 
 
punishment philosophy  0.68*  0.06  0.38 
race    -0.48  0.32  -0.05 
sex    1.33  0.89  0.05 
age    0.00  0.04  0.00 
educate    -1.19*  0.30  -0.15 
income    0.48  0.25  0.07 
ideology    1.79*  0.51  0.13 
sexroles    -0.19  0.21  -0..04 
abortion    -0.43*  0.10  -0.17 
socwlfre    0.80*  0.22  0.14 
police    0.09  0.14  0.02 
 
 
 
*Significant at p<.05 
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we found that the indirect effects were more aligned with our expectations.  Possessing a forgiving 
theological emphasis was significantly associated with possessing a situational attribution style, as well as 
opposition to the death penalty.  Neither of these effects, however, was as strong as the direct effect (in the 
opposite direction we predicted) of a progressive theological emphasis on Biblical literalness.  Possessing a 
progressive theological emphasis was not significantly associated with individuals’ correctional treatment 
philosophies. 
 Recall that the relationship between Biblical literalness and attribution style was significant, but 
inconsistent with our hypotheses.  Biblical literalness also significantly affected punishment philosophy 
(b=0.19, p<.05) and support for capital punishment (b=0.42, p<.05), but notice that these effects are 
positive.  Finally, we found that attribution style did not affect attitudes toward the death penalty, thus 
lending credence to our decision to separate punishment philosophy and attitudes toward capital 
punishment. 
 The direct and indirect relationships between theological emphasis, Biblical literalness, attribution 
style, punishment philosophy, and attitudes toward the death penalty largely supported our hypotheses.  In 
fact, Biblical literalness was the only variable that displayed effects inconsistent with our expectations.  
First, it did not produce a significant effect on individuals’ attribution styles, such that individuals who 
possessed a more literal interpretation of the Bible were not more likely to adopt a dispositional attribution 
style, and individuals who interpreted the Bible less literally were not more likely to adopt a situational 
attribution style.  Second, Biblical literalness was significantly related to attitudes toward capital 
punishment.  These seemingly anomalous relationships are likely a reflection of two different types of 
“right to lifers” in conservative faith groups: first, those individuals who are interested in the protection of 
all lives (e.g., are opposed to abortion, capital punishment, euthanasia, etc.) and second, those individuals 
who are interested in the protection of innocent lives (e.g., are opposed to abortion and euthanasia, but 
support the death penalty).  These individuals’ theological emphases are what segregates them, thereby 
producing the significant relationships we found in the attribution theory analysis.  Individuals who adopt a 
more conservative theological emphasis adopted a more literal interpretation of the Bible; they were more 
punitive, and more supportive of capital punishment than individuals with a more progressive theological 
emphasis.  However, the negative relationship between Biblical literalness and attribution style seems to 
 89
suggest that even members of conservative faith groups may adopt a more positivist approach to crime 
causation, allowing for the possible influence of external factors, such as poor home life, poverty, etc.  
These individuals still tend to be more punitive than individuals who adopt a more progressive theological 
emphasis, but nevertheless, they seem to be more liberal than they have been reputed to be. 
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CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The Race-Religion-Death Penalty Attitudes Relationship
 Several pieces of research have advanced the study of the effects of race and religion on attitudes 
toward criminal justice policies, including the death penalty.  Much of the earlier research on this topic is 
atheoretical and fails to develop the different dimensions of religion.  More recent investigations, however, 
have utilized theoretical frameworks to analyze the race-religion-death penalty attitudes relationship, and 
they have broadened the conceptualization of religion beyond the typical crude distinctions.  This more 
recent body of research has revealed several trends.  First, members of conservative Protestant faith groups 
are more retributive toward adult and juvenile offenders; they believe that the courts are too lenient; and 
they are more supportive of capital punishment than members of other faith groups (Young, 1992; 
Grasmick et al., 1993a; Grasmick et al., 1993b; Grasmick and McGill, 1994; Britt, 1998; Applegate et al., 
2000).  Second, when the effects of both race and religion are considered, significant interactive effects 
emerge, with white fundamentalists exhibiting the highest level of support for capital punishment and black 
non-fundamentalists displaying the lowest level of support for capital punishment (Young, 1992; Britt, 
1998).  Third, attribution theory has been successfully utilized as a theoretical framework to explain the 
relationship between individuals’ attribution styles and their punitive or rehabilitative orientations toward 
offenders (Cullen et al., 1983; Grasmick et al., 1993a; Grasmick et al., 1993b; Grasmick and McGill, 
1994). 
 The present study aimed to provide a more comprehensive explanation of public attitudes toward 
capital punishment, first by determining the degree to which faith group, religiosity, and race affected 
public attitudes and second, by using attribution theory to provide the process through which religion 
affects death penalty attitudes.  In spite of support we found for the hypotheses regarding membership in 
different faith groups and races, the conclusion remains that we found little support for the faith group-
religiosity-capital punishment and the faith group-religiosity-race-capital punishment attitudes 
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relationships.  Our findings, then, that whites and members of more conservative religious traditions, 
particularly conservative Protestants, were more likely to support capital punishment than non-whites and 
members of more liberal religious traditions, but that there were limited significant religiosity by race by 
faith group effects were inconsistent with the previous trends demonstrated in the literature and somewhat 
puzzling.  Clearly, there is something about fundamentalist Protestant religions that either draws people 
with certain qualities to them (in which case their commitment to and involvement with the group would 
not matter if they had already adopted the types of behaviors and beliefs that the group required) or changes 
the behaviors and beliefs of their members even without a high level of commitment and involvement from 
them. 
 Criminological research has been lacking a processual explanation for how religion shapes 
individuals’ attitudes and behaviors related to social and political issues.  The attitudinal research on 
religion and punitiveness thus far has tended to focus on the effect of possessing conservative religious 
beliefs or punitive orientations (Young, 1992; Grasmick et al., 1993a; Grasmick et al., 1993b; Grasmick 
and McGill, 1994; Britt, 1998).  In focusing on the fundamentalist and proscriptive elements of religion, 
criminologists have risked neglecting the possible effects of other dimensions of religion, including more 
forgiving moral messages and even the level at which religion is measured (e.g., faith group, congregation, 
etc.) without which a comprehensive understanding of its effects on individuals’ attitudes and behaviors 
cannot be understood. 
 Theological emphasis is a different and arguably more precise dimension of religion, as it is a 
concrete reflection of individuals’ perceptions of God, whereas faith group is a more structural level 
measure of religion that may or may not be reflective of individuals’ personal beliefs, because it imposes 
on members a theological position.  In other words, there is likely more within group than between group 
variation among members of faith groups.  Faith group, then, regardless of how it is measured, is a crude 
measure of affiliation that presumes sameness among its members; divisions within faith groups are not 
reflected by this measurement. 
 Our test of attribution theory, while addressing many of the puzzling conclusions left by our initial 
analyses, also left many unanswered questions.  Our findings, as well as Applegate et al’s (2000), are 
moving in a new direction theoretically, as both pieces of research seem to indicate that the differences 
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between fundamentalists and non-fundamentalists are not as stark as they have been treated in previous 
research, particularly the body of research conducted by Grasmick and his colleagues (1992, 1993a, 1993b, 
1994).  Applegate et al. (2000) found no relationship between theological emphasis or Biblical literalness 
and attitudes toward capital punishment; however, they did find significant effects of both of these 
measures of fundamentalism on general punitiveness toward offenders, as well as on punitiveness toward a 
hypothetical offender.  Furthermore and consistent with our earlier statement regarding neglected 
dimensions of religion in social scientific research, Applegate et al. (2000) also found that individuals who 
adopted a more forgiving theological emphasis were significantly less punitive than more fundamentalist 
individuals: they were less likely to support capital punishment, less likely to agree that their local courts 
were too lenient, less punitive toward offenders in general, and less punitive toward a hypothetical 
offender. 
 Our findings were consistent with Applegate et al’s (2000) in that we, too, found that individuals 
who held less strongly to fundamentalist religious tenets (i.e., possessed a more progressive theological 
emphasis) were significantly less likely to support the death penalty than their fundamentalist counterparts.  
Our analyses, however, detailed how this relationship between religion and capital punishment attitudes 
developed, and it established a more precise theoretical framework that explained the direct and indirect 
effects between the variables in the processual model derived from attribution theory. 
 The results from the path model in the present study support findings in previous studies that 
found a relationship between conservative religious beliefs, a dispositional attribution style, and punitive 
sentiments toward convicted offenders, including support for capital punishment.  More importantly, 
however, the present study is among the first pieces of research to examine the effect of more progressive 
elements of religion and shed light on individuals’ more compassionate sentiments toward convicted 
offenders.  Indeed, we found that possessing a less forgiving theological emphasis was associated with a 
less literal interpretation of the Bible.  Further, we utilized several situational items in our attribution scale, 
and found that individuals who possessed more of a situational attribution style were more supportive of 
rehabilitative correctional policies than individuals who possessed more of a dispositional attribution style, 
and finally that these individuals (who were more supportive of rehabilitative policies) were less likely to 
support the death penalty than individuals who favored more punitive correctional policies. 
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Theoretical and Policy Implications
 The results in the present study demonstrate that the conceptualization of the relationship between 
attitudes toward criminal justice policies and religion should extend beyond religion as a basis for punitive 
sentiments.  Certain religious values may contribute to feelings of compassion and understanding toward 
convicted offenders, which would likely be associated with less punitive policies to deal with them.  
Moreover, no existing criminological theory, nor any other theory which has been applied to the study of 
religion and criminal justice attitudes, confines its propositions to religion as an institution of social control.  
This presumption has been adopted by social scientists, and it has created a void in the extant literature on 
religion as a predictor of criminal justice attitudes.   
 Clearly, the study of public attitudes is very important.  Politicians use public appeal as one of the 
major forces behind the justification of ‘get tough’ measures, which empirically appear to be largely 
ineffective.  As we develop a more sophisticated understanding of why individuals support or oppose 
criminal justice policies, we will be in a better position to utilize different mediums and different types of 
presentations of information to inform individuals about the policies that they are supporting.  The United 
States’s treatment of its worst offenders (murderers) is a reflection of its level of civilization.  Furthermore, 
we are in the midst of an international battle against human rights violations, among which one of the focal 
issues is the institution of capital punishment.  Understanding why individuals support and oppose the 
taking of a human life—even if it is a person who has been convicted of murder—and understanding how 
they arrive at these positions is one of fundamental importance in developing an intellectual dialogue about 
the death penalty, devoid of false rhetoric and in possibly swaying the political and constitutional 
pendulums. 
 Religion is one of the most influential institutions in individuals’ lives and has consistently been 
viewed as one of the reasons behind public punitiveness.  While this may certainly be the case, it is equally 
important to recognize that religion may also be a major reason why individuals oppose punitive 
correctional policies, including the death penalty.  Many individuals across different faiths perceive God as 
a loving and understanding God, and in trying to follow His example, believe that there is hope for 
redemption for all people and, accordingly, support rehabilitative approaches to convicted offenders.
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Future Research
 This study contributed to an important dialogue about the bases for attitudes toward capital 
punishment and how these attitudes are formed.  It is necessary, however, in order to expand our 
understanding of this topic, to acknowledge the limitations of our research and provide ideas for future 
investigations.  One of the weaknesses in this study was its geographical limitation; our sample was drawn 
from a single county in Florida.  The differences between our findings and the findings of Grasmick and his 
colleagues could very well be a function of location.  Grasmick’s respondents were residents of Oklahoma, 
which is in the middle of the “Bible Belt” and, not surprisingly, more fundamentalist than our sample from 
the Tampa area, which is more cosmopolitan. 
 Our study utilized more in-depth measures of religion, attribution style, general punitiveness, and 
capital punishment attitudes than had been adopted in previous research.  Future research should continue 
to develop even more sophisticated measures, particularly of religion.  The concept of a “progressive 
theological emphasis” should be further developed, and other dimensions of religion should be created and 
comprehensively considered in one analytic strategy.  Perhaps the most important consideration that our 
study neglected was the level at which we measured faith group.  Instead of examining separate faith 
groups, future endeavors should explore smaller units of analysis, such as congregation, to better assess 
religious-based between group differences on attitudes toward capital punishment.  Future research should 
also attempt to obtain larger sample sizes, as it would facilitate a more confident interpretation of racial and 
ethnic religious-based differences toward social policies like capital punishment. 
 With regard to the study of religion and capital punishment attitudes, future endeavors should 
consider the effect of religion on not only death penalty attitudes, but other right to life issues, as well.  Just 
as capital punishment may be viewed as a criminal justice policy, it may also be viewed as a right-to-life 
issue.  The examination of capital punishment attitudes in such a context will likely shed new light on 
theoretical applications to the study of religion and crime. 
 Finally, due to the cross-sectional nature of our data, it was impossible to definitively determine 
whether the causal order of the relationships we predicted was accurate.  Longitudinal data on religion and 
attitudes toward social and political issues, such as the death penalty, would be very enlightening.  
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Moreover, they would provide a much clearer picture of the utility of the theories that have been applied to 
this body of research thus far.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
 
 
JURY POOL SURVEY 
Fall, 1999 
 
          University of South Florida 
Department of Criminology 
Tampa, FL 33620 
 
 
 
Thank you for participating in our survey.  Your answers to the following questions will give us 
information about your attitudes regarding crime and justice.  
Please complete the questionnaire as follows. 
1.   Please answer the questions in the order they appear. 
2.   Circle only one answer for each question unless directed otherwise. 
3. There are no right or wrong answers—we are interested in your opinions. 
4. Please DO NOT write your name on the questionnaire.  
5. Your responses are anonymous and will not be tied to you in any way. 
6. You may skip any question you do not wish to answer. 
7. You may stop filling out the questionnaire at any time. 
8.   Please ignore the numbers next to the response options; they are for computer coding  
      purposes only. 
 
 
Thank you, again, for your participation! 
 
 
 
 
 
Continued on next page 
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Appendix A continued 
 
A. PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ABOUT YOU AND 
YOUR BACKGROUND.  CIRCLE WHICH APPLIES. 
1.   Sex 0. Female 1. Male 
2. Race  
1.  American Indian or Alaskan Native  
(a person having origins in any of the original peoples of North and South America, 
including Central America, and who maintain tribal affiliation or community attachment). 
2.  Asian  
(a person having origins in any of the original peoples of the Far East, Southeast, Asia or 
the Indian subcontinent, including, for example, Cambodia, China, India, Japan, Korea, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippine Islands, Thailand, and Vietnam). 
3.  Black or African American  
(a person having origins in any of the black racial groups or Africa.  This term includes 
Haitian or Negro). 
4.  Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander 
(a person having origins in any of the original peoples of Hawaii, Guam, Samoa, or other 
Pacific Islanders). 
5.  White  
(a person having origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, the Middle East, or 
North America). 
 
3. Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin? 
(includes a person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or Central American, or other 
Spanish culture or race, regardless of race) 
1. yes 
0. no 
 
4. What is your age? _____  
5. Do you have any children (biological, stepchildren, adopted, etc.)? 
1. Yes 0.   No 
If so, what are their ages?  ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ 
6.   How much education have you completed? 
1. grade school or less 
2. some high school 
3. high school graduate 
4. 1 or more years of technical, vocational, or trade school  
5. some college  
6. college graduate 
7. 1 or more years of graduate, law, or medical school 
8. advanced degree (e.g., Master’s, Ph.D., J.D., M.D., etc.) 
 
Continued on next page
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7.   What is the combined income of everyone in your household? 
1. under $10,000 
2. $10,000-$19,000 
3. $20,000-$29,000 
4. $30,000-$39,000 
5. $40,000-$49,000 
6. $50,000-$69,000 
7. $70,000-$89,000 
8. $90,000-$119,000 
9. $120,000-$149,000 
10. $150,000+ 
 
8.   In what region of the country did you grow up? 
1. North 
2. East 
3. South 
4. West 
5. Midwest 
6. Other: _______________ 
7. Don’t know 
 
9.  Which of the following best describes the area in which you currently live? 
1. the City of Tampa 
2. a suburb of Tampa (e.g. Brandon, Temple Terrace, Carrolwood, North Tampa) 
3. another Hillsborough County community (e.g. Sun City, Wimouma, Plant City) 
4. rural Hillsborough 
5. Other: ____________________  
 
10.    How are you registered as a voter? 
1. Republican 
2. Democrat 
3. Independent 
4. Other:___________________ 
5. I am not registered. 
 
11.  Circle the position which best describes your social and political views. 
1.   Very-----2. somewhat --- 3. middle of --- 4. somewhat  ------  5. very 
                        liberal            liberal             the road           conservative          conservative 
 
12.   With what religion, if any, do you identify? 
1. Catholicism 
2. Judaism 
3. Protestantism 
4. None 
5. Other: _____________________  
 
Continued on next page
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13.   If you are Protestant, what denomination are you?   
1. Baptist 
2. Episcopalian 
3. Lutheran 
4. Methodist 
5. Presbyterian 
6. Fundamentalist 
7. Other: ___________________ 
 
14.  Were your above answers in questions 12 and 13 the faith that you grew up in? 
1. Yes _____  0. No _____  9. Not applicable to me _____ 
 
15.   If you answered no to number 15, what faith did you grow up in?  Please be specific  
(e.g. Southern Baptist, Roman Catholic, Conservative Judaism, none, etc.)  
_____________________ 
 
B. THE NEXT GROUP OF QUESTIONS ASKS YOU ABOUT YOUR  
EXPERIENCE WITH AND FEAR OF CRIME. 
 
16.  In the past twelve months, have you been the victim of a crime? Check all that  
       apply. 
1. Violent ________ 
2. Property _______ 
 
17.   How afraid are you of being a victim of property crime? 
1. Not at all afraid 
2. Somewhat afraid 
3. Afraid 
4. Very afraid 
 
18.  How afraid are you of being a victim of violent crime? 
1. Not at all afraid 
2. Somewhat afraid 
3. Afraid 
4. Very afraid 
 
19.  Do you believe that you will be a victim of a property crime in the future? 
1. It is very unlikely. 
2. It is somewhat unlikely. 
3. It is somewhat likely. 
4. It is very likely. 
 
20.   Do you believe that you will be a victim of a violent crime in the future? 
1. It is very unlikely. 
2. It is somewhat unlikely. 
3. It is somewhat likely. 
4. It is very likely. 
 
 
Continued on next page
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C. THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ASK ABOUT YOUR VIEWS ON  
VARIOUS SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES. 
 
 21.  Women should have an equal role with men in running businesses. 
1. strongly agree 
2. agree 
3. uncertain 
4. disagree 
5. strongly disagree 
 
22.   Women should have an equal role with men in running the military. 
1. strongly agree 
2. agree 
3. uncertain 
4. disagree 
5. strongly disagree 
 
23.   Women should have an equal role with men in running the family. 
1. strongly agree 
2. agree 
3. uncertain 
4. disagree 
5. strongly disagree 
 
24.  Abortion should be allowed under any circumstances. 
1. strongly agree 
2. agree 
3. uncertain 
4. disagree 
5. strongly disagree 
 
25.  Abortion should be allowed when a woman’s health or life is in danger. 
1. strongly agree 
2. agree 
3. uncertain 
4. disagree 
5. strongly disagree 
 
26.  Abortion should be allowed when the fetus’ health or life is in danger. 
1. strongly agree 
2. agree 
3. uncertain 
4. disagree 
5. strongly disagree 
 
Continued on next page 
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27.  Abortion should be allowed when the pregnancy is the result of incest or rape. 
1. strongly agree 
2. agree 
3. uncertain 
4. disagree 
5. strongly disagree 
 
28.  Abortion should be allowed when the mother cannot afford to raise the child. 
1. strongly agree 
2. agree 
3. uncertain 
4. disagree 
5. strongly disagree 
 
29.  Abortion should not be allowed under any circumstances. 
1. strongly agree 
2. agree 
3. uncertain 
4. disagree 
5. strongly disagree 
 
30.   The government should make every effort to improve the social and economic  
        condition of women and other racial and ethnic minorities through affirmative action policies. 
1. strongly agree 
2. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
4. somewhat disagree  
5. strongly disagree  
 
31.   The government should make every effort to improve the social and economic 
         condition of women and other racial and ethnic minorities through welfare programs.  
1. strongly agree 
2. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
4. somewhat disagree  
5. strongly disagree  
 
 
Continued on next page 
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Appendix A continued 
 
D. THE NEXT GROUP OF QUESTIONS ASKS ABOUT YOUR RELIGIOUS PRACTICES AND 
BELIEFS.  
We recognize that these questions refer to statements  
often associated with Judeo-Christian religious beliefs and, therefore,  
may not reflect your personal beliefs.  If you are uncomfortable  
responding to these statements, feel free to check the code after  
each statement that indicates, “Rating this question is not appropriate  
given my personal beliefs.” 
 
 32.   In a typical month (4 weeks long), how many times do you attend worship services? 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 or more  
 
  9.   Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
    
33.   How many church-related groups or organizations do you belong to (include Bible  
 studies, youth groups, educative activities, choral groups, etc.)?    _____ 
   
9.  Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
 
34.  How often do you take part in the activities and organizations of a church or place of  
       worship other than attending services?  
0. never 
1. 1-2 times per year 
2. 1-2 times per month 
3. 1-2 times per week 
4. 3-5 times per week 
5. daily/almost daily 
6. more than once a day 
 9. Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
 
35.  In a typical month, how often do you pray outside of worship services? (do not            
       include table blessings). 
4. more than once a day 
3. daily/almost daily 
2. once or twice a week 
1. once or twice a month 
0. never 
9. Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
 
36.   Religion is a very important part of my life. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
1. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
9. Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
 
 
Continued on next page
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37.    I would describe myself as very religious. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
9. Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
 
38.  When I have decisions to make in my everyday life, I usually try to find out what 
God wants me to do. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
9. Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
 
39.   Religion influences how I live my life. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
9. Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
 
40.   In a typical month, how often do you have quiet time that focuses on religious or 
         spiritual development (e.g., read religious material, meditate, etc.)  
4. more than once a day 
3. daily/almost daily 
2. once or twice a week 
1. once or twice a month 
0. never 
9. Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
 
41.   I believe I have had a religious “born-again” experience. 
1. yes 
0. no 
9. Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
 
42.   I believe everyone must have a “born-again” experience in order to be saved. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
9. Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
 
 
Continued on next page
 110
Appendix A continued 
 
43.  After I do something wrong, I fear God’s punishment. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
9. Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
 
44.  People who do evil in this world will eventually suffer in Hell. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
9. Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
 
45.  In order to receive God’s forgiveness, it is important that we forgive those who sin  
against us. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
9. Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
 
46.  It is important that we hate the sin, but love the sinner. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
9. Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
 
47.   God teaches us that even if someone has lived a life of crime, s/he should be forgiven for their  
          offenses if they are truly repentant (sorry). 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
9. Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
 
48.  The God I believe in condemns sinners. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
9. Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
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49.  The God I believe in sympathizes with people. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
9. Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
 
50.  The God I believe in understands when people sin. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
9. Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
 
51.  The God I believe in gets back at sinners. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
9. Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
 
52.  The God I believe in loves people regardless of their behavior and beliefs. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
9. Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
 
E.  BELOW IS A LIST OF BIBLE VERSES.  PLEASE INDICATE THE EXTENT TO WHICH 
YOU BELIEVE EACH SHOULD BE INTERPRETED LITERALLY. 
 We recognize that the questions in this section refer to statements  
often associated with Judeo-Christian religious beliefs and, therefore,  
 may not reflect your personal beliefs.  If you are uncomfortable  
 responding to these statements, feel free to check the code after each  
 statement which indicates, “Rating this question is not appropriate 
 given my personal beliefs.” 
 
53.   “Anyone who hits a man so hard that he dies shall surely be put to death.” 
4. the true/literal words of God 
3. the inspired or interpreted words of God 
2. more or less influenced by human beings 
1. myth or simply not true 
9. Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
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54.  “Obey the government, for God is the one who has put it there.  There is no  
  government anywhere that God has not placed in power.” 
4. the true/literal words of God 
3. the inspired or interpreted words of God 
2. more or less influenced by human beings 
1. myth or simply not true 
9. Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
 
55.  “If her eye is injured, injure his; if her tooth is knocked out, knock out his; and so 
on-hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, lash for lash.” 
4. the true/literal words of God 
3. the inspired or interpreted words of God 
2. more or less influenced by human beings 
1. myth or simply not true 
9. Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
 
56. “Your heavenly father will forgive you if you forgive those who sin against you; but  
  if you refuse to forgive them, he will not forgive you.” 
4. the true/literal words of God 
3. the inspired or interpreted words of God 
2. more or less influenced by human beings 
1. myth or simply not true 
9. Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
 
57.  “Then Jesus asked the man, ‘what do you want?’ ‘Lord,’ he pleaded, ‘I want to  
 see!’ And Jesus said, ‘All right, begin seeing!  Your faith has healed you.’” 
4. the true/literal words of God 
3. the inspired or interpreted words of God 
2. more or less influenced by human beings 
1. myth or simply not true 
9. Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
  
58.   “If someone slaps you on one cheek, let him slap the other too!  If someone 
         demands your coat, give him your shirt besides.” 
4. the true/literal words of God 
3. the inspired or interpreted words of God 
2. more or less influenced by human beings 
1. myth or simply not true 
9. Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
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F. THE FOLLOWING ITEMS CONTINUE TO ASK YOU ABOUT ASPECTS 
OF YOUR RELIGIOUS BELIEFS. 
 We recognize that the questions in this section refer to statements  
often associated with Judeo-Christian religious beliefs and, therefore, 
 may not reflect your personal beliefs.  If you are uncomfortable 
 responding to these statements, feel free to check the code after each 
 statement that indicates, “Rating this question is not appropriate given 
 my personal beliefs.” 
 
59.   I believe the Bible is the actual word of God and it is to be taken literally, word  
 for word. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
9. Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
 
60.   I believe the miracles described in the Bible really happened; they are not just 
 stories. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
9. Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
  
61.   I believe Jesus truly rose from the dead. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
9. Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
 
62.   I believe that those who do not accept God will go to hell after their death. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
9. Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
 
63.  I believe that Hell actually exists. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
9. Rating this question is not appropriate given my personal beliefs. 
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G. THE NEXT GROUP OF QUESTIONS ASKS ABOUT YOUR THOUGHTS  
ABOUT PEOPLE.  SOME OF THESE QUESTIONS REFER TO PERSONS 
WHO HAVE BEEN LEGALLY CONVICTED OF CRIMES. 
 
64.   I believe most police officers are prejudiced against minorities. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
 
65.   I believe most police officers abuse their discretion. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
 
66.  I believe most police officers try hard, but do not have the resources to do their job 
effectively. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
 
67.  I believe most police officers are trustworthy and do their job effectively. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
 
68.   I believe most police officers act professionally when dealing with citizens. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
 
69.   Most people who commit crimes were born to be criminals. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
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70.   Most offenders commit crimes because they have little or no self-control. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
 
71.   Most adult offenders commit crimes as a way of coping with poor living  
        conditions (e.g., extreme poverty, violence in the home, marital problems, etc.) 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
 
72.   Most adult offenders commit crimes because they have bad characters. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
 
73.     Most adult offenders commit crimes because they are too lazy to find a lawful way  
   out of a bad situation. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
 
74.    Most adult offenders commit crimes because our society offers them little  
  opportunity to get a job and make money. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
 
75.    Most adult offenders commit crimes because their home lives as children were lacking  
  in love, discipline, and supervision. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
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76.   Most adult offenders commit crimes because of outside influences (e.g., peer 
 pressure, money problems). 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
 
77.    When determining the sentence for adult offenders who have been legally convicted of crimes, the 
circumstances of the offense, such as weapon used, planning, injury to victim, amount of loss, are not 
important.  Instead, the sentence should be based solely on the seriousness of the offense committed. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
 
78.    The best way to deal with adults who have been legally convicted of crimes is to 
           lock them up so they are not able to harm anyone again. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
 
 79.   The best way to deal with adults who have been legally convicted of crimes is to 
         punish them harshly so they will learn their lesson and not commit other crimes. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
 
80. The best way to deal with adults who have been legally convicted of crimes is to  
        punish them to the extent that they will pay their debt to society for the crimes they have committed. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
 
81. The best way to deal with adults who have been legally convicted of crimes is to  
        punish them harshly to set an example so that others will not commit crimes. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
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82.   The best way to deal with adults who have been legally convicted of crimes is to  
         treat and help them so that they do not commit other crimes. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
 
83.   Most juvenile offenders commit crimes as a way of coping with poor living  
        conditions (e.g., poverty, violence in the home, lack of supervision, broken home). 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
 
84.   Most juvenile offenders commit crimes because they have bad characters. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
 
85.   Most juvenile offenders commit crimes because they are too lazy to find a lawful 
 way out of a bad situation. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
 
86.   Most juvenile offenders commit crimes because they are bored and have 
        nothing to do (e.g., work, play sports, help with family chores, etc.). 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
  
87.    Most juvenile offenders commit crimes because of outside influences (e.g., peer 
  pressure, money problems). 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
 
 
Continued on next page
 118
Appendix A continued 
 
88. Most juvenile offenders commit crimes because their home life is lacking in 
 love, discipline, and supervision. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
 
89.    When determining the sentence for juvenile offenders who have been legally convicted of crimes, the 
circumstances of the offense, such as the weapon used, planning, injury to victim, amount of loss, are 
not important.  Instead, the sentence should be based solely on the seriousness of the offense 
committed.  
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
 
90.  The best way to deal with juveniles who have been legally convicted of crimes is  
         to lock them up so they are not able to harm anyone again. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
 
91.  The best way to deal with juveniles who have been convicted of crimes 
  is to punish them harshly so they will learn their lesson and not commit other crimes. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
 
92.  The best way to deal with juveniles who have been convicted of crimes is to punish 
them to the extent that they will pay their debt to society for the crimes they have committed. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
 
93.   The best way to deal with juveniles who have been convicted of crimes is to punish them harshly to      
set an example so that others will not commit crimes. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
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94.  The best way to deal with juveniles who have been convicted of crimes is to treat 
and help them so that they do not commit other crimes. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
 
 
H. THE FINAL GROUP OF QUESTIONS ASKS FOR YOUR OPINION ON 
THE DEATH PENALTY. 
 
95. Generally speaking, I support the death penalty for adults. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
 
96.  Generally speaking, I support the death penalty for juveniles. 
5. strongly agree 
4. somewhat agree 
3. uncertain 
2. somewhat disagree 
1. strongly disagree 
 
For questions 97-108, please check the column that best reflects your thoughts about 
whether adult or juvenile offenders should be sentenced to death for the following crimes (e.g., for stealing 
a loaf of bread if a juvenile                         X  ): 
 
 
SENTENCED TO DEATH 
 
     Strongly     Strongly 
     Disagree Disagree          Uncertain Agree Agree 
 1      2        3      4      5  
            
 
97.  for the murder of a    
 employee when an adult  ___ ___  ___ ___ ___ 
 is the killer 
 
98.  for the murder of a                         
        criminal justice     ___ ___  ___ ___ ___ 
 employee when a juvenile
  is the killer 
 
99.  for murder that is  
intentional and well-planned ___ ___  ___ ___ ___   
 when the killer is an adult 
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100.  for murder that is  
 intentional and well-planned ___ ___  ___ ___ ___ 
  when the killer is a juvenile
 
101.  for the murder of a  ___ ___  ___ ___ ___   
  child when the killer is an adult  
 
102.  for the murder of a  ___ ___  ___ ___ ___ 
  child when the killer is a juvenile
 
103.  for unplanned murder  ___ ___  ___ ___ ___            
  when the killer is an adult 
 
104.  for unplanned murder  ___ ___  ___ ___ ___ 
  when the killer is a juvenile
 
105.  for multiple rapes when  ___ ___  ___ ___ ___ 
  the rapist is an adult 
 
106.  for multiple rapes when  ___ ___  ___ ___ ___ 
 the rapist is a juvenile
  
107.  for molesting a child  ___ ___  ___ ___ ___ 
  when the molester is an adult  
 
108.  for molesting a child  ___ ___  ___ ___ ___ 
  when the molester is a juvenile 
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 FOR THOSE WHO SUPPORT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: 
 
If you support capital punishment, please indicate how important each of the reasons 
below are to you when thinking about the issue with regard to offenders who have been legally 
convicted of crimes.  
                                  
Not at all  Somewhat  Important Very   
Important Important   Important 
     1.       2.        3.        4. 
 
109. Because the offender  _____  _____  _____  _____ 
        deserves to die 
 
110.  So the offender  _____  _____  _____  _____ 
         cannot re-offend 
 
111. To teach a lesson   _____  _____  _____  _____ 
        to others in society so 
        they will not offend 
 
112. To give the victim’s   _____  _____  _____  _____ 
        family a sense that 
        justice has been done 
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FOR THOSE WHO OPPOSE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
 
Please indicate how important each of the reasons below are to you when thinking 
about capital punishment with regard to offenders who have been legally convicted of crimes. 
 
  Not at all  Somewhat  Important Very  
  Important Important   Important 
            1.       2.        3.        4. 
 
 
113. Because it is    _____  _____  _____  _____ 
        morally wrong 
 
114. Because everyone  _____  _____  _____  _____ 
        is redeemable  
 
115. Because certain racial  _____  _____  _____  _____ 
        and ethnic minority 
        groups are more likely 
        to receive a death sentence 
 
116. Because only the poor  _____  _____  _____  _____ 
        get the death penalty  
 
117. Because of the   _____  _____  _____  _____ 
        possibility of  
        executing innocent people  
 
118. Because it is cruel  _____  _____  _____  _____  
        and unusual punishment 
 
 
YOU HAVE FINISHED THE SURVEY.  THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION! 
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APPENDIX B 
 
YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONNAIRE IS 
VOLUNTARY.  YOU ARE UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO TAKE OR 
COMPLETE THE INSTRUMENT. 
Tampa Jury Pool Survey 
Research Project on Attitudes Toward Crime and Justice 
 
 
RESEARCH INFORMATION AND RESPONDENT CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
 
 Professors John K. Cochran and Kathleen M. Heide in the Department of Criminology, and Sheila 
Schlaupitz, a master’s student in the Department of Criminology at the University of South Florida, request 
your participation in a research project examining public attitudes toward crime and justice.  This project 
has been approved by the Department of Criminology and the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the 
University of South Florida.  
 
 Our staff of graduate criminology students at the University of South Florida will administer 
questionnaires to jury pool participants in Hillsborough County such as yourself.  Your participation in this 
project will be very valuable to increasing our knowledge regarding how citizens view issues related to 
crime and punishment. However, your participation is entirely voluntary; you are under no obligation to 
participate.  Moreover, if at any time during the survey you feel you do not wish to continue filling it out, 
you may simply stop.  Likewise, you may decline to answer any question. 
 
 Should you choose to participate, please also note that your identity will remain anonymous and 
the information you provide will not be tied to you in any way.  No one outside the research staff will have 
access to your answers; your answers will be recoded into numeric, machine-readable code and the 
questionnaires will be destroyed.  Finally, only statistics summarizing findings from this study will be 
published or shared with the public. 
  
 We hope that you will choose to participate.  If you choose not to participate, we ask that you 
please complete Section A, questions 1 through 9 of the survey.  Your willingness to participate indicates 
your voluntary consent.  Should you have any questions, please feel free to contact any of us. 
 
Please retain this document.  Thank you, and have a great day! 
 
John K. Cochran, PhD.    Kathleen M. Heide, PhD.   
Associate Professor/Associate Chair  Full Professor 
(813) 974-9569     (813) 974-9543 
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Appendix C. Factor Analysis Results for the Overall Death Penalty Scale 
Item-to-Scale Correlations 
 
General support for adult death penalty     0.66 
Death penalty support for adults who murder a criminal justice employee 0.82 
Death penalty support for adults who commit a planned murder  0.77 
Death penalty support for adults who murder a child    0.79 
Death penalty support for adults who commit an unplanned murder  0.71 
Death penalty support for adults who commit a rape    0.74 
Death penalty support for adults who molest a child    0.69 
General support for juvenile death penalty     0.55 
Death penalty support for juveniles who murder a criminal justice employee 0.81 
Death penalty support for juveniles who commit a planned murder  0.84 
Death penalty support for juveniles who murder a child   0.83 
Death penalty support for juveniles who commit an unplanned murder  0.69 
Death penalty support for juveniles who commit a rape   0.75 
Death penalty support for juveniles who molest a child   0.69 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha=0.95 
 
Eigenvalue=8.55 
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Item-to-Scale Correlations 
 
Frequency of attendance at worship services    0.73 
Number of church-related groups     0.56 
Frequency of participation in activities outside of services  0.65 
Frequency of prayer outside of services    0.73 
Respondents believe religion is an important part of life.  0.72 
Degree to which respondents describe themselves as religious  0.77 
Respondents seek God when making decisions   0.81 
Religion influences how respondents live their lives   0.77 
Frequency of quiet time       0.72 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha=0.92 
 
Eigenvalue=5.56 
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Theological Emphasis 
Item-to-Scale Correlations 
To receive forgiveness, you must forgive sinners   0.66 
Important to hate the sin, but love the sinner    0.68 
If sorry, person who lives life of crime should be forgiven  0.63 
God sympathizes with people     0.51 
God understands when people sin     0.46 
God loves people regardless of their behaviors and beliefs  0.51 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha=0.81 
Eigenvalue=3.09 
 
Gpunitiv (alternative theological emphasis scale used in the first path analysis due to possible problems 
with the sampling distribution) 
 
Item-to-Scale Correlations 
Respondents feared God’s punishment after wrongdoing  0.42 
People who do evil will eventually go to hell   0.48 
God condemns sinners      0.43 
God gets back at all sinners     0.30 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha=0.63 
Eigenvalue=1.89 
 
Biblical Literalness 
Item-to-Scale correlations 
Bible is actual word of God to be taken word-for-word  0.71 
Miracles really happened—not just stories    0.84 
Jesus truly rose from the dead     0.76 
Those who do not accept God will go to hell    0.76 
Hell actually exists      0.79 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha=0.91 
Eigenvalue=3.68 
 
Attribution Style 
Item-to-Scale correlations 
Adults commit crimes because they have bad characters  -0.02 
Adults commit crimes because they are lazy    0.05 
Adults commit crimes to cope with poor living conditions  0.20 
Adults commit crimes as a result of a lacking home life  0.23 
Adults commit crimes as a result of outside influences  0.23 
Juveniles commit crimes because they have bad characters  0.10 
Juveniles commit crimes because they are lazy   0.05 
Juveniles commit crimes to cope with poor living conditions  0.26 
Juveniles commit crimes as a result of a lacking home life  0.28 
Juveniles commit crimes as a result of outside influences  0.20 
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Cronbach’s Alpha=0.40 
Eigenvalue=3.30 
 
Punishment Philosophy 
 
Item-to-Scale Correlations 
Adult sentence/based on severity of offense only   0.25 
Adult sentence/lock them up, so they cannot re-offend  0.46 
Adult sentence/lock them up to scare them into not re-offending 0.65 
Adult sentence/punish to the extent that they repay debt to society 0.30 
Adult sentence/punish them to scare others into not offending  0.63 
Adult sentence/treat and help them so they do not re-offend  0.12 
Juvenile sentence/based on severity of offense only   0.31 
Juvenile sentence/lock them up, so they cannot re-offend  0.60 
Juvenile sentence/lock them up to scare them into not re-offending 0.69 
Juvenile sentence/punish to the extent that they repay debt  0.39 
Juvenile sentence/punish them to scare others into not offending 0.68 
Juvenile sentence/treat and help them so they do not re-offend  0.09 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha=0.79 
Eigenvalue=4.22 
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Attitudes toward sex roles 
Item-to-Scale Correlations 
Women should have an equal role as men in business   0.60 
Women should have an equal role as men in the military  0.51 
Women should have an equal role as men in the family  0.53 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha=0.70 
Eigenvalue=1.96 
 
Attitudes toward abortion 
Item-to-Scale Correlations 
Abortion allowable under any circumstance    0.68 
Abortion allowable when mom’s health is in danger   0.65 
Abortion allowable when fetus’ health is in danger   0.74 
Abortion allowable when pregnancy is the result of a rape  0.76 
Abortion allowable when mom cannot afford to raise the child 0.63 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha=0.87 
Eigenvalue=3.29 
 
Attitudes toward social welfare 
Item-to-Scale correlations 
Support affirmative action to help minorities    0.50 
Support welfare to help minorities     0.50 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha=0.67 
Eigenvalue=1.50 
 
Attitudes toward the police (the criminal justice scale)
 
Item-to-Scale correlations 
Most police officers are prejudiced against minorities.  0.60 
Most police officers abuse their discretion.    0.68 
Most police officers are trustworthy/do their jobs effectively.  0.62 
Most police officers act professionally when dealing with citizens. 0.61 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha=0.80 
Eigenvalue=2.56 
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Appendix G. OLS Regression of Control Variables on Death Penalty Attitudes     
      
Model 1:  OLS regression of control variables on the overall adult death penalty scale for religious 
tradition*religiosity        
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  13 3748.86 288.37 7.16* 
Error 454 18280 40.26 
Total 467 22029         
          
R²=.170         
          
 b se(b) B       
          
age  -0.00 0.03 -0.12      
educate -0.52* 0.22 -0.12      
income 0.30 0.17 0.08      
ideology 0.86* 0.37 0.11   
sexroles 0.03 0.15 0.01     
abortion -0.35* 0.07 -0.25     
socwlfre 0.46* 0.15 0.15   
police 0.15 0.10 0.07 
 
Model 2:  OLS regression of control variables on general support for adult death penalty for 
religious tradition *religiosity        
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  13 130.38 10.03 7.76* 
Error 454 586.85 1.29 
Total 467 717.23         
          
R²=.182      
          
 b se(b) B       
             
age  0.00 0.01 0.00      
educate -0.02 0.04 -0.03       
income 0.04 0.03 0.00       
ideology 0.19* 0.07 0.14      
sexroles -0.00 0.03 -0.00       
abortion -0.07* 0.01 -0.27       
socwlfre 0.07* 0.03 0.13    
police 0.04 0.02 0.10 
 
Continued on next page 
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Model 3:  OLS regression of control variables on adult murder of a criminal justice employee for 
religious tradition *religiosity        
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  13 88.91 6.84 5.69* 
Error 454 545.87 1.20        
Total 467 634.79         
          
R²=.140      
          
 b se(b) B       
            
age  -0.00 0.00 -0.04      
educate -0.03 0.04 -0.04    
income 0.07* 0.03 0.11       
ideology 0.13 0.06 0.10      
sexroles 0.01 0.03 0.02       
abortion -0.04* 0.01 -0.16       
socwlfre 0.06* 0.03 0.12  
police 0.02 0.02 0.07 
 
Model 4:  OLS regression of control variables on adult planned murder for religious 
tradition*religiosity         
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  13 96.54 7.43 5.60* 
Error 454 601.84 1.33        
Total 467 698.38         
          
R²=.138       
          
 b se(b) B       
            
age  -0.00 0.01 -0.03      
educate -0.06 0.04 -0.08       
income 0.04 0.03 0.07       
ideology 0.12 0.07 0.09      
sexroles -0.00 0.03 -0.01       
abortion -0.05* 0.01 -0.18       
socwlfre 0.10* 0.03 0.17     
police 0.03 0.02 0.09 
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Model 5:  OLS regression of control variables on adult murder of a child for religious 
tradition*religiosity         
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  13 100.76 7.75 5.75*   
Error 454 611.47 1.35        
Total 467 712.23         
          
R²=.142        
          
 b se(b) B       
             
age  -0.00 0.01 -0.01      
educate -0.07 0.04 -0.09        
income 0.04 0.03 0.07       
ideology 0.17* 0.07 0.13      
sexroles -0.01 0.03 -0.02      
abortion -0.04* 0.01 -0.16       
socwlfre 0.08* 0.03 0.14     
police 0.03 0.02 0.09 
 
Model 6:  OLS regression of control variables on adult unplanned murder for religious 
tradition*religiosity         
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  13 49.59 3.81 4.69* 
Error 454 369.37 0.81  
Total 467 418.97         
          
R²=.118      
          
 b se(b) B       
            
age  0.00 0.00 0.05       
educate -0.08* 0.03 0.13       
income 0.04 0.02 0.08       
ideology 0.04 0.05 0.04      
sexroles -0.00 0.02 -0.01        
abortion -0.05* 0.01 -0.23       
socwlfre 0.03 0.02 0.06     
police 0.02 0.01 0.08 
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Model 7:  OLS regression of control variables on adult rape for religious tradition*religiosity 
       
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  13 76.65 5.90 4.23* 
Error 454 632.76 1.39        
Total 467 709.41        
          
R²=.108      
          
 b se(b) B       
            
age  0.01 0.01 0.05       
educate -0.12* 0.04 -0.15        
income 0.04 0.03 0.05    
ideology 0.12 0.07 0.09      
sexroles 0.01 0.03 0.02       
abortion -0.05* 0.01 -0.19        
socwlfre 0.07* 0.03 0.13     
police -0.01 0.02 -0.02 
 
Model 8:  OLS regression of control variables on adult child molestation for religious 
tradition*religiosity         
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  13 82.68 6.36 4.72* 
Error 454 611.40 1.35  
Total 467 694.07      
          
R²=.119       
          
 b se(b) B       
            
age  -0.00 0.01 -0.03       
educate -0.15* 0.04 -0.19       
income 0.02 0.03 0.04        
ideology 0.09 0.07 0.06     
sexroles 0.03 0.03 0.05       
abortion -0.06* 0.01 -0.23       
socwlfre 0.05 0.03 0.09   
police 0.00 0.02 0.01 
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Model 9:  OLS regression of control variables on the overall juvenile death penalty scale for 
religious tradition *religiosity        
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  13 3909.87 300.76 8.47* 
Error 454 16116 35.50  
Total 467 20026        
          
R²=.195       
          
 b se(b) B       
             
age  0.02 0.03 0.04    
educate -0.75* 0.20 -0.18      
income 0.34* 0.16 0.10       
ideology 1.16* 0.35 0.16      
sexroles 0.13 0.14 0.04        
abortion -0.37* 0.07 -0.27       
socwlfre 0.32* 0.14 0.11  
police -0.08 0.09 -0.04 
 
Model 10:  OLS regression of control variables on general support for juvenile death penalty for 
religious tradition *religiosity        
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  13 136.48 10.50 7.21* 
Error 454 660.92 1.46        
Total 467 797.41         
          
R²=.171          
          
 b se(b) B       
            
age  0.01 0.01 0.05      
educate -0.07 0.04 -0.09       
income 0.07* 0.03 0.10      
ideology 0.23* 0.07 0.16      
sexroles 0.03 0.03 0.05       
abortion -0.07* 0.01 -0.26       
socwlfre 0.07* 0.03 0.13   
police -0.04* 0.02 -0.10 
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Model 11:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile murder of a criminal justice employee for 
religious tradition *religiosity        
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  13 96.83 7.45 6.97*  
Error 454 484.92 1.07        
Total 467 581.75         
          
R²=.166      
          
 b se(b) B       
            
age  0.00 0.00 0.00      
educate -0.08* 0.04 -0.11       
income 0.08* 0.03 0.14       
ideology 0.15* 0.06 0.12      
sexroles 0.01 0.02 0.03       
abortion -0.05* 0.01 -0.21       
socwlfre 0.07* 0.02 0.14   
police -0.00 0.02 -0.00 
 
Model 12:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile planned murder for religious 
tradition*religiosity         
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  13 118.04 9.08 7.18* 
Error 454 573.93 1.26        
Total 467 691.97        
          
R²=.171        
          
 b se(b) B       
             
age  0.00 0.00 0.00       
educate -0.09* 0.04 -0.11       
income 0.06 0.03 0.09       
ideology 0.18* 0.07 0.13      
sexroles 0.01 0.03 0.03       
abortion -0.05* 0.01 -0.22       
socwlfre 0.08* 0.03 0.14     
police 0.01 0.02 0.02 
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Model 13:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile murder of a child for religious 
tradition*religiosity         
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  13 103.74 7.98 6.78* 
Error 454 534.64 1.18    
Total 467 638.38        
          
R²=.163          
          
 b se(b) B       
            
age  0.00 0.00 0.01       
educate -0.13* 0.04 -0.18       
income 0.07* 0.03 0.11       
ideology 0.24* 0.06 0.18      
sexroles 0.02 0.02 0.03       
abortion -0.05* 0.01 -0.20       
socwlfre 0.04 0.03 0.08     
police -0.00 0.02 -0.00 
 
Model 14:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile unplanned murder for religious 
tradition*religiosity         
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  13 49.43 3.80 4.80* 
Error 454 359.82 0.79       
Total 467 409.25        
          
R²=.121      
          
 b se(b) B       
             
age  0.01* 0.00 0.10       
educate -0.10* 0.03 -0.17       
income 0.04 0.02 0.09       
ideology 0.07 0.05 0.07      
sexroles -0.01 0.02 -0.04       
abortion -0.04* 0.01 -0.21       
socwlfre 0.02 0.02 0.06     
police -0.01 0.01 -0.02 
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Model 15:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile rape for religious tradition*religiosity 
        
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  13 77.11 5.93 5.24* 
Error 454 513.44 1.13       
Total 467 590.56        
  
          
R²=.131     
          
 b se(b) B       
          
age  0.00 0.00 0.03       
educate -0.12* 0.04 -0.17       
income 0.01 0.03 0.02       
ideology 0.15* 0.06 0.12      
sexroles 0.04 0.02 0.08       
abortion -0.05* 0.01 -0.22       
socwlfre 0.03 0.03 0.05     
police -0.03 0.02 -0.08 
 
Model 16:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile child molestation for religious 
tradition*religiosity         
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  13 71.92 5.53 5.20* 
Error 454 483.39 1.06       
Total 467 555.31         
          
R²=.130     
          
 b se(b) B       
          
age  0.00 0.00 0.03       
educate -0.15* 0.04 -0.22       
income 0.01 0.03 0.01       
ideology 0.13* 0.06 0.11      
sexroles 0.03 0.02 0.06       
abortion -0.05* 0.01 -0.24       
socwlfre 0.00 0.02 0.01     
police -0.01 0.02 -0.03 
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Model 17:  OLS regression of control variables on the overall adult death penalty scale for 
membership in a conservative Protestant faith*religiosity 
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  13 4869.80 374.60 9.47* 
Error 622 24617 39.58 
Total 635 29487        
          
R²=.165          
          
 b se(b) B       
             
age  -0.02 0.02 -0.03      
educate -0.51* 0.18 -0.12       
income 0.20 0.15 0.06      
ideology 0.84* 0.30 0.12      
sexroles -0.08 0.12 -0.03       
abortion -0.31* 0.06 -0.22       
socwlfre 0.53* 0.13 0.17     
police 0.13 0.08 0.07 
 
Model 18:  OLS regression of control variables on general support for adult death penalty for 
membership in a conservative Protestant faith*religiosity    
     
 DF SS MS F      
Model  13 182.03 14.00 11.04*  
Error 622 788.66 1.27       
Total 635 970.68        
          
R²=.188          
          
 b se(b) B       
             
age -0.00 0.02 -0.03        
educate -0.02 0.03 -0.03       
income 0.02 0.03 0.03       
ideology 0.16* 0.05 0.12      
sexroles -0.01 0.02 -0.02       
abortion -0.07* 0.01 -0.27       
socwlfre 0.08* 0.02 0.15     
police 0.04* 0.01 0.11 
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Model 19:  OLS regression of control variables on adult murder of a criminal justice employee for 
membership in a conservative Protestant faith*religiosity    
     
 DF SS MS F      
Model  13 136.86 10.53 9.08* 
Error 622 720.85 1.16    
Total 635 857.71         
          
R²=.160       
          
 b se(b) B       
             
age  -0.01 0.00 -0.06      
educate -0.03 0.03 -0.05       
income 0.07* 0.02 0.11      
ideology 0.13* 0.05 0.11      
sexroles -0.01 0.02 -0.02       
abortion -0.03* 0.01 -0.15       
socwlfre 0.09* 0.02 0.16    
police 0.03 0.01 0.07 
 
Model 20:  OLS regression of control variables on adult planned murder for membership in a 
conservative Protestant faith*religiosity      
   
 DF SS MS F      
Model  13 128.79 9.91 7.65*  
Error 622 805.80 1.30        
Total 635 934.58         
          
R²=.138       
          
 b se(b) B       
           
age  -0.01 0.00 -0.05       
educate -0.05 0.03 -0.06       
income 0.03 0.03 0.04       
ideology 0.14* 0.05 0.11      
sexroles -0.02 0.02 -0.04       
abortion -0.05* 0.01 -0.19       
socwlfre 0.09* 0.02 0.17     
police 0.03* 0.01 0.09 
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Model 21:  OLS regression of control variables on adult murder of a child for membership in a 
conservative Protestant faith*religiosity      
   
 DF SS MS F      
Model  13 129.42 9.96 7.45*  
Error 622 830.76 1.34   
Total 635 960.18         
          
R²=.135      
          
 b se(b) B       
           
age  -0.00 0.00 -0.03       
educate -0.06 0.03 0.08       
income 0.04 0.03 0.06      
ideology 0.17* 0.06 0.13      
sexroles -0.02 0.02 -0.04       
abortion -0.04* 0.01 -0.15       
socwlfre 0.07* 0.02 0.13     
police 0.04 0.02 0.10 
 
Model 22:  OLS regression of control variables on adult unplanned murder for membership in a 
conservative Protestant faith*religiosity      
   
 DF SS MS F      
Model  13 73.15 5.63 6.85* 
Error 622 510.62 0.82 
Total 635 583.77        
  
       
R²=.125        
          
 b se(b) B       
             
age  0.00 0.00 0.04      
educate -0.09* 0.03 -0.15       
income 0.03 0.02 0.06       
ideology 0.04 0.04 0.04      
sexroles -0.01 0.02 -0.03       
abortion -0.04* 0.01 -0.21       
socwlfre 0.06* 0.02 0.13     
police 0.02 0.01 0.06 
 
Continued on next page 
 
 140
Appendix G continued 
 
Model 23:  OLS regression of control variables on adult rape for membership in a conservative 
Protestant faith*religiosity         
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  13 82.35 6.33 4.49* 
Error 622 878.34 1.41  
Total 635 960.68         
          
R²=.086          
          
 b se(b) B       
           
age  0.00 0.00 0.01      
educate -0.12* 0.03 -0.16       
income 0.02 0.03 0.02       
ideology 0.12* 0.06 0.09      
sexroles -0.00 0.02 -0.01       
abortion -0.04* 0.01 -0.17*       
socwlfre 0.08* 0.02 0.14     
police -0.01 0.02 -0.03 
 
Model 24:  OLS regression of control variables on adult child molestation for membership in a 
conservative Protestant faith*religiosity      
   
 DF SS MS F      
Model  13 79.20 6.09 4.48* 
Error 622 846.74 1.36        
Total 635 925.94         
          
R²=.086          
          
 b se(b) B       
            
age  -0.00 0.00 0.04      
educate -0.13* 0.03 -0.17       
income 0.00 0.03 0.01       
ideology 0.07 0.06 0.06      
sexroles 0.00 0.02 0.00       
abortion -0.04* 0.01 -0.15       
socwlfre 0.06* 0.02 0.11     
police -0.01 0.02 -0.02 
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Model 25:  OLS regression of control variables on the overall juvenile death penalty scale for 
membership in a conservative Protestant faith*religiosity    
     
 DF SS MS F      
Model  13 4845.68 372.74 10.36* 
Error 622 22382 35.98   
Total 635 27228         
          
R²=.178          
          
 b se(b) B       
           
age  0.02 0.02 0.04      
educate -0.83* 0.17 -0.20       
income 0.31* 0.14 0.09       
ideology 1.12* 0.29 0.16      
sexroles 0.04 0.12 0.01       
abortion -0.30* 0.06 -0.22       
socwlfre 0.51* 0.12 0.17     
police -0.07 0.08 -0.04 
 
Model 26:  OLS regression of control variables on general support for juvenile death penalty for 
membership in a conservative Protestant faith*religiosity    
     
 DF SS MS F      
Model  13 170.37 13.11 9.02*   
Error 622 903.27 1.45        
Total 635 1073.64         
          
R²=.159         
          
 b se(b) B       
          
age  0.01 0.00 0.06       
educate -0.10* 0.03 -0.12       
income 0.08* 0.03 0.11       
ideology 0.17* 0.06 0.13      
sexroles 0.02 0.02 0.04       
abortion -0.06* 0.01 -0.23       
socwlfre 0.11* 0.02 0.19     
police -0.03* 0.02 -0.09 
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Model 27:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile murder of a criminal justice employee for 
membership in a conservative Protestant faith*religiosity    
     
 DF SS MS F      
Model  13 135.00 10.38 9.76* 
Error 622 661.85 1.06       
Total 635 796.85         
          
R²=.169       
          
 b se(b) B       
          
age  -0.00 0.00 -0.01       
educate -0.10* 0.03 -0.13       
income 0.08* 0.02 0.13       
ideology 0.16* 0.05 0.13      
sexroles -0.00 0.02 -0.00       
abortion -0.04* 0.01 -0.17       
socwlfre 0.10* 0.02 0.19     
police 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 
Model 28:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile planned murder for membership in a 
conservative Protestant faith*religiosity      
   
 DF SS MS F      
Model  13 146.60 11.28 9.01* 
Error 622 778.39 1.25       
Total 635 924.99         
          
R²=.159       
          
 b se(b) B       
          
age  -0.00 0.00 -0.01       
educate -0.09* 0.03 -0.12       
income 0.06* 0.03 0.09       
ideology 0.20* 0.05 0.15      
sexroles -0.00 0.02 -0.00       
abortion -0.05* 0.01 -0.20       
socwlfre 0.10* 0.02 0.18     
police 0.01 0.01 0.03 
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Model 29:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile murder of a child for membership in a 
conservative Protestant faith*religiosity      
   
 DF SS MS F      
Model  13 130.84 10.06 8.61* 
Error 622 726.89 1.17        
Total 635 857.73         
          
R²=.153       
          
 b se(b) B       
             
age  0.00 0.00 0.02       
educate -0.13* 0.03 -0.18       
income 0.06* 0.03 0.09       
ideology 0.23* 0.05 0.19      
sexroles 0.00 0.02 0.00       
abortion -0.04* 0.01 0.15       
socwlfre 0.07* 0.02 0.13     
police -0.00 0.01 -0.00 
 
Model 30:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile unplanned murder for membership in a 
conservative Protestant faith*religiosity      
   
 DF SS MS F      
Model  13 71.80 5.52 6.93* 
Error 622 495.86 0.80        
Total 635 567.66        
          
R²=.127       
          
 b se(b) B       
          
age  0.01* 0.00 0.10       
educate -0.12* 0.03 -0.20       
income 0.04* 0.02 0.08       
ideology 0.07 0.04 0.07      
sexroles -0.02 0.02 -0.04       
abortion -0.04* 0.01 -0.19       
socwlfre 0.06* 0.02 0.13     
police -0.00 0.01 -0.01 
 
Continued on next page 
 
 144
Appendix G continued 
 
Model 31:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile rape for membership in a conservative 
Protestant faith*religiosity         
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  13 82.75 6.37 5.57* 
Error 622 710.32 1.14  
Total 635 793.07     
          
R²=.104      
          
 b se(b) B       
           
age  0.00 0.00 0.02      
educate -0.14* 0.03 -0.19       
income 0.01 0.02 0.01       
ideology 0.16* 0.05 0.14      
sexroles 0.02 0.02 0.05       
abortion -0.04* 0.01 -0.19       
socwlfre 0.05* 0.02 0.10     
police -0.03* 0.01 -0.08 
 
Model 32:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile child molestation for membership in a 
conservative Protestant faith*religiosity      
   
 DF SS MS F      
Model  13 71.33 5.49 5.14* 
Error 622 663.89 1.07  
Total 635 735.23        
          
R²=.097         
      
 b se(b) B       
          
age  0.00 0.00 0.04       
educate -0.16* 0.03 -0.23       
income -0.00 0.02 -0.00       
ideology 0.14* 0.05 0.12     
sexroles 0.01 0.02 0.03       
abortion -0.03* 0.01 -0.15       
socwlfre 0.03 0.02 0.06     
police -0.02 0.01 -0.06 
 
*Significant at p<.05 
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Appendix H. OLS Regression of Control Variables on Death Penalty Attitudes Among Whites   
        
          
Model 1:  OLS regression of control variables on the overall adult death penalty scale for religious 
tradition*religiosity among whites       
  
    
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 2997.00 249.75 6.49* 
Error 380 14616 38.46  
Total 392 17613         
          
R²=.170         
          
 b se(b) B       
            
age  0.00 0.03 0.00      
educate -0.48* 0.23 -0.11       
income 0.22 0.18 0.06       
ideology 0.99* 0.40 0.13      
sexroles 0.06 0.16 0.02       
abortion -0.36* 0.08 0.27       
socwlfre 0.55* 0.16 0.18     
police 0.19 0.10 0.09 
 
Model 2:  OLS regression of control variables on general support for adult death penalty for 
religious tradition*religiosity among whites      
  
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 107.09 8.92 7.42* 
Error 380 456.91 1.20 
Total 392 564.00         
          
R²=.190         
          
 b se(b) B       
             
age  0.00 0.01 0.01       
educate -0.01 0.04 -0.01       
income 0.01 0.03 0.02       
ideology 0.21* 0.07 0.15      
sexroles 0.00 0.03 0.00       
abortion -0.07* 0.01 -0.30       
socwlfre 0.10* 0.03 0.18     
police 0.05* 0.02 0.12 
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Model 3:  OLS regression of control variables on adult murder of a criminal justice employee for 
religious tradition *religiosity among whites      
  
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 67.41 5.62 4.96*  
Error 380 430.24 1.13    
Total 392 497.65        
       
R²=.136          
          
 b se(b) B       
             
age  -0.01 0.01 -0.05       
educate -0.03 0.04 -0.04       
income 0.06* 0.03 0.10       
ideology 0.17* 0.07 0.13      
sexroles 0.01 0.03 0.02       
abortion -0.04* 0.01 -0.18       
socwlfre 0.08* 0.03 0.15     
police 0.03 0.02 0.08 
 
Model 4:  OLS regression of control variables on adult planned murder for religious 
tradition*religiosity among whites       
  
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 80.96 6.75 5.39* 
Error 380 475.92 1.25 
Total 392 556.88        
          
R²=.145         
          
 b se(b) B       
            
age  -0.00 0.01 -0.01      
educate -0.05 0.04 -0.06       
income 0.03 0.03 0.05       
ideology 0.16* 0.07 0.12      
sexroles 0.00 0.03 0.00       
abortion -0.05* 0.01 -0.20       
socwlfre 0.10* 0.03 0.18     
police 0.04* 0.02 0.12 
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Model 5:  OLS regression of control variables on adult murder of a child for religious 
tradition*religiosity among whites       
  
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 82.50 6.87 5.41* 
Error 380 483.34 1.27        
Total 392 565.84         
          
R²=.146      
          
 b se(b) B       
            
age  -0.00 0.01 -0.01      
educate -0.06 0.04 -0.08       
income 0.04 0.03 0.06       
ideology 0.19* 0.07 0.14    
sexroles -0.00 0.03 -0.00       
abortion -0.04* 0.01 -0.19      
socwlfre 0.10* 0.03 0.17  
police 0.05* 0.02 0.12 
 
Model 6:  OLS regression of control variables on adult unplanned murder for religious 
tradition*religiosity among whites       
  
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 43.14 3.60 4.69* 
Error 380 291.41 0.77     
Total 392 334.55         
          
R²=.129      
          
 b se(b) B       
            
age  0.00 0.00 0.06      
educate -0.07* 0.03 -0.12       
income 0.03 0.03 0.07      
ideology 0.04 0.06 0.04     
sexroles -0.01 0.02 -0.02     
abortion -0.05* 0.01 -0.26       
socwlfre 0.04 0.02 0.09     
police 0.03 0.01 0.10 
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Model 7:  OLS regression of control variables on adult rape for religious tradition*religiosity 
among whites         
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 54.78 4.56 3.29* 
Error 380 527.55 1.39 
Total 392 582.33        
          
R²=.094          
          
 b se(b) B       
          
age  0.01 0.01 0.06      
educate -0.12* 0.04 -0.15       
income 0.03 0.03 0.04      
ideology 0.11 0.08 0.08    
sexroles 0.02 0.03 0.04       
abortion -0.05* 0.01 -0.21       
socwlfre 0.08* 0.03 0.15   
police -0.00 0.02 -0.00 
 
Model 8:  OLS regression of control variables on adult child molestation for religious 
tradition*religiosity among whites       
  
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 73.37 6.11 4.67*   
Error 380 497.62 1.31  
Total 392 571.00         
          
R²=.129       
          
 b se(b) B       
             
age  -0.00 0.01 -0.02      
educate -0.15* 0.04 -0.19       
income 0.02 0.03 0.03       
ideology 0.11 0.07 0.08      
sexroles 0.03 0.03 0.07       
abortion -0.06* 0.01 -0.26       
socwlfre 0.06* 0.03 0.11     
police 
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Model 9:  OLS regression of control variables on the overall juvenile death penalty scale for 
religious tradition *religiosity among whites      
  
     
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 2982.86 248.57 7.26* 
Error 380 13004 34.22 
Total 392 15987         
          
R²=.187      
          
 b se(b) B       
           
age  0.02 0.03 0.03      
educate -0.72 0.22 -0.18     
income 0.29 0.17 0.09     
ideology 1.30* 0.38* 0.18     
sexroles 0.11 0.15 0.04     
abortion -0.38* 0.07 -0.30     
socwlfre 0.41* 0.15 0.14  
police -0.08 0.10 -0.04 
 
Model 10:  OLS regression of control variables on general support for juvenile death penalty for 
religious tradition*religiosity among whites      
  
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 112.44 9.37 6.65* 
Error 380 535.07 1.41    
Total 392 647.51        
          
R²=6.65      
          
 b se(b) B       
            
age  0.00 0.01 0.04      
educate -0.09* 0.04 -0.11     
income 0.05 0.03 0.08    
ideology 0.27* 0.08 0.18    
sexroles 0.02 0.03 0.04      
abortion -0.07* 0.02 -0.28     
socwlfre 0.09* 0.03 0.16  
police -0.04* 0.02 -0.10 
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Appendix H continued 
 
Model 11:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile murder of a criminal justice employee for 
religious tradition *religiosity among whites      
  
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 71.26 5.94 5.89* 
Error 380 383.05 1.01    
Total 392 454.31       
          
R²=.157      
          
 b se(b) B       
            
age  -0.00 0.00 -0.01       
educate -0.07 0.04 -0.11    
income 0.07* 0.03 0.13    
ideology 0.20* 0.07 0.17    
sexroles 0.01 0.03 0.02      
abortion -0.05* 0.01 -0.25     
socwlfre 0.07* 0.03 0.14  
police -0.00 0.02 -0.00 
 
Model 12:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile planned murder for religious 
tradition*religiosity among whites       
  
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 87.52 7.29 6.15* 
Error 380 450.99 1.19     
Total 392 538.51       
        
R²=.163        
          
 b se(b) B       
            
age  -0.00 0.01 -0.01      
educate -0.06 0.04 -0.09    
income 0.05 0.03 0.08    
ideology 0.20* 0.07 0.15      
sexroles 0.01 0.03 0.02     
abortion -0.06* 0.01 -0.25     
socwlfre 0.09* 0.03 0.17     
police 0.01 0.02 0.04 
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Appendix H continued 
 
Model 13:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile murder of a child for religious 
tradition*religiosity among whites       
  
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 80.77 6.73 5.77* 
Error 380 443.48 1.17     
Total 392 524.25       
          
R²=.154        
          
 b se(b) B       
             
age  -0.00 0.01 -0.01      
educate -0.14* 0.04 -0.19    
income 0.06* 0.03 0.10    
ideology 0.28* 0.07 0.21    
sexroles 0.02 0.03 0.03       
abortion -0.05* 0.01 -0.21     
socwlfre 0.06* 0.03 0.11  
police -0.00 0.02 -0.01 
 
Model 14:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile unplanned murder for religious 
tradition*religiosity among whites        
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 41.24 3.44 4.58* 
Error 380 284.90 0.75   
Total 392 326.14       
          
R²=.126      
          
 b se(b) B       
             
age  0.01 0.00 0.10    
educate -0.09* 0.03 -0.16     
income 0.03 0.03 0.07    
ideology 0.10 0.06 0.09    
sexroles -0.03 0.02 -0.07      
abortion -0.04* 0.01 -0.22    
socwlfre 0.03 0.02 0.07  
police -0.01 0.01 -0.02 
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Appendix H continued 
 
Model 15:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile rape for religious tradition*religiosity 
among whites         
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 56.64 4.72 4.15* 
Error 380 432.43 1.14     
Total 392 489.07       
          
R²=.116      
          
 b se(b) B       
            
age  0.00 0.01 0.03      
educate -0.11* 0.04 -0.15     
income 0.01 0.03 0.01    
ideology 0.14* 0.07 0.11    
sexroles 0.04 0.03 0.08     
abortion -0.05* 0.01 -0.24     
socwlfre 0.05 0.03 0.01  
police -0.03 0.02 -0.07 
 
Model 16:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile child molestation for religious 
tradition*religiosity among whites       
  
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 56.01 4.67 4.49* 
Error 380 394.92 1.04     
Total 392 450.94       
          
R²=.124      
          
 b se(b) B       
            
age  0.00 0.00 0.02       
educate -0.05* 0.04 -0.22     
income 0.01 0.03 0.01       
ideology 0.12 0.07 0.10    
sexroles 0.03 0.03 0.07     
abortion -0.05* 0.01 -0.25     
socwlfre 0.02 0.03 0.04  
police -0.01 0.02 -0.04 
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Model 17:  OLS regression of control variables on the overall adult death penalty scale for 
membership in a conservative Protestant faith*religiosity among whites 
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 3848.27 320.69 8.50* 
Error 506 19089 37.73  
Total 518 22938      
          
R²=.168      
          
 b se(b) B       
           
age  -0.02 0.02 -0.04       
educate -0.47* 0.19 -0.11    
income 0.11 0.16 0.03    
ideology 0.95* 0.34 0.13    
sexroles -0.09 0.14 -0.03   
abortion -0.31 0.07 -0.24    
socwlfre 0.60* 0.14 0.20  
police 0.20* 0.09 0.10 
 
Model 18:  OLS regression of control variables on general support for adult death penalty for 
membership in a conservative Protestant faith*religiosity among whites  
      
 DF SS MS F      
Model  12 155.86 12.99 11.32*  
Error 506 580.59 1.15     
Total 518 736.44        
       
R²=.212        
          
 b se(b) B       
            
age  -0.00 0.00 -0.04      
educate -0.01 0.03 -0.01    
income 0.01 0.03 0.01    
ideology 0.18* 0.06 0.14    
sexroles -0.02 0.02 -0.04     
abortion -0.07* 0.01 -0.30    
socwlfre 0.11 0.02 0.20  
police 0.05 0.02 0.14 
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Model 19:  OLS regression of control variables on adult murder of a criminal justice employee for 
membership in a conservative Protestant faith*religiosity among whites  
      
 DF SS MS F      
Model  12 103.64 8.64 7.78* 
Error 506 561.42 1.11     
Total 518 665.06       
          
R²=.156      
          
 b se(b) B       
           
age  -0.01 0.00 -0.08       
educate -0.04 0.03 -0.05    
income 0.06* 0.03 0.10    
ideology 0.17* 0.06 0.14    
sexroles -0.02 0.02 -0.04     
abortion -0.03* 0.01 -0.15    
socwlfre 0.09* 0.02 0.18  
police 0.03* 0.02 0.09 
 
Model 20:  OLS regression of control variables on adult planned murder for membership in a 
conservative Protestant faith*religiosity among whites    
     
 DF SS MS F      
Model  12 100.34 8.36 6.72* 
Error 506 629.47 1.24     
Total 518 729.81       
          
R²=.138      
          
 b se(b) B       
            
age  -0.00 0.00 -0.04       
educate -0.03 0.03 -0.05    
income 0.01 0.03 0.02    
ideology 0.17* 0.06 0.13    
sexroles -0.02 0.03 -0.04     
abortion -0.04* 0.01 -0.19    
socwlfre 0.09* 0.02 0.17  
police 0.04* 0.02 0.12 
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Model 21:  OLS regression of control variables on adult murder of a child for membership in a 
conservative Protestant faith*religiosity among whites    
     
 DF SS MS F      
Model  12 100.97 8.41 6.68* 
Error 506 637.80 1.26     
Total 518 738.77       
          
R²=.137      
          
 b se(b) B       
           
age  -0.00 0.00 -0.04       
educate -0.05 0.03 -0.07    
income 0.03 0.03 0.04    
ideology 0.16* 0.06 0.13    
sexroles -0.02 0.03 -0.04     
abortion -0.03* 0.01 -0.15    
socwlfre 0.09* 0.03 0.16     
police 0.05* 0.02 0.13 
 
Model 22:  OLS regression of control variables on adult unplanned murder for membership in a 
conservative Protestant faith*religiosity among whites    
     
 DF SS MS F      
Model  12 63.72 5.31 6.75* 
Error 506 398.05 0.79   
Total 518 461.77     
          
R²=.138      
          
 b se(b) B       
             
age  0.00 0.00 0.02       
educate -0.09* 0.03 -0.15     
income 0.02 0.02 0.03    
ideology 0.05 0.05 0.05    
sexroles -0.02 0.02 -0.05     
abortion -0.04* 0.01 -0.22    
socwlfre 0.07* 0.02 0.16  
police 0.03* 0.01 0.10 
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Model 23:  OLS regression of control variables on adult rape for membership in a conservative 
Protestant faith*religiosity among whites 
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 55.82 4.65 3.31*   
Error 506 712.14 1.41  
Total 518 767.96       
          
R²=.073          
       
 b se(b) B       
          
age  0.00 0.00 0.01      
educate -0.12* 0.04 -0.15     
income 0.00 0.03 0.00    
ideology 0.11 0.07 0.09    
sexroles 0.00 0.03 0.01     
abortion -0.05* 0.01 -0.19     
socwlfre 0.08* 0.03 0.15  
police -0.00 0.02 -0.01 
 
Model 24:  OLS regression of control variables on adult child molestation for membership in a 
conservative Protestant faith*religiosity among whites    
     
 DF SS MS F      
Model  12 70.36 5.86 4.43* 
Error 506 669.45 1.32     
Total 518 739.81       
          
R²=.095      
          
 b se(b) B       
           
age  -0.00 0.00 -0.04       
educate -0.13* 0.04 -0.18    
income -0.01 0.03 -0.02    
ideology 0.10 0.06 0.08   
sexroles 0.01 0.03 0.02     
abortion -0.04* 0.01 -0.18     
socwlfre 0.07* 0.03 0.13  
police 
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Model 25:  OLS regression of control variables on the overall juvenile death penalty scale for 
membership in a conservative Protestant faith*religiosity among whites  
      
 DF SS MS F      
Model  12 3912.65 326.05 9.41* 
Error 506 17530 34.64     
Total 518 21443       
          
R²=.183      
          
 b se(b) B       
           
age  0.01 0.02 0.01       
educate -0.76* 0.18 -0.19     
income 0.25 0.15 0.08    
ideology 1.24* 0.33 0.18    
sexroles -0.01 0.13 -0.00     
abortion -0.31* 0.07 -0.24    
socwlfre 0.59* 0.13 0.20  
police -0.03 0.08 0.01 
 
Model 26:  OLS regression of control variables on general support for juvenile death penalty for 
membership in a conservative Protestant faith*religiosity among whites  
      
 DF SS MS F      
Model  12 148.55 12.38 8.74* 
Error 506 716.49 1.42     
Total 518 865.04       
          
R²=.172      
          
 b se(b) B       
            
age  0.01 0.00 0.05       
educate -0.10* 0.04 -0.12     
income 0.07* 0.03 0.10    
ideology 0.21* 0.07 0.15    
sexroles 0.01 0.03 0.01       
abortion -0.07* 0.01 -0.26     
socwlfre 0.13* 0.03 0.22  
police -0.03 0.02 -0.08 
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Model 27:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile murder of a criminal justice employee for 
membership in a conservative Protestant faith*religiosity among whites  
      
 DF SS MS F      
Model  12 107.73 8.98 8.68* 
Error 506 523.32 1.03     
Total 518 631.06       
          
R²=.171      
          
 b se(b) B       
         
age  -0.00 0.00 -0.04      
educate -0.09* 0.03 -0.13    
income 0.07* 0.03 0.12    
ideology 0.21* 0.06 0.18    
sexroles -0.01 0.02 -0.02     
abortion -0.05* 0.01 -0.21    
socwlfre 0.10* 0.02 0.20  
police 0.01 0.01 0.03 
 
Model 28:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile planned murder for membership in a 
conservative Protestant faith*religiosity among whites    
     
 DF SS MS F      
Model  12 119.97 10.00 8.57* 
Error 506 589.99 1.17     
Total 518 709.96       
          
R²=.169      
          
 b se(b) B       
         
age  -0.00 0.00 -0.03      
educate -0.07* 0.03 -0.09    
income 0.05 0.03 0.08    
ideology 0.20* 0.06 0.16    
sexroles -0.01 0.02 -0.02     
abortion -0.05* 0.01 -0.21    
socwlfre 0.11* 0.02 0.20 
police 0.02 0.02 0.05 
 
Continued on next page 
 
 159
Appendix H continued 
 
Model 29:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile murder of a child for membership in a 
conservative Protestant faith*religiosity among whites    
     
 DF SS MS F      
Model  12 107.83 8.99 7.83* 
Error 506 580.86 1.15     
Total 518 688.69       
          
R²=.157      
          
 b se(b) B       
         
age  0.00 0.00 0.00      
educate -0.12* 0.03 -0.17     
income 0.05 0.03 0.09    
ideology 0.25* 0.06 0.21    
sexroles -0.00 0.02 -0.01       
abortion -0.03* 0.01 -0.15    
socwlfre 0.08* 0.02 0.15  
police 0.00 0.02 0.01 
 
Model 30:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile unplanned murder for membership in a 
conservative Protestant faith*religiosity among whites    
     
 DF SS MS F      
Model  12 61.80 5.15 6.63* 
Error 506 393.07 0.78     
Total 518 454.87       
          
R²=.136      
          
 b se(b) B       
          
age  0.01 0.00 0.07      
educate -0.12* 0.03 -0.20     
income 0.03 0.02 0.05    
ideology 0.08 0.05 0.08    
sexroles -0.04 0.02 -0.10     
abortion -0.04* 0.01 -0.19    
socwlfre 0.07* 0.02 0.16  
police 0.00 0.01 0.01 
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Model 31:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile rape for membership in a conservative 
Protestant faith*religiosity among whites 
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 59.25 4.94 4.35* 
Error 506 573.93 1.13     
Total 518 633.18       
          
R²=.094      
          
 b se(b) B       
       
age  0.00 0.00 0.00      
educate -0.12 0.03 -0.17     
income -0.00 0.03 -0.00    
ideology 0.15* 0.06 0.13   
sexroles 0.03 0.02 0.05     
abortion -0.04* 0.01 -0.20     
socwlfre 0.06* 0.02 0.12  
police -0.02 0.02 -0.06 
 
Model 32:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile child molestation for membership in a 
conservative Protestant faith*religiosity among whites    
     
 DF SS MS F      
Model  12 56.19 4.68 4.57* 
Error 506 519.04 1.03     
Total 518 575.23       
          
R²=.098      
          
 b se(b) B       
        
age  0.00 0.00 0.03       
educate -0.15* 0.03 -0.22     
income -0.01 0.03 -0.02    
ideology 0.14* 0.06 0.12   
sexroles 0.02 0.02 0.03     
abortion -0.04* 0.01 -0.17     
socwlfre 0.04 0.02 0.09  
police -0.01 0.01 -0.04 
 
*Significant at p<.05 
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Appendix I. OLS Regression of Control Variables on Death Penalty Attitudes Among Non-whites  
        
          
Model 1:  OLS regression of control variables on the overall adult death penalty scale for religious 
tradition*religiosity among non-whites      
   
 DF SS MS F      
Model  12 905.66 75.47 1.50 
Error 62 3111.86 50.19     
Total 74 4017.52       
          
R²=.225      
          
 b se(b) B       
           
age  -0.04 0.09 -0.06       
educate -0.46 0.71 -0.10    
income 0.82 0.58 0.18    
ideology -0.14 1.00 -0.02    
sexroles -0.02 0.42 -0.01    
abortion -0.30 0.25 -0.16    
socwlfre -0.26 0.50 -0.07  
police -0.37 0.32 -0.15 
 
Model 2:  OLS regression of control variables on general support for adult death penalty for 
religious tradition*religiosity among non-whites     
   
 DF SS MS F      
Model  12 33.47 2.79 1.64 
Error 62 105.25 1.70     
Total 74 138.72       
        
R²=.241        
          
 b se(b) B       
           
age  0.00 0.00 0.02      
educate -0.07 0.13 -0.08     
income 0.24* 0.11 0.28    
ideology 0.11 0.18 0.07    
sexroles 0.05 0.08 0.09      
abortion -0.08 0.05 -0.25     
socwlfre -0.11 0.09 -0.16  
police -0.05 0.06 -0.11 
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Model 3:  OLS regression of control variables on adult murder of a criminal justice employee for 
religious tradition*religiosity among non-whites 
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 20.49 1.71 1.07 
Error 62 98.90 1.60     
Total 74 119.39       
       
R²=.172         
          
 b se(b) B       
         
age  -0.00 0.02 -0.03      
educate 0.01 0.13 0.01    
income 0.14 0.10 0.18     
ideology -0.11 0.18 -0.08    
sexroles 0.03 0.08 0.06    
abortion -0.05 0.05 -0.15     
socwlfre -0.03 0.09 -0.05  
police -0.04 0.06 -0.09 
 
Model 4:  OLS regression of control variables on adult planned murder for religious 
tradition*religiosity among non-whites      
   
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 27.98 2.33 1.36 
Error 62 106.34 1.72     
Total 74 134.32       
        
R²=.208        
          
 b se(b) B       
          
age  -0.02 0.02 -0.15      
educate -0.13 0.13 -0.14    
income 0.13 0.11 0.15    
ideology -0.18 0.18 -0.11    
sexroles -0.04 0.08 -0.08    
abortion -0.06 0.05 -0.17    
socwlfre 0.06 0.09 0.08  
police -0.09 0.06 -0.19 
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Model 5:  OLS regression of control variables on adult murder of a child for religious 
tradition*religiosity among non-whites      
   
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 32.62 2.72 1.61 
Error 62 104.66 1.69     
Total 74 137.28       
          
R²=.238      
          
 b se(b) B       
         
age  -0.00 0.02 -0.02       
educate -0.05 0.13 -0.05    
income 0.10 0.11 0.11    
ideology 0.02 0.18 0.01    
sexroles -0.06 0.08 -0.10     
abortion -0.02 0.05 -0.07    
socwlfre -0.05 0.09 -0.07  
police -0.07 0.06 -0.14 
 
Model 6:  OLS regression of control variables on adult unplanned murder for religious 
tradition*religiosity among non-whites      
   
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 17.35 1.45 1.39 
Error 62 64.57 1.04     
Total 74 81.92       
          
R²=.212      
          
 b se(b) B       
         
age  0.00 0.01 0.02      
educate -0.10 0.10 -0.14     
income 0.14 0.08 0.21    
ideology -0.05 0.14 -0.04    
sexroles 0.02 0.06 0.04    
abortion -0.05 0.04 -0.20     
socwlfre -0.06 0.07 -0.10  
police -0.05 0.05 -0.14 
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Model 7:  OLS regression of control variables on adult rape for religious tradition*religiosity 
among non-whites         
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 17.47 1.46 0.94  
Error 62 96.48 1.56 
Total 74 113.95       
          
R²=.153      
          
 b se(b) B       
           
age  -0.00 0.02 -0.02      
educate -0.04 0.13 -0.05    
income 0.08 0.10 0.10    
ideology 0.13 0.18 0.09    
sexroles -0.02 0.07 -0.04     
abortion -0.01 0.04 -0.04    
socwlfre -0.02 0.09 -0.03   
police -0.07 0.06 -0.16 
 
Model 8:  OLS regression of control variables on adult child molestation for religious 
tradition*religiosity among non-whites      
   
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 14.85 1.24 0.72 
Error 62 107.15 1.73     
Total 74 122.00       
          
R²=.122      
          
 b se(b) B       
         
age  -0.02 0.02 -0.12      
educate -0.10 0.13 -0.11    
income 0.01 0.11 0.01    
ideology -0.06 0.19 -0.04    
sexroles 0.01 0.08 0.02    
abortion -0.02 0.05 -0.07     
socwlfre -0.06 0.09 -0.09  
police -0.02 0.06 -0.04 
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Model 9:  OLS regression of control variables on the overall juvenile death penalty scale for 
religious tradition*religiosity among non-whites     
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 1062.70 88.56 2.06* 
Error 62 2665.64 42.99     
Total 74 3728.35       
          
R²=.285      
          
 b se(b) B       
            
age  0.04 0.08 0.06    
educate -0.52 0.66 -0.11     
income 0.56 0.54 0.13    
ideology 0.47 0.93 0.06    
sexroles 0.37 0.39 0.13      
abortion -0.32 0.24 -0.18     
socwlfre -0.44 0.47 -0.12  
police 
 
Model 10:  OLS regression of control variables on general support for juvenile death penalty for 
religious tradition*religiosity among non-whites     
   
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 45.51 3.79 2.32* 
Error 62 101.16 1.63     
Total 74 146.67       
         
R²=.310       
          
 b se(b) B       
         
age  0.02 0.02 0.16      
educate 0.08 0.13 0.09     
income 0.15 0.10 0.17     
ideology 0.19 0.18 0.12    
sexroles 0.15 0.08 0.25     
abortion -0.06 0.05 -0.17     
socwlfre -0.13 0.09 -0.18  
police -0.05 0.06 -0.11 
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Model 11:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile murder of a criminal justice employee for 
religious tradition*religiosity among non-whites     
   
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 27.23 2.27 1.63 
Error 62 86.16 1.39     
Total 74 113.39       
          
R²=.240         
       
 b se(b) B       
          
age  0.01 0.01 0.06      
educate -0.04 0.12 -0.05     
income 0.11 0.10 0.14    
ideology -0.05 0.17 -0.03    
sexroles 0.03 0.07 0.06    
abortion -0.03 0.04 -0.09     
socwlfre 0.03 0.08 0.05  
police -0.03 0.05 -0.07 
 
Model 12:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile planned murder for religious 
tradition*religiosity among non-whites      
   
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 35.83 2.99 1.78 
Error 62 104.25 1.68     
Total 74 140.08       
          
R²=.256      
          
 b se(b) B       
        
age  0.00 0.02 0.03      
educate -0.15 0.13 -0.17     
income 0.06 0.11 0.07    
ideology 0.03 0.18 0.02    
sexroles 0.05 0.08 0.09     
abortion -0.03 0.05 -0.09     
socwlfre -0.04 0.09 -0.05  
police -0.06 0.06 -0.13 
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Model 13:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile murder of a child for religious 
tradition*religiosity among non-whites      
   
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 25.02 2.09 1.70 
Error 62 75.86 1.22     
Total 74 100.88       
          
R²=.248      
          
 b se(b) B       
           
age  0.00 0.01 0.03      
educate -0.05 0.11 -0.07     
income 0.10 0.09 0.13    
ideology 0.05 0.16 0.04    
sexroles 0.03 0.07 0.06     
abortion -0.05 0.04 -0.16     
socwlfre -0.07 0.08 -0.13  
police -0.01 0.05 -0.04 
 
Model 14:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile unplanned murder for religious 
tradition*religiosity among non-whites      
  
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 24.36 2.03 2.16* 
Error 62 58.23 0.94     
Total 74 82.59       
         
R²=.295       
          
 b se(b) B       
        
age  0.01 0.01 0.06      
educate -0.15 0.10 -0.21     
income 0.15 0.08 0.22    
ideology -0.06 0.14 -0..05    
sexroles 0.05 0.06 0.11    
abortion -0.08* 0.03 -0.30     
socwlfre -0.02 0.07 -0.04  
police -0.03 0.04 -0.09 
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Model 15:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile rape for religious tradition*religiosity 
among non-whites         
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 23.84 1.99 1.76 
Error 62 69.84 1.13     
Total 74 93.68       
          
R²=.255      
          
 b se(b) B       
           
age  -0.00 0.01 -0.02      
educate -0.12 0.11 -0.17    
income 0.03 0.09 0.05    
ideology 0.16 0.15 0.13    
sexroles 0.02 0.06 0.05     
abortion -0.03 0.04 -0.11     
socwlfre -0.09 0.08 -0.16  
police -0.06 0.05 -0.15 
 
Model 16:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile child molestation for religious 
tradition*religiosity among non-whites      
   
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 20.70 1.73 1.30 
Error 62 82.05 1.32     
Total 74 102.75       
          
R²=.202      
          
 b se(b) B       
          
age  0.00 0.01 0.01      
educate -0.10 0.12 -0.12     
income -0.02 0.09 -0.03    
ideology 0.15 0.16 0.11   
sexroles 0.04 0.07 0.09     
abortion -0.05 -0.04 -0.16     
socwlfre -0.12 0.08 -0.19  
police 0.00 0.05 0.01 
 
Continued on next page 
 
 169
Appendix I continued 
 
Model 17:  OLS regression of control variables on the overall adult death penalty scale for 
membership in a conservative Protestant faith*religiosity among non-whites 
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 897.76 74.81 1.57 
Error 104 4969.47 47.78      
Total 116 5867.23       
          
R²=.153      
          
 b se(b) B       
          
age  -0.03 0.06 -0.04      
educate -0.56 0.54 -0.12    
income 0.77 0.41 0.19    
ideology -0.01 0.72 -0.00    
sexroles 0.01 0.29 0.00    
abortion -0.37* 0.17 -0.22     
socwlfre 0.02 0.36 0.00  
police -0.29 0.22 0.13 
 
Model 18:  OLS regression of control variables on general support for adult death penalty for 
membership in a conservative Protestant faith*religiosity among non-whites  
       
 DF SS MS F      
Model  12 27.48 2.29 1.31 
Error 104 181.51 1.75       
Total 116 208.99 
         
R²=.132       
          
 b se(b) B       
             
age  -0.00 0.01 -0.03      
educate -0.09 0.10 -0.10    
income 0.12 0.08 0.16    
ideology -0.01 0.14 -0.01    
sexroles 0.05 0.05 0.10    
abortion -0.07* 0.03 -0.25     
socwlfre -0.07 0.07 -0.11  
police -0.02 0.04 -0.05 
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Model 19:  OLS regression of control variables on adult murder of a criminal justice employee for 
membership in a conservative Protestant faith*religiosity among non-whites  
       
 DF SS MS F      
Model  12 21.87 1.82 1.32 
Error 104 143.36 1.38     
Total 116 165.23       
          
R²=.132      
          
 b se(b) B       
       
age  -0.00 0.01 -0.04      
educate -0.02 0.09 -0.03    
income 0.14* 0.07 0.21    
ideology -0.06 0.12 -0.05    
sexroles 0.03 0.05 0.07     
abortion -0.06* 0.03 -0.22     
socwlfre 0.04 0.06 0.06  
police -0.03 0.04 -0.07 
 
Model 20:  OLS regression of control variables on adult planned murder for membership in a 
conservative Protestant faith*religiosity among non-whites    
     
 DF SS MS F      
Model  12 30.14 2.51 1.61 
Error 104 162.19 1.56     
Total 116 192.32       
          
R²=.157      
          
 b se(b) B       
          
age  -0.02 0.01 -0.15       
educate -0.11 0.10 -0.12    
income 0.12 0.07 0.17    
ideology -0.04 0.13 -0.03    
sexroles -0.02 0.05 -0.04    
abortion -0.08* 0.03 -0.26    
socwlfre 0.07 0.07 0.11  
police -0.03 0.04 -0.07 
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Model 21:  OLS regression of control variables on adult murder of a child for membership in a 
conservative Protestant faith*religiosity among non-whites    
     
 DF SS MS F      
Model  12 31.34 2.61 1.56 
Error 104 174.36 1.68     
Total 116 205.69       
          
R²=.152      
          
 b se(b) B       
           
age  -0.01 0.01 -0.04       
educate -0.07 0.10 -0.08    
income 0.11 0.08 0.15    
ideology 0.09 0.14 0.06    
sexroles -0.00 0.05 -0.06     
abortion -0.06 0.03 -0.20    
socwlfre -0.02 0.07 -0.03  
police -0.03 0.04 -0.07 
 
Model 22:  OLS regression of control variables on adult unplanned murder for membership in a 
conservative Protestant faith*religiosity among non-whites    
     
 DF SS MS F      
Model  12 20.50 1.71 1.86* 
Error 104 95.36 0.92     
Total 116 115.86       
          
R²=.177      
          
 b se(b) B       
         
age  0.01 0.01 0.10      
educate -0.07 0.07 -0.10     
income 0.13* 0.06 0.23    
ideology -0.05 0.10 -0.05    
sexroles 0.01 0.04 0.04    
abortion -0.05 0.02 -0.22     
socwlfre -0.02 0.05 -0.03  
police -0.05 0.03 -0.17 
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Model 23:  OLS regression of control variables on adult rape for membership in a conservative 
Protestant faith*religiosity among non-whites 
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 23.20 1.93 1.29 
Error 104 156.25 1.50     
Total 116 179.45       
          
R²=.129      
          
 b se(b) B       
        
age  0.00 0.01 0.01       
educate -0.10 0.10 -0.11     
income 0.07 0.07 0.10    
ideology 0.12 0.13 0.09    
sexroles -0.02 0.05 -0.04     
abortion -0.04 0.03 -0.13    
socwlfre 0.04 0.06 0.06  
police -0.07 0.04 -0.19 
 
Model 24:  OLS regression of control variables on adult child molestation for membership in a 
conservative Protestant faith*religiosity among non-whites    
     
 DF SS MS F      
Model  12 15.10 1.26 0.79 
Error 104 166.04 1.60     
Total 116 181.15       
          
R²=.083      
          
 b se(b) B       
         
age  -0.01 0.01 -0.06       
educate -0.10 0.10 -0.12    
income 0.07 0.07 0.10    
ideology -0.05 0.13 -0.04    
sexroles -0.02 0.05 -0.04    
abortion -0.02 0.03 -0.06    
socwlfre -0.02 0.07 -0.03  
police -0.06 0.04 -0.16 
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Model 25:  OLS regression of control variables on the overall juvenile death penalty scale for 
membership in a conservative Protestant faith*religiosity among non-whites  
       
 DF SS MS F      
Model  12 1159.54 96.63 2.34* 
Error 104 4294.12 41.29     
Total 116 5453.66       
          
R²=.213      
          
 b se(b) B       
         
age  0.06 0.06 0.09      
educate -0.99 0.50 -0.21     
income 0.71 0.38 0.18    
ideology 0.47 0.67 0.06    
sexroles 0.21 0.27 0.08     
abortion -0.30 0.16 0.19     
socwlfre -0.01 0.34 -0.00   
police -0.37 0.21 -0.17 
 
Model 26:  OLS regression of control variables on general support for juvenile death penalty for 
membership in a conservative Protestant faith*religiosity among non-whites  
       
 DF SS MS F      
Model  12 33.51 2.79 1.71 
Error 104 170.18 1.64     
Total 116 203.69       
          
R²=.165      
          
 b se(b) B       
            
age  0.01 0.01 0.11       
educate -0.06 0.10 -0.07     
income 0.09 0.08 0.12    
ideology 0.05 0.13 0.03    
sexroles 0.08 0.05 0.16     
abortion -0.04 0.03 -0.12     
socwlfre -0.01 0.07 -0.01  
police -0.06 0.04 -0.14 
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Model 27:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile murder of a criminal justice employee for 
membership in a conservative Protestant faith*religiosity among non-whites  
       
 DF SS MS F      
Model  12 24.13 2.01 1.73 
Error 104 121.10 1.16     
Total 116 145.23       
          
R²=.166      
          
 b se(b) B       
         
age  0.01 0.01 0.10       
educate -0.09 0.08 -0.11     
income 0.10 0.06 0.16    
ideology -0.04 0.11 -0.03    
sexroles 0.03 0.04 0.07    
abortion -0.02 0.03 -0.09     
socwlfre 0.05 0.06 0.09  
police -0.04 0.04 -0.11 
 
Model 28:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile planned murder for membership in a 
conservative Protestant faith*religiosity among non-whites    
     
 DF SS MS F      
Model  12 35.91 2.99 1.85* 
Error 104 168.31 1.62     
Total 116 204.22       
          
R²=.176      
          
 b se(b) B       
         
age  0.00 0.01 0.02       
educate -0.18 0.10 -0.20     
income 0.12 0.08 0.16    
ideology 0.12 0.13 0.08    
sexroles 0.02 0.05 0.03     
abortion -0.05 0.03 -0.18     
socwlfre 0.03 0.07 0.04  
police -0.04 0.04 -0.11 
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Model 29:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile murder of a child for membership in a 
conservative Protestant faith*religiosity among non-whites    
     
 DF SS MS F      
Model  12 27.20 2.27 1.80 
Error 104 131.12 1.26     
Total 116 158.32       
          
R²=.172      
          
 b se(b) B       
           
age  0.00 0.01 0.01       
educate -0.17 0.09 -0.21     
income 0.11 0.07 0.17    
ideology 0.09 0.12 0.08    
sexroles 0.02 0.05 0.05     
abortion -0.06* 0.03 -0.23     
socwlfre -0.01 0.06 -0.01  
police -0.03 0.04 -0.09 
 
Model 30:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile unplanned murder for membership in a 
conservative Protestant faith*religiosity among non-whites    
     
 DF SS MS F      
Model  12 28.83 2.40 3.03* 
Error 104 82.42 0.79     
Total 116 111.25       
          
R²=.259      
          
 b se(b) B       
        
age  0.02 0.01 0.18      
educate -0.12 0.07 -0.17     
income 0.14* 0.05 0.25    
ideology -0.02 0.09 -0.02    
sexroles 0.04 0.04 0.12    
abortion -0.05* 0.02 -0.22     
socwlfre -0.01 0.05 -0.02  
police -0.05 0.03 -0.15 
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Model 31:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile rape for membership in a conservative 
Protestant faith*religiosity among non-whites 
          
DF SS MS F      
Model  12 32.79 2.73 2.32* 
Error 104 122.29 1.18     
Total 116 155.08       
          
R²=.211      
          
 b se(b) B       
        
age  0.01 0.01 0.07      
educate -0.20* 0.08 -0.25     
income 0.08 0.06 0.12    
ideology 0.16 0.11 0.13    
sexroles 0.01 0.05 0.02     
abortion -0.05 0.03 -0.17     
socwlfre -0.01 0.06 -0.02  
police -0.08* 0.04 -0.21 
 
Model 32:  OLS regression of control variables on juvenile child molestation for membership in a 
conservative Protestant faith*religiosity among non-whites    
     
 DF SS MS F      
Model  12 22.40 1.87 1.43 
Error 104 135.46 1.30     
Total 116 157.86       
          
R²=.142      
          
 b se(b) B       
         
age  0.01 0.01 0.07       
educate -0.18 0.09 -0.22     
income 0.07 0.07 0.10    
ideology 0.10 0.12 0.08    
sexroles 0.00 0.05 0.01     
abortion -0.03 0.03 -0.10     
socwlfre -0.05 0.06 -0.08  
police -0.06 0.04 -0.17 
 
*Significant at p<.05 
